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We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labour market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly non-linear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence.

AbstractInequality indices are traditionally interpreted as measures of deviations from equality. This article interprets them instead as statistical tests for a null of fairness within well-defined income generating processes. We find that the likelihood ratio (LR) test for fairness versus unfairness within two such processes are proportional to Theil's first and second inequality indices respectively. The LR values may be used either as a test statistic or to approximate a Bayes factor that measures the posterior probabilities of the fair version of the processes over that of the unfair. We also apply this perspective to measurement of inequality of opportunity.