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The burden of Salmonella entering pig slaughterhouses across the European Union is considered a primary food safety concern. To assist E.U. member states with the development of national control plans, we have developed a farm transmission model applicable to all member states. It is an individual‐based stochastic susceptible‐infected model that takes into account four different sources of infection of pigs (sows, feed, external contaminants such as rodents, and new stock) and various management practices linked to Salmonella transmission/protection (housing, flooring, feed, all‐in‐all‐out production). A novel development within the model is the assessment of dynamic shedding rates. The results of the model, parameterized for two case study member states (one high and one low prevalence) suggest that breeding herd prevalence is a strong indicator of slaughter pig prevalence. Until a member state's' breeding herd prevalence is brought below 10%, the sow will be the dominant source of infection to pigs raised for meat production; below this level of breeding herd prevalence, feed becomes the dominant force of infection.

Exotic animal diseases (EADs) are characterized by their capacity to spread global distances, causing impacts on animal health and welfare with significant economic consequences. We offer a critique of current import risk analysis approaches employed in the EAD field, focusing on their capacity to assess complex systems at a policy level. To address the shortcomings identified, we propose a novel method providing a systematic analysis of the likelihood of a disease incursion, developed by reference to the multibarrier system employed for the United Kingdom. We apply the network model to a policy‐level risk assessment of classical swine fever (CSF), a notifiable animal disease caused by the CSF virus. In doing so, we document and discuss a sequence of analyses that describe system vulnerabilities and reveal the critical control points (CCPs) for intervention, reducing the likelihood of U.K. pig herds being exposed to the CSF virus.

African swine fever (ASF) is currently spreading westwards throughout Europe and eastwards into China, with cases occurring in both wild boar and domestic pigs. A generic risk assessment framework is used to determine the probability of first infection with ASF virus (ASFV) at a fine spatial scale across European Union Member States. The framework aims to assist risk managers across Europe with their ASF surveillance and intervention activities. Performing the risk assessment at a fine spatial scale allows for hot-spot surveillance, which can aid risk managers by directing surveillance or intervention resources at those areas or pathways deemed most at risk, and hence enables prioritization of limited resources. We use 2018 cases of ASF to estimate prevalence of the disease in both wild boar and pig populations and compute the risk of initial infection for 2019 at a 100 km2 cell resolution via three potential pathways: legal trade in live pigs, natural movement of wild boar, and legal trade in pig meat products. We consider the number of pigs, boar and amount of pig meat entering our area of interest, the prevalence of the disease in the origin country, the probability of exposure of susceptible pigs or boar in the area of interest to introduced infected pigs, boar, or meat from an infected pig, and the probability of transmission to susceptible animals. We provide maps across Europe indicating regions at highest risk of initial infection. Results indicate that the risk of ASF in 2019 was predominantly focused on those regions which already had numerous cases in 2018 (Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and Latvia). The riskiest pathway for ASFV transmission to pigs was the movement of wild boar for Eastern European countries and legal trade of pigs for Western European countries. New infections are more likely to occur in wild boar rather than pigs, for both the pig meat and wild boar movement pathways. Our results provide an opportunity to focus surveillance activities and thus increase our ability to detect ...

African swine fever (ASF) is currently spreading westwards throughout Europe and eastwards into China, with cases occurring in both wild boar and domestic pigs. A generic risk assessment framework is used to determine the probability of first infection with ASF virus (ASFV) at a fine spatial scale across European Union Member States. The framework aims to assist risk managers across Europe with their ASF surveillance and intervention activities. Performing the risk assessment at a fine spatial scale allows for hot-spot surveillance, which can aid risk managers by directing surveillance or intervention resources at those areas or pathways deemed most at risk, and hence enables prioritization of limited resources. We use 2018 cases of ASF to estimate prevalence of the disease in both wild boar and pig populations and compute the risk of initial infection for 2019 at a 100 km(2) cell resolution via three potential pathways: legal trade in live pigs, natural movement of wild boar, and legal trade in pig meat products. We consider the number of pigs, boar and amount of pig meat entering our area of interest, the prevalence of the disease in the origin country, the probability of exposure of susceptible pigs or boar in the area of interest to introduced infected pigs, boar, or meat from an infected pig, and the probability of transmission to susceptible animals. We provide maps across Europe indicating regions at highest risk of initial infection. Results indicate that the risk of ASF in 2019 was predominantly focused on those regions which already had numerous cases in 2018 (Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and Latvia). The riskiest pathway for ASFV transmission to pigs was the movement of wild boar for Eastern European countries and legal trade of pigs for Western European countries. New infections are more likely to occur in wild boar rather than pigs, for both the pig meat and wild boar movement pathways. Our results provide an opportunity to focus surveillance activities and thus increase our ability to ...

