Suchergebnisse

In a path-breaking study of Russian elections, Regina Smyth reveals how much electoral competition matters to the Putin regime and how competition leaves Russia more vulnerable to opposition challenges than is perceived in the West. Using original data and analysis, Smyth demonstrates how even weak political opposition can force autocratic incumbents to rethink strategy and find compromises in order to win elections. Smyth challenges conventional notions about Putin's regime, highlighting the vast resources the Kremlin expends to maintain a permanent campaign to construct regime-friendly majorities. These tactics include disinformation as well as symbolic politics, social benefits, repression, and falsification. This book reveals the stresses and challenges of maintaining an electoral authoritarian regime and provides a roadmap to understand how seemingly stable authoritarian systems can fall quickly to popular challenges even when the opposition is weak. A must-read for understanding Russia's future and the role of elections in contemporary autocratic regimes.

In a path-breaking study of Russian elections, Regina Smyth reveals how much electoral competition matters to the Putin regime and how competition leaves Russia more vulnerable to opposition challenges than is perceived in the West. Using original data and analysis, Smyth demonstrates how even weak political opposition can force autocratic incumbents to rethink strategy and find compromises in order to win elections. Smyth challenges conventional notions about Putin's regime, highlighting the vast resources the Kremlin expends to maintain a permanent campaign to construct regime-friendly majorities. These tactics include disinformation as well as symbolic politics, social benefits, repression, and falsification. This book reveals the stresses and challenges of maintaining an electoral authoritarian regime and provides a roadmap to understand how seemingly stable authoritarian systems can fall quickly to popular challenges even when the opposition is weak. A must-read for understanding Russia's future and the role of elections in contemporary autocratic regimes.

Between 2011 and 2016, the Kremlin altered its strategy to maintain elite coherence and shore up social support. The papers presented in this volume argue that these changes in formal rules, informal practices, state policy, and ideational narratives constituted a second authoritarian turn since 2000. In comparison to the first regime shift in the mid-2000s this strategic change combined tactics designed redefine the Kremlin's core support and construct electoral majorities that could deliver victories in the 2016 national parliamentary election and the 2018 presidential election. While the outcome of the 2016 election suggests overwhelming regime success, these papers raise important questions about the long-term efficacies of these strategies, their unintended consequences, and the contradictions that are evident in social attitudes. In the context of the growing literature on contemporary autocracy, these papers present a strong case for increased focus on social attitudes and behaviors as well as the ideational and informal elements of the state's mechanisms to maintain regime stability.

Vladimir Putin remains central to regime stability in the Russian Federation. However, the role that Mr. Putin's personalist appeal—rooted in both charismatic and noncharismatic linkages—plays in maintaining regime support is undertheorized. I argue that personalism is a powerful political resource in electoral authoritarian regimes because it provides a positive logic for skeptical voters to support the leader. Personalist linkages obscure the role that electoral bias plays in shaping electoral outcomes, diminishing the impulse for mass postelection protest. When the effectiveness of personalism declines, discontented citizens are more likely to protest biased elections. This article shows that Mr. Putin's appeal as a sound steward of the economy declined by 2012 but that other sources of issue satisfaction continued to shape some respondents' trust in the president.

ObjectiveIt is widely argued that a primary source of legislative deadlock in America is the combination of a secular increase in polarization, combined with constitutional provisions that divide law‐making power across branches. We argue that polarization affects productivity, but only given a particular pattern of divided government. We distinguish between split branches, where a president from one party faces a Congress controlled by the other, and split chambers, where each party controls one house of Congress.MethodsMultivariate analysis of enactment data from post‐War Congresses, augmented by data on House and Senate Uncovered Sets.ResultsEnactments of major legislation are less likely given split chambers compared to the other options and polarization has no impact after controlling for these factors.ConclusionThese results redefine the conditions under which polarization drives deadlock. They also explain why the increase in polarization over the last two decades has until recently had little impact on major enactments.