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Most great powers had internationalized coalitions in 1914, but some were stronger than others. In particular the German internationalizers faced heavy industry, militarists, and apostles of Weltpolitik to say nothing of the military itself. Mercantilists were also opposed. China's internationalizers are far stronger than those in Germany in 1914.

Recent commentary on the centenary of World War I evokes similarities between Germany then and China now, and between globalization then and now. The nature of dominant coalitions in both countries provides a conceptual anchor for understanding the links between internal and external politics in 1914 and 2014. Coalitional dynamics draw greater attention to agency in debates that all too often emphasize structure, impersonal forces, and inevitability. Two core claims rest on this basic analytical building block. First, despite apparent similarities in domestic coalitional arrangements of putative revisionist challengers—Germany and China—important differences defy facile analogies. China now is not Germany then. Second, the regional coalitional cluster and the global political economy—and hence the links between domestic and external politics—differ across the two periods. The "world-time" against which coalitions operate today is significantly different as well. Thus ahistorical analogies between then and now may not only be imperfect; they can infuse actors with misguided and perilous protocols for international behavior. There is plenty that may recall World War I today but even more that does not, and all must make sure that gap never narrows.

The Great Recession, Euro contagion, Middle East upheavals, nuclear proliferation, and expansion of rights, among others, highlight the centrality of diffusion to international studies. This Presidential Address outlines building blocks for a shared conceptualization of diffusion that is attentive to the initial stimulus; the medium through which information about the stimuli may/may not travel to other destinations; the political agents un/affected by the stimulus' positive or negative externalities, who aid or block the stimulus' journey to other destinations; and outcomes that enable discrimination among grades of diffusion and resulting equilibria. Various issue areas illustrate how initial stimuli may/may not change preferences, transform identities, trigger emotions, alter strategic choices, and affect outcomes. I advance three related considerations. First, to avoid selection bias, understanding what does not diffuse (the "Vegas counterfactual") should be as central as what does. Concepts such as firewalls and sedimentation are essential for gauging a medium's relative immunity/vulnerability to diffusion. Second, weaving domestic, regional, and global considerations into a single analytical framework reduces omitted variable bias and enables systematic cross-regional comparisons. Third, these building blocks imbue the study of diffusion with political dynamics-entailing strategic interaction, contingency, incomplete information, and unintended effects-that defy determinism, automaticity, or teleology. Similar causal mechanisms may yield different outcomes under different domestic, regional, and global conditions. And different mechanisms may yield similar outcomes under comparable circumstances. I highlight the challenges inherent in assessing the outcomes of diffusion given competing empirical findings, epistemologies, and normative readings of what does/does not and should/should not diffuse, and outline an agenda for future research. © 2012 International Studies Association.

Why do regional institutions emerge, what accounts for their variation in design, and what are their effects? Several conceptual and epistemological perspectives-neorealism, neoliberal-institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics-provide competing and complementary answers to these questions. I focus on regional organizations as productive arenas for developing contingent propositions on institutions more generally. The purpose is to advance cross-paradigmatic dialogue in two ways: through sensitivity to scope conditions and to institutional genesis, forms, and effects, in an effort to transcend axiomatic debates that often conflate different dependent variables. The empirical analysis includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Arab League. The main findings from these cases suggest that understanding the nature of dominant domestic coalitions is often crucial for explaining incentives to create, design, and fine-tune the effects of institutions. However, this is mainly the case when the consequences of creating or designing institutions for power distribution, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate. In many cases these consequences are sizeable, reducing the explanatory influence of domestic coalitions. The latter often provide no more than permissive conditions for the emergence, design, and effect of institutions. Their influence is most decisive in explaining institutional genesis but is often underdetermining in explaining their design. © 2008 International Studies Association.

Athough turmoil characterized both the Middle East and East Asia in the two decades following World War II, the two regions looked dramatically different at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Since 1965 the incidence of interstate wars and militarized conflicts has been nearly five times higher in the Middle East, as was their severity, including the use of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons By contrast, declining militarized conflict and rising intraregional cooperation has replaced earlier patterns in East Asia. There are no systematic efforts explaining this contrast between Bella Levantina and an evolving Pax Asiatica. This article traces these diverging paths to competing domestic models of political survival East Asian leaders pivoted their political control on economic performance and integration in the global economy, whereas Middle East leaders relied on inward-looking self-sufficiency, state and military entrepreneurship, and a related brand of nationalism. I examine permissive and catalytic conditions explaining the models' emergence; their respective intended and unintended effects on states, military, and authoritarian institutions; and their implications for regional conflict. The final section distills conceptual and methodological conclusions.

This article examines the implications of domestic political changes in the post-1997 era for ASEAN's regional cooperation and institutionalization. The conceptual framework traces regional relations to the makeup and grand strategies of domestic coalitions (internationalizing, hybrid, backlash). Had some predictions in the immediate aftermath of the crisis been fulfilled, the advent of domestic backlash coalitions would have portended lower levels of regional cooperation. Alternatively, in the absence of changes in the fundamental nature of most ruling coalitions after the crisis, ASEAN's cooperative thrust was expected to be maintained. The article explores the extent to which ASEAN's activities in the post-crisis era supports either of these two propositions. It finds that a shock of major proportions in Southeast Asia led to some immediate challenges to bilateral relations. At the same time, the aftermath of the crisis led to considerable multilateral and bilateral cooperation on economic issues, expansion, intervention, and security. Furthermore, cooperation may have indeed improved despite subsequent crises, including 9/11 and its aftermath. Yet no linear progression or irrevocable process towards internationalization or regional cooperation can be assumed. Alternative coalitions, and their potential for changing regional trajectories, must be reckoned with. © Oxford University Press and the Japan Association of International Relations 2005, all rights reserved.

The crisis of 1997-98 unleashed the most severe challenge to Southeast Asian ruling coalitions in decades. This article examines the domestic political consequences of the crisis, focusing on continuity and change in fundamental coalitional forms. Despite initial concerns with a potential backlash, internationalizing coalitions stayed the course while adapting to new political-institutional requirements imposed by the growing salience of social dimensions of internationalization. Yet, the longer-term distributional and political effects of the crisis may not be evident for some time. © 2004 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.

The Barcelona process Initiative must be seen as part of a broader design of European Union (EU) evolution in the post-Cold War era, one involving spatial and functional expansion, including efforts to design a common foreign policy. Both classical security issues (the availability of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East, terrorism, