Suchergebnisse

We examine how regional-level political influence affects firm financial performance and survival. Combining representative survey data on mid-sized manufacturing firms in Russia with official registry data, we find that politically influential firms exhibit higher profitability and retain larger financial investments than non-influential firms. At the same time, we find no association between regional political influence and access to bank lending. Most importantly, our empirical analysis suggests that the benefits of influence may be transient. Influential firms experienced significantly lower growth during our 2004–2010 sample period than non-influential firms. Moreover, influential firms had a significantly higher probability of going bankrupt after the 2008 global financial crisis than non-influential firms.

Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups-i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests-have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys-one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises-we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson's hypothesis. Adapted from the source document.

Why are some lobby groups less benign in their external effects than others? Nearly three decades ago, Mancur Olson (1982) proposed that less-encompassing lobby groups with their constituents collectively representing a narrow range of sectors are more apt to seek the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that impose costs on the rest of society. To the best of our knowledge, Olson s oft-cited hypothesis has yet to be actually tested, due perhaps to the absence of adequate data on general policy preferences of various types of lobbies. Thus, we examine a pair of surveys from 2003 and 2004 which were targeted at managers of business associations (lobby groups) and their enterprise constituents to directly test Olson s hypothesis. Managers from a diverse array of Russian industrial firms and business associations were asked similar questions regarding their attitudes to policies that explicitly benefit well-defined sectoral or regional interests and, implicitly, impose external costs. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of less-encompassing associations and the constituent firms of such groups are much more apt to see such policies in a favorable light. In contrast, more-encompassing associations and their member display greater skepticism toward narrowly targeted government interventions. Our results strongly support Olson s hypothesis.