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Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Praise for A Life of Experimental Economics, Volume II -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Part III East, Southwest, East Again -- 13 Yankee Land -- 14 West with the Night -- 15 Arizona and E-Commerce in the Laboratory -- Some Early Intellectual History -- 16 My Friends Were Finally Right -- 17 Wives, Daughters, and Sons -- Part IV Rethinking Recessions, Markets, Adam Smith and Religion -- 18 Home Again: Chapman University -- 19 Economic Collapse 2007-2008: Would 1929 Be Reborn in Anemic Growth? -- Proposition 1: Severe Economic Recessions Have Their Origin in Household and Bank Balance Sheet Crises -- Proposition 2: Standard Economic Models Do Not Contain Balance Sheets -- Proposition 3: The Great Recession-A Balance Sheet Crisis -- Proposition 4: The Depression-A Balance Sheet Crisis? -- Proposition 5: Policy Experts, Economists, Consumers, and Businesses Were Blindsided by the Great Recession -- Proposition 6: Bernanke's 14 Months of "Liquidity Enhancement"-A Test of the Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis that Liquidity Expansion Can Prevent Depression-Like Episodes? -- Proposition 7: Monetary Policy Is Ineffective in a Balance Sheet Crisis -- Proposition 8: When Monetary Policy Is an Ineffective Economic Stimulant, So Is Government Deficit Spending, and for the Same Reason -- Proposition 9: Housing Expenditures Are a Leading Indicator of Most Economic Recessions -- in Only the Depression and Great Recession Was the End of the Recession Not Accompanied by a Housing Recovery -- Instead, We Remained Stuck in Low Growth -- Proposition 10: Stock Market Crashes Do Not Impact Household and Bank Balance Sheets the Way Housing-Mortgage Market Crashes Do -- Consequently, Loss in Stock Market Value Is Not a Good Indicator of Potential Damage to the Economy from Losses in Housing Val.

This book provides an intimate history of Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith's early life, combining elements of biography, history, economics and philosophy to show how crucial incidents early in his life provided the necessary framework for his research into experimental economics. Smith takes the reader from his family roots on the railroads and oil fields of Middle America to his early life on a farm in Depression-wracked Kansas. A mediocre student in high school, Smith attended Friends University, on Wichita's west side, where an intense study of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and astronomy enabled him to pass the examinations to enter Caltech and study under luminary scientists like Linus Pauling. Eventually Smith discovered economics and pursued graduate study in the field at University of Kansas and Harvard. This volume ends with his Camelot years at Purdue, where he began his famous work in experimental economics, nurturing his research into an unlikely new field of economics.

This book provides an intimate history of Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith's early life, combining elements of biography, history, economics and philosophy to show how crucial incidents early in his life provided the necessary framework for his research into experimental economics. Smith takes the reader from his family roots on the railroads and oil fields of Middle America to his early life on a farm in Depression-wracked Kansas. A mediocre student in high school, Smith attended Friends University, on Wichita's west side, where an intense study of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and astronomy enabled him to pass the examinations to enter Caltech and study under luminary scientists like Linus Pauling. Eventually Smith discovered economics and pursued graduate study in the field at University of Kansas and Harvard. This volume ends with his Camelot years at Purdue, where he began his famous work in experimental economics, nurturing his research into an unlikely new field of economics.

This sequel to A Life of Experimental Economics, Volume I, continues the intimate history of Vernon Smith's personal and professional maturation after a dozen years at Purdue. The scene now shifts to twenty-six transformative years at the University of Arizona, then to George Mason University, and his recognition by the Nobel Prize Committee in 2002. The book ends with his most recent decade at Chapman University. At Arizona Vernon and his students studied asset trading markets and learned how wrong it had been to suppose that price bubbles could not occur where markets were full-information transparent. Their work in computerization of the lab facilitated very complex supply and demand experiments in natural gas pipeline, communication and electricity markets that paved the way for implementing, through decentralized market processes, the liberalization of industries traditionally believed to be "natural" monopolies. The "Smart Computer Assisted Market" was born. Smith's move to George Mason University greatly facilitated government and industry work in tandem with various public and private entities, whereas his relocation to Chapman University coincided with the Great Recession, whose similarity with the Depression was evident in his research. There he integrated two fundamental kinds of markets with laboratory experiments: Consumer non-durables, the supply and demand for which was stable in the lab and in the economy, and durable assets whose bubble tendencies made them unstable in the lab as well as in the economy--witness the great housing-mortgage market bubble run-up of 1997-2007. This book's conversational style and emphasis on the backstory of research accomplishments allows readers an exclusive peak into how and why economists pursue their work. It's a must-read for those interested in experimental economics, the housing crisis, and economic history.--

The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by economic theory, under information conditions far weaker than specified in the theory. In personal, social, and economic exchange, as studied in two-person games, cooperation exceeds the prediction of traditional game theory. This book relates these two findings to field studies and applications and integrates them with the main themes of the Scottish Enlightenment and with the thoughts of F. A. Hayek: through emergent socio-economic institutions and cultural norms, people achieve ends that are unintended and poorly understood. In cultural changes, the role of constructivism, or reason, is to provide variation, and the role of ecological processes is to select the norms and institutions that serve the fitness needs of societies

This second Cambridge University Press collection of papers by Vernon L. Smith, a creator of the field of experimental economics, includes many of his primary authored and coauthored contributions on bargaining and market behavior between 1990 and 1998. The essays explore the use of laboratory experiments to test propositions derived from economics and game theory. They also investigate the relationship between experimental economics and psychology, particularly the field of evolutionary psychology, using the latter to broaden the perspective in which experimental results are interpreted. The volume complements Professor Smith's earlier work by demonstrating the importance of institutional features of markets in understanding behavior and market performance. Specific themes investigated include rational choice, the notion of fairness, game theory and extensive form experimental interactions, institutions and market behavior, and the study of laboratory stock markets

Professor Vernon L. Smith is a major creator of the new discipline of experimental economics. This collection of his papers from 1962 to 1990 surveys key developments in the field from early attempts to study economic behaviour in now classic double oral auction markets through recent studies of industrial organization and decision making. Topics covered include monopoly and oligopoly, supply and demand theory under posted pricing, uniform pricing, double continuous auction, and sealed bid-offer auctions; hypothetical valuation and market pricing; asset price bubbles; predatory pricing; market contestability and natural monopoly; and the methodology of experimental economics. Taken together, the papers form a history of the study of economics under controlled conditions

SUMMARYSince the neoclassical revolution of the 1870s, reasoning and analysis in economic theory has been dominated by utility theory, in which: Action implies Outcome implies Utility. I describe three prominent and unexpected failures of this utilitarian framework to predict the replicable outcomes of experiments. First, in supply and demand experiments for non‐durables the predicted equilibrium obtains, but under conditions violating those thought necessary: complete information, large numbers and price‐taking behavior. The failure is in not accounting for the weak conditions under which equilibrium is actually attained. Second, in asset markets it is thought that price bubbles cannot rationally occur under complete common information on fundamental value. Replicable experiments consistently yield price bubbles in violation of this prediction. Third, in two‐person trust and ultimatum games, equilibrium predicted outcomes failed decisively and massively. The observed failures stem from modelling only the outcome consequences of actions, not "the impulses from which action proceeds." Utility theory rigidly binds the origins of action to their outcome value, thereby trumping alternative mental models of the actor.