Suchergebnisse

Wedle wielu potwierdzających się nawzajem diagnoz, które zaczęły pojawiać się od drugiej połowy XX wieku, żyjemy obecnie w "społeczeństwie spektaklu". To spektakl wyznacza bowiem dominujący model życia społecznego. Rozwój mediów cyfrowych dokonał daleko idącej radykalizacji tej sytuacji, nie zmieniając zasadniczo jej prawdy: wirtualizacja wszechobecnego spektaklu potęguje jego ogólną omnipotencję.
Ta autocharakterystyka najnowszej epoki w dziejach świata przywołuje, ale też radykalizuje znaną skądinąd metaforę theatrum mundi. Pytanie zasadnicze artykułu brzmi następująco: jeśli rzeczywistość jest teatrem, to znaczy grą i nieprawdą, czy i jak możliwa jest dziś jeszcze metafizyka, która z założenia ma być domeną prawdy? Zwrot "metafizyka dziś" można rozumieć wszak wielorako. Jednym z jego znaczeń jest metafizyka tego, co daje (się) widzieć, to znaczy metafizyka dnia. Byłaby ona metafizyką zjawiania się i pokazywania, metafizyką fenomenalności, słowem – metafizyką fenomenologiczną. Powodem wyróżnienia przez autora podejścia fenomenologicznego jest, po pierwsze, to, że głównym tematem fenomenologii jest jawienie się i pokazywanie tego, co się jawi, a po drugie, coraz częściej powtarzane przekonanie, że to jawienie się należy badać nie czysto "teoretycznie", lecz poprzez pełne uważności i zaangażowania, konkretne działanie, które uniemożliwia poznającemu zajmowanie li tylko biernej pozycji widza (jak było dotychczas). Poznawanie to sprawa czynienia. Dlatego to właśnie fenomenologia, rozumiana tutaj jako specyficzne działanie performatywne, wydaje się według autora najlepiej przygotowana do podjęcia metafizycznego wyzwania rzuconego przez spektakularną naturę współczesnej rzeczywistości.

In his original phenomenology of law Adolf Reinach distinguishes among experiences the so-called "social acts". These include acts directed towards other persons that require that the latter acknowledge the communicated contents and assume certain attitudes. Among these acts Reinach mentions there are promises, orders, requests and questions. He argues the promise is the special act that creates the a priori grounds of law. It is to be noted that Reinach's phenomenology of law is of static character (in the Husserlian sense of the word) and therefore it shares all its advantages and disadvantages. In my paper I would like to draw attention to another social act, which can also be attributed to certain law-making activities, especially from the perspective of the genetic phenomenology. It is questioning. At the same time when Reinach was working on his theory of law, his Munich friend, Johannes Daubert (1877–1947), also a student of Theodor Lipps and a friend of Edmund Husserl, who together with Reinach made an "invasion of the Munichs at Göttingen", worked on the first phenomenology of the question. Although he did not refer his research to the phenomenon of law, we can ask whether, like Reinach's deliberations about promises and obligation, it cannot be done. That this is possible to some extent, for example, is evinced by the Hannah Arendt and Klaus Held's phenomenology of the political world. He points out that the public world as such arises from the primordial openness of man, understood as "zoon politikon". This openness might be interpreted as the question which is not so much a single act as it is an attitude. The purpose of the paper is to outline how, while starting with the phenomenological reflection over various types of utterances, one can specify their certain forms and the acts constituting them as well as the attitudes which allow for a priori grounding the phenomenon of law from the perspective of static and genetic phenomenology.

In his original phenomenology of law Adolf Reinach distinguishes among experiences the so-called "social acts". These include acts directed towards other persons that require that the latter acknowledge the communicated contents and assume certain attitudes. Among these acts Reinach mentions there are promises, orders, requests and questions. He argues the promise is the special act that creates the a priori grounds of law. It is to be noted that Reinach's phenomenology of law is of static character (in the Husserlian sense of the word) and therefore it shares all its advantages and disadvantages. In my paper I would like to draw attention to another social act, which can also be attributed to certain law-making activities, especially from the perspective of the genetic phenomenology. It is questioning. At the same time when Reinach was working on his theory of law, his Munich friend, Johannes Daubert (1877–1947), also a student of Theodor Lipps and a friend of Edmund Husserl, who together with Reinach made an "invasion of the Munichs at Göttingen", worked on the first phenomenology of the question. Although he did not refer his research to the phenomenon of law, we can ask whether, like Reinach's deliberations about promises and obligation, it cannot be done. That this is possible to some extent, for example, is evinced by the Hannah Arendt and Klaus Held's phenomenology of the political world. He points out that the public world as such arises from the primordial openness of man, understood as "zoon politikon". This openness might be interpreted as the question which is not so much a single act as it is an attitude. The purpose of the paper is to outline how, while starting with the phenomenological reflection over various types of utterances, one can specify their certain forms and the acts constituting them as well as the attitudes which allow for a priori grounding the phenomenon of law from the perspective of static and genetic phenomenology.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the philosophical and historical sources and concepts of the antinomy of contemporary professionalism. A professional is somebody distinct from a craftsman and a specialist. Professionalism has its roots in the medieval phenomenon of a profession, which refers to the category of an occupation, liberal arts as well as the beginning of universities and a characteristic vision of education. In the 19th century, the understanding of a profession was altered. The development of science and technology, which runs in parallel with the endorsement of materialistic objectivism, resulting in the total separation of reality from the realm of values, contributed to the fact that professionalism was cracking at its seams. In consequence, the contemporary professionalism is endangered by the possibility of losing its essence. The dangers are the following: commercialisation, corporationalism, esoterism, politicalisation, bureaucratization, technocracy and barbarisation.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the philosophical and historical sources and concepts of the antinomy of contemporary professionalism. A professional is somebody distinct from a craftsman and a specialist. Professionalism has its roots in the medieval phenomenon of a profession, which refers to the category of an occupation, liberal arts as well as the beginning of universities and a characteristic vision of education. In the 19th century, the understanding of a profession was altered. The development of science and technology, which runs in parallel with the endorsement of materialistic objectivism, resulting in the total separation of reality from the realm of values, contributed to the fact that professionalism was cracking at its seams. In consequence, the contemporary professionalism is endangered by the possibility of losing its essence. The dangers are the following: commercialisation, corporationalism, esoterism, politicalisation, bureaucratization, technocracy and barbarisation.