AbstractThis article details a systemic analysis of the controls in place and possible interventions available to further reduce the risk of a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom. Using a research‐based network analysis tool, we identify vulnerabilities within the multibarrier control system and their corresponding critical control points (CCPs). CCPs represent opportunities for active intervention that produce the greatest improvement to United Kingdom's resilience to future FMD outbreaks. Using an adapted 'features, events, and processes' (FEPs) methodology and network analysis, our results suggest that movements of animals and goods associated with legal activities significantly influence the system's behavior due to their higher frequency and ability to combine and create scenarios of exposure similar in origin to the U.K. FMD outbreaks of 1967/8 and 2001. The systemic risk assessment highlights areas outside of disease control that are relevant to disease spread. Further, it proves to be a powerful tool for demonstrating the need for implementing disease controls that have not previously been part of the system.

As part of the evidence base for the development of national control plans for Salmonella spp. in pigs for E.U. Member States, a quantitative microbiological risk assessment was funded to support the scientific opinion required by the EC from the European Food Safety Authority. The main aim of the risk assessment was to assess the effectiveness of interventions implemented on‐farm and at the abattoir in reducing human cases of pig meat–borne salmonellosis, and how the effects of these interventions may vary across E.U. Member States. Two case study Member States have been chosen to assess the effect of the interventions investigated. Reducing both breeding herd and slaughter pig prevalence were effective in achieving reductions in the number of expected human illnesses in both case study Member States. However, there is scarce evidence to suggest which specific on‐farm interventions could achieve consistent reductions in either breeding herd or slaughter pig prevalence. Hypothetical reductions in feed contamination rates were important in reducing slaughter pig prevalence for the case study Member State where prevalence of infection was already low, but not for the high‐prevalence case study. The most significant reductions were achieved by a 1‐ or 2‐log decrease of Salmonella contamination of the carcass post‐evisceration; a 1‐log decrease in average contamination produced a 90% reduction in human illness. The intervention analyses suggest that abattoir intervention may be the most effective way to reduce human exposure to Salmonella spp. However, a combined farm/abattoir approach would likely have cumulative benefits. On‐farm intervention is probably most effective at the breeding‐herd level for high‐prevalence Member States; once infection in the breeding herd has been reduced to a low enough level, then feed and biosecurity measures would become increasingly more effective.

In response to the European Food Safety Authority's wish to assess the reduction of human cases of salmonellosis by implementing control measures at different points in the farm‐to‐consumption chain for pork products, a quantitative microbiological risk assessment (QMRA) was developed. The model simulated the occurrence of Salmonella from the farm to consumption of pork cuts, minced meat, and fermented ready‐to‐eat sausage, respectively, and a dose‐response model was used to estimate the probability of illness at consumption.The QMRA has a generic structure with a defined set of variables, whose values are changed according to the E.U. member state (MS) of interest. In this article we demonstrate the use of the QMRA in four MSs, representing different types of countries.The predicted probability of illness from the QMRA was between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 10 million per serving across all three product types. Fermented ready‐to‐eat sausage imposed the highest probability of illness per serving in all countries, whereas the risks per serving of minced meat and pork chops were similar within each MS. For each of the products, the risk varied by a factor of 100 between the four MSs.The influence of lack of information for different variables was assessed by rerunning the model with alternative, more extreme, values. Out of the large number of uncertain variables, only a few of them have a strong influence on the probability of illness, in particular those describing the preparation at home and consumption.

A farm‐to‐consumption quantitative microbiological risk assessment (QMRA) for Salmonella in pigs in the European Union has been developed for the European Food Safety Authority. The primary aim of the QMRA was to assess the impact of hypothetical reductions of slaughter‐pig prevalence and the impact of control measures on the risk of human Salmonella infection. A key consideration during the QMRA development was the characterization of variability between E.U. Member States (MSs), and therefore a generic MS model was developed that accounts for differences in pig production, slaughterhouse practices, and consumption patterns. To demonstrate the parameterization of the model, four case study MSs were selected that illustrate the variability in production of pork meat and products across MSs. For the case study MSs the average probability of illness was estimated to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 10 million servings given consumption of one of the three product types considered (pork cuts, minced meat, and fermented ready‐to‐eat sausages). Further analyses of the farm‐to‐consumption QMRA suggest that the vast majority of human risk derives from infected pigs with a high concentration of Salmonella in their feces (≥104 CFU/g). Therefore, it is concluded that interventions should be focused on either decreasing the level of Salmonella in the feces of infected pigs, the introduction of a control step at the abattoir to reduce the transfer of feces to the exterior of the pig, or a control step to reduce the level of Salmonella on the carcass post‐evisceration.

A circular economy relies on demonstrating the quality and environmental safety of wastes that are recovered and reused as products. Policy-level risk assessments, using generalised exposure scenarios, and informed by stakeholder communities have been used to appraise the acceptability of necessary changes to legislation, allowing wastes to be valued, reused and marketed. Through an extensive risk assessment exercise, summarised in this paper, we explore the burden of proof required to offer safety assurance to consumer and brand-sensitive food sectors in light of attempts to declassify, as wastes, quality-assured, source-segregated compost and anaerobic digestate products in the United Kingdom. We report the residual microbiological and chemical risks estimated for both products in land application scenarios and discuss these in the context of an emerging UK bioeconomy worth £52bn per annum. Using plausible worst case assumptions, as demanded by the quality food sector, risk estimates and hazard quotients were estimated to be low or negligible. For example, the human health risk of E. coli 0157 illness from exposure to microbial residuals in quality-assured composts, through a ready-to-eat vegetable consumption exposure route, was estimated at ~10-8 per person per annum. For anaerobic digestion residues, 7 x10-3 cases of E. coli 0157 were estimated per annum, a potential contribution of 0.0007 percent of total UK cases. Hazard quotients for potential chemical contaminants in both products were insufficient in magnitude to merit detailed quantitative risk assessments. Stakeholder engagement and expert review was also a substantive feature of this study. We conclude that quality assured, source-segregated products applied to land, under UK quality protocols and waste processing standards, pose negligible risks to human, animal, environmental and crop receptors, providing that risk management controls set within the standards and protocols are adhered to.

A circular economy relies on demonstrating the quality and environmental safety of wastes that are recovered and reused as products. Policy-level risk assessments, using generalised exposure scenarios, and informed by stakeholder communities have been used to appraise the acceptability of necessary changes to legislation, allowing wastes to be valued, reused and marketed. Through an extensive risk assessment exercise, summarised in this paper, we explore the burden of proof required to offer safety assurance to consumer and brand-sensitive food sectors in light of attempts to declassify, as wastes, quality-assured, source-segregated compost and anaerobic digestate products in the United Kingdom. We report the residual microbiological and chemical risks estimated for both products in land application scenarios and discuss these in the context of an emerging UK bioeconomy worth £52bn per annum. Using plausible worst case assumptions, as demanded by the quality food sector, risk estimates and hazard quotients were estimated to be low or negligible. For example, the human health risk of E. coli 0157 illness from exposure to microbial residuals in quality-assured composts, through a ready-to-eat vegetable consumption exposure route, was estimated at ~10−8 per person per annum. For anaerobic digestion residues, 7 × 10−3 cases of E. coli 0157 were estimated per annum, a potential contribution of 0.0007% of total UK cases. Hazard quotients for potential chemical contaminants in both products were insufficient in magnitude to merit detailed quantitative risk assessments. Stakeholder engagement and expert review was also a substantive feature of this study. We conclude that quality-assured, source-segregated products applied to land, under UK quality protocols and waste processing standards, pose negligible risks to human, animal, environmental and crop receptors, providing that risk management controls set within the standards and protocols are adhered to.

EFSA received an application from the Dutch Competent Authority, under Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 and Regulation (EU) No 142/2011, for the evaluation of an alternative method for treatment of Category 3 animal by‐products (ABP). It consists of the hydrolysis of the material to short‐carbon chains, resulting in medium‐chain fatty acids that may contain up to 1% hydrolysed protein, for use in animal feed. A physical process, with ultrafiltration followed by nanofiltration to remove hazards, is also used. Process efficacy has been evaluated based on the ability of the membrane barriers to retain potential biological hazards present. Small viruses passing the ultrafiltration membrane will be retained at the nanofiltration step, which represents a Critical Control Point (CCP) in the process. This step requires the Applicant to validate and provide certification for the specific use of the nanofiltration membranes used. Continuous monitoring and membrane integrity tests should be included as control measures in the HACCP plan. The ultrafiltration and nanofiltration techniques are able to remove particles of the size of virus, bacteria and parasites from liquids. If used under controlled and appropriate conditions, the processing methods proposed should reduce the risk in the end product to a degree which is at least equivalent to that achieved with the processing standards laid down in the Regulation for Category 3 material. The possible presence of small bacterial toxins produced during the fermentation steps cannot be avoided by the nanofiltration step and this hazard should be controlled by a CCP elsewhere in the process. The limitations specified in the current legislation and any future modifications in relation to the end use of the product also apply to this alternative process, and no hydrolysed protein of ruminant origin (except ruminant hides and skins) can be included in feed for farmed animals or for aquaculture.