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3 Alternative Historical Explanations and Initial Conditions -- Colonial Legacies -- Mechanisms of Colonial Impact -- The Bourbon Reforms: State Power at the Twilight of Colonial Rule -- Chile -- Colombia -- Peru -- Mexico -- Foundational Wars, New States? -- Post-Independence Crisis -- Education -- Chile -- Colombia -- Mexico -- Peru -- Taxation -- Chile -- Colombia -- Mexico -- Peru -- Monopoly of Force -- Chile -- Colombia -- Mexico -- Peru -- Explaining State Administrative Appointment Practices -- Perceived Threats to Systemic Stability -- Chile -- Mexico -- Peru -- The Place of Traditional Authority in National Projects -- Anti-Traditional Ideology in Liberal Mexico (1857-1876) -- The Absence of Ideology in Porfirian Mexico (1877-1910) -- Accomodationist Ideology in Guano-Era Peru (1845-1875) -- Anti-Traditional Ideology in Postwar Peru (1895-1919) -- The Currency of Patronage -- Political and Federal Patronage in Mexico -- Administrative Patronage in Peru -- Conclusion -- 4 State Projects, Institutions, and Educational Development -- Educational Development and State Power: Dimensions and Indicators -- Indicators of Primary Schooling Provision -- Indicators of Control over Public Primary Schooling -- Comparative Development -- Provision -- Systematization -- Inspection -- Lack of Educational Initiative in Colombia -- A Structural Alternative: Inequality and Education Development -- Deployed Rule and State Power: The Development of School Inspection in Chile -- Institutional Change and Education Development in Peru -- Explaining Cross-State Divergence in Mexican Education -- Statistical Analysis -- Sonora -- Michoacán -- Conclusion -- 5 Political Costs, Infrastructural Obstacles, and Tax State Development -- Operationalizing Tax State Development -- Tax Types -- Tax Burden -- Comparative Development -- Tax Types -- Chile -- Peru -- Colombia.

This article argues that variation in public good provision is determined by the salience of demographic and economic regionalism, conceptualized as the presence of multiple large population centers and distinct economic units within a single country's borders. Two mechanisms—divergent public good preferences and regional self-sufficiency—underpin this relationship. Evidence of these mechanisms as central to low public good provision is found in case studies of Ecuador and Colombia, two countries that score high on standard measures of ethnic diversity and that saw little public good provision during the first century after independence. A region-wide examination of post-independence South America and an investigation of change over time in Venezuela provide further support for the claim that regionalism affects public good provision. A plausible case for this aspect of geography as a cause of low public good provision poses a challenge to the scholarship attributing it to ethnic diversity.

Recent comparative politics scholarship on regime change has not taken state capacity seriously. Prominent works on the relationship between democracy and economic inequality center on the expectation by economic elites that democratization will lead to economic redistribution. But state capacity is necessary for redistribution, and where extractive capacity is lacking, rational economic elites should not fear that suffrage expansion would lead to effective redistribution, nor should the masses expect to gain economically from democratization. State capacity thus acts as a scope condition for the effect of inequality on regime outcomes. This prediction is confirmed through replication and extension of the analysis in Boix (2003), with the addition of the presence of a regularly implemented national census as a proxy for state capacity. In strong states, the effect of inequality on regime change is confirmed. But where the state is weak, inequality is shown to have no effect on regime outcomes. Thus, including state capacity in theories of regime change calls into question general claims about the "economic origins" of dictatorship and democracy. Adapted from the source document.

Despite the fact that critical junctures are frequently deployed in historical analyses, we lack an explicit causal logic for them. This article proposes a distinction between permissive and productive conditions in critical junctures. Permissive conditions are necessary conditions that mark the loosening of constraints on agency or contingency and thus provide the temporal bounds on critical junctures. Productive conditions, which can take various logical forms, act within the context of these permissive conditions to produce divergence. I develop these concepts in detail and use classic analyses that apply the concept to show the implications of this new framework for the scope conditions, case selection, and theoretical completeness of historical analysis, as well as for broader issues in historical analysis such as the relationships between crisis and outcome, and between stability and change.