Suchergebnisse

Front Cover -- Front Flap -- Title Page -- Copyright Information -- Table of Contents -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: A Trading Nation for the Twenty-First Century -- Competitiveness and Leadership -- Legitimacy I: Shared Economic Prosperity -- Legitimacy II: Sovereignty and the Regulatory State -- Legitimacy III: The Democratic Deficit Debate -- Political Viability in the Quest for Ratification -- Dilemmas of Trade Governance: Navigating Vexing Trade-Offs -- The Transformation of Japan as a Trading Nation -- Decisiveness/Inclusiveness Dilemmas in Japanese Trade Policy -- Reform/Subsidization Dilemmas in Japanese Trade Policy -- Conclusion: Forging a New Economic Asia-Pacific Order -- Notes -- Index -- Back Flap -- Back Cover.

What explains the pattern of selective business interest in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with active campaigning for and utilization of tariff preferences for some trade agreements, but not others? Under what conditions can business advocates of PTA policy mount an effective lobbying campaign to influence policy outcomes (i.e., shaping decisions onwhoto negotiate with andwhatto negotiate about)? These are important questions given that analyses of Asian PTAs frequently assign a negligible role to business interests either out of apathy or lobbying weakness. To understand the pattern of selective business lobbying for PTAs, I develop a theoretical model with three main independent variables: venue selection, preference intensity, and advocacy effectiveness, and apply it to the case of Japan to test its usefulness. My model shows that the conditions for effective business PTA campaigning are exacting: loss avoidance, high technical expertise, and influence-seeking strategies that maximize access opportunities given institutional constraints. And yet when these factors align, business interests do influence PTA outcomes. My research shows that the current trend to characterize the agency of PTA proliferation as either state-led or business-driven needs to be re-examined as it is more useful to think about state-society constellations in favor or against PTAs.

Political economists have long noted that the prospects for trade liberalization diminish in a climate of economic recession. A stagnant economy intensifies the burden of adjustment for non-competitive sectors and polarizes domestic trade politics. Not surprisingly, the global financial crisis has raised concerns of a substantial protectionist backlash, through the imposition of national measures that circumvent WTO disciplines such as anti-dumping or tied stimulus packages. The impact of economic crisis on regional integration is, however, more ambiguous and has not been explored systematically. On the one hand, policymakers may be pressed to renege on trade liberalization commitments on all fronts - also weakening the momentum to negotiate or implement free trade agreements (FTAs). On the other hand, policymakers may be tempted to 'insulate' their region from adverse global trends and may see FTAs as more amenable to political manipulation that shelters inefficient sectors. In order to shed light on the connection between external crisis and regionalist drive, this article assesses three main challenges East Asian elites confront in devising a regional trade bloc capable of acting as a growth locomotive: institutional fit, multilateralization, and architectural design. The track record of East Asian governments of negotiating FTAs to score diplomatic points abroad and ensure political survival at home - at the expense of maximizing economic gains through far-reaching liberalization - does not bode well for the magnitude of this challenge. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

AbstractJapan's response to the global financial crisis has emphasized global initiatives and downplayed the regional agenda, in sharp contrast with its approach to the Asian financial crisis. This rebalancing in Japan's economic diplomacy reflects the greater political space that it has enjoyed at the global level since its long-held views on the benefits of flexible International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending practices and controls on volatile capital flows became mainstream. Meanwhile, at the regional level Japan faces stiff competition from China in shaping the regional integration agenda and unchartered territory in coleading a multilateral Chiang Mai Initiative. Despite its enhanced profile, Japan's new globalism is uneven: it has made a very significant financial contribution to expand the IMF's resources and to restore trade financing; but Japan has not played a major role in the debate surrounding the most pressing issues of a future financial architecture, such as tackling global imbalances and promoting foreign exchange-rate cooperation. Japan's muted voice, despite its large financial commitments, reflects its difficult adaptation to the G20 summitry process, as well as political volatility at home, which prevents it from developing measures to deal with the global downturn.

Since late 1998, Japan reversed its exclusive support for the multilateral trade regime and endorsed for the first time bilateral and preferential trade pacts, signing one with Singapore, negotiating another with Mexico, and announcing free trade talks with South Korea. The newfound Japanese interest in pursuing free trade agreements (FTAs) therefore represents one of the most significant departures in Japanese trade diplomacy of the past half-century. This article seeks to explain the birth of a preferential trading policy in a country that until recently had been a staunch multilateralist, and to analyze the reasons for the launch of FTA negotiations between Japan and Mexico. Indeed, one of the most remarkable aspects of Japan's new trade bilateralism is its cross-regional orientation, seeking preferential trade with a Latin American nation. Trade negotiations with Mexico are of great consequence to the development of Japan's FTA strategy for one more reason. Japan has embarked on this new regionalism to offset the negative effects of competing FTAs, but at the same time it has tried to minimize agricultural concessions to bilateral trade partners. Mexico is the first large agricultural exporter that Japan has approached for trade negotiations and is therefore an important test for the success of the Japanese FTA strategy.

An unacknowledged key feature of East Asian FTA diplomacy is the region's active cross-regional preferential trading relations. In sharp contrast to the Americas and Europe, where cross-regional initiatives gained strength after the consolidation of regional trade integration, East Asian governments negotiate trade deals with partners outside of their region at an early stage in their FTA policies. The book asks three main questions: Are there regional factors in East Asia encouraging countries to explore cross-regionalism early on? What are the most important criteria behind the cross-regional partner selection? How do cross-regional FTSs (CRTAs) influence their intra-regional trade initiatives? Through detailed country case studies from China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, we show the ways in which these governments seek to leverage their CRTAs in the pursuit of intra-regional trade integration objectives, a process that yields a much more permeated regionalism.