Suchergebnisse

Niniejszy artykuł przedstawia wyniki kompleksowego badania polskich organizacji imigranckich w Hiszpanii. Analiza opiera się na danych zebranych podczas pogłębionych wywiadów z członkami polskich organizacji imigranckich w tym kraju, przedstawicielami ich otoczenia, ekspertami oraz przedstawicielami administracji hiszpańskiej. Głęboki kryzys ekonomiczny w Hiszpanii wyłania się jako główny element kształtujący kondycję badanych organizacji. Trudna sytuacja gospodarki hiszpańskiej w latach 2008–2014 zasadniczo zmieniła charakterystykę diaspory polskiej (a co za tym idzie, członków i odbiorców organizacji) oraz polityczną strukturę możliwości, w której egzystują stowarzyszenia. Jednocześnie, szersze zmiany w procesie migracji związane z globalizacją i integracją regionalną są postrzegane przez rozmówców jako kluczowe dla transformacji roli pełnionej przez organizacje.


Between Crisis and Transformation: Polish Immigrant Organizations in Spain
This article presents the results of a comprehensive study of Polish immigrant organizations in Spain. The analysis is based on original data collected through in-depth interviews with Polish immigrant organizations' members, representatives of their environment, experts, and representatives of the Spanish administration. The deep economic crisis in Spain emerges as a critical juncture that reshaped the situation of the surveyed organizations. These difficulties are emphasized as the root cause of many of the issues faced by the organizations, both in terms of a decreasing Polish diaspora (and, thus, reduced numbers of members and recipients of the organization) and changes in the political structure of opportunities. At the same time, broader changes in the migration process related to globalization and regional integration are seen as crucial determinants of the changing character of their activities.

European Union (EU) membership constituted an important element for the stabilization and modernization of democratic institutions in post‑1989 Central‑Eastern Europe (CEE). While public opinion support for European integration has not been uniform in the region, trust in European institutions has been consistently higher than confidence in domestic institutions in the region. EU structures and policies have been often perceived as necessary and efficient, especially where domestic institutions were failing. However, the financial andeconomic crisis of the first decade of the 21st century has seriously undermined such perceptions of output legitimacy of EU institutions and, consequently, support for the European integration project and trust in supranational institutions has been eroding in the whole of the EU. In this context, the goal of the article is to explore the possible link between CEE citizens' evaluations of the financial, economic, and political crisis within the EU and their institutional trust in a multilevel political system.

The research undertaken in this thesis aims to move the scholarly debate forward in several ways. Firstly, it offers a multidimensional analysis of the state of European identification, its determinants, contents, and consequences, and addresses the question of the viability of a European identity after the Eastern enlargement. Secondly, it contributes to the theoretical debate on the concept and operationalization of European identity in empirical research by pointing out and explaining relevant East/West differences in this aspect. Finally, it explores the role of affective determinants in the formation of EU support, which has largely been overlooked in scholarship on EU attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. ; El objetivo de esta tesis es contribuir al debate académico en varios aspectos. En primer lugar, ofrece un análisis multidimensional del estado de identificación europea, sus determinantes, el contenido y consecuencias, y aborda la cuestión de la viabilidad de una identidad europea después de la ampliación hacia el Este. En segundo lugar, contribuye al debate teórico sobre el concepto y la operacionalización de identidad europea en la investigación empírica, señalando y explicando las diferencias pertinentes Este/Oeste al respecto. Por último, se explora el papel de los determinantes afectivos en la formación del apoyo a la UE, que han sido en gran medida obviados en los estudios sobre actitudes en Europa central y oriental. ; Tesis Univ. Granada. Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración

The inclusion of 11 new member states from the former Eastern bloc constitutes a significant challenge to the European Union in various respects. Many worry that whatever tenuous 'European identity' existed prior to the eastern enlargement, it has now become so diluted that no meaningful European political community can form. We provide an empirical account of the state of European identity after the eastern enlargement through a comparative analysis of affective and cognitive European identity in the old and the new Central and Eastern European member states. Our empirical analyses indicate that while the overall levels of cognitive European identification in the East are indeed lower than in the West, citizens from new member states are just as attached to Europe as citizens from old member states. Most importantly, not only is there no discernable difference in cognitive identification among young Europeans in East and West, but the youngest in the East seem to be even more strongly attached to Europe than their peers in the West.

En el actual contexto de creciente politización del proceso de integración europea, que ha puestode relieve la importancia de las identidades políticas, el presente trabajo trata la cuestión de laidentidad europea en el sur de Europa. Valiéndonos de los datos del Proyecto IntUne, analizamoslos componentes afectivos y cognitivos que conforman la identidad europea y contrastamosla validez de los distintos modelos explicativos para el caso de las élites y la opinión públicaen España y Portugal. Los resultados confirman un mayor grado de identificación con Europaentre las élites españolas y portuguesas, en comparación con la opinión pública. Asimismo, seratifica que la movilización cognitiva constituye el factor clave para la identificación europeaentre las élites mientras que para la opinión pública lo son las consideraciones utilitaristas. Porúltimo, corroboramos a través de nuestro trabajo cómo la identidad nacional y europea resultan complementarias en un sentido de retroalimentación positiva tanto entre la población como entrelas élites españolas y portuguesas.

"In the context of the debates on the present and future role of the EU in a globalized world, in this chapter we focus on the prospects for a common EU foreign policy as conditioned by the attitudes of elites and public opinion within the enlarged EU. The main objective is to investigate the patterns of support for the European integration project in the area of foreign, defense and security policy. We analyze the data from a cross-national survey among elites and citizens across Europe, and test explanatory models which provide us with valuable information on what factors drive elite and public opinion attitudes on the issue of a common European foreign policy, controlling for the possible difference between new and old EU member states." (publisher's description)

Free movement is simultaneously widely acclaimed and strongly contested in the European Union. To address this apparent contradiction, we unpack European Union freedom of movement into its different transnational rights and argue that opposition is unequal across entitlements. Using evidence from a unique survey conducted in the United Kingdom in 2017, we show that citizens mainly contest welfare access. This transnational right implies costs for the host country and taps into perceptions of belonging and deservingness. Due to its association with ideas of national community and solidarity, access to welfare is more contested even among those who, in principle, should be favourable to such entitlements: inclusive national identifiers and European integration supporters. Our findings underscore the challenge of creating a sense of European community that could underpin all transnational rights implied by the Union's principle of freedom of movement.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) generated an unprecedented contestation across Europe. In this paper, we focus on the sources of such backlash and analyze opinions on free trade and the specific agreement. Not accounting for the fact that these preferences are correlated could lead to biased conclusions about their determinants. To remediate this, we construct a set of bivariate probit models and calculate joint probabilities for the different types of preference configurations. We validate that support for free trade and support for the TTIP have similar, but not identical foundations. Inconsistent preferences are rooted in individual values, EU attitudes, and political cues, as well as treaty partner heuristics. Our innovative empirical approach offers an improved understanding of trade attitudes within EU's multilevel context.

Two principal strands of scholarship analyse the material roots of European Union (EU) dis- content. Some focus on the effects of regional decline, while others examine the role of indi- vidual socioeconomic factors. This paper brings these two perspectives together. We argue that EU discontent is a multifaceted phenomenon structured by the spatially-rooted inter- play between individual and regional material conditions and subjective perceptions. We apply PLS-SEM to Eurobarometer public opinion data (2018–2019) and find that the geo- graphical location and the socioeconomic position shape EU discontent directly. However, material factors' relevance for EU discontent is the greatest in structuring individual future expectations. Furthermore, democratic dissatisfaction turns out to be a key factor, pointing to the importance of institutional perceptions in the geography of discontent

Abstract
Two principal strands of scholarship analyse the material roots of European Union (EU) discontent. Some focus on the effects of regional decline, while others examine the role of individual socioeconomic factors. This paper brings these two perspectives together. We argue that EU discontent is a multifaceted phenomenon structured by the spatially-rooted interplay between individual and regional material conditions and subjective perceptions. We apply PLS-SEM to Eurobarometer public opinion data (2018–2019) and find that the geographical location and the socioeconomic position shape EU discontent directly. However, material factors' relevance for EU discontent is the greatest in structuring individual future expectations. Furthermore, democratic dissatisfaction turns out to be a key factor, pointing to the importance of institutional perceptions in the geography of discontent.