Suchergebnisse

This paper proposes a model of turnout in which citizens have a preference for conformism, which adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Under this environment multiple equilibria arise, some that generate a (more realistic) high level of turnout, for a wide rage of parameter values. It is also shown that high levels of turnout are robust to the introduction of asymmetry and heterogeneity in the parameter governing the preference for conformism and with respect to the reference group for conformism. This model suggests that high turnout can only be achieved as the outcome of a particular coordination among citizens and, therefore, introduces a different perspective in understanding the citizens' decision to vote, which allows also to account for large shifts in turnout rates that are observed after compulsory laws have been introduced or abolished. Moreover, this set up proposes a theory for the D term used in rational theories of voting to account for high turnout rates.

AbstractIn this paper, we consider the nonlinear discrete-time dynamic model proposed by Bischi and Baiardi (Chaos Solitons Fractals 79:145-156, 2015a). The model considers players with adaptive adjustment mechanisms towards the best reply and a form of inertia in adopting such mechanism. Moreover, we formulate an extension of the original model, where endogenous market size is considered. Through numerical simulations, we show that multiple attractors may exist in the presence of homogeneous agents and the emergence of non-synchronized trajectories both in the short (on-off intermittency) and long (global riddling) run. Therefore, the article highlights that strategic contexts exist in which the players' knowledge of the market and the adoption of the best reply do not always allow the use of the representative agent's rhetoric to describe the dynamics of the model.

We examine the social dynamics of crime by means of evolutionary game theory, and we model the choice of boundedly rational potential victims to privately self-protect against prospective offenders. Negative externalities from self-protection, as the socially transmitted fear of victimization, can influence the strategic choices of victims even with constant or declining crime rates, and this circumstance may lead to Pareto inefficient equilibria with excessive expenses for private protection. Providing higher levels of public security (or of appropriate social care) financed through discriminatory taxation of private defensive behaviors can prevent crime and reduce superfluous self-protection, thus driving the social dynamics toward a more efficient equilibrium. Public policy can therefore be effective in implementing the social optimum. This article extends previous work by Cressman, Morrison, and Wen by increasing the range of possible dynamics and the scope for public intervention. Consequently, in our model, public policy can deter crime and improve the welfare of victims by addressing the intangible aspects of crime, that is, the social dynamics of fear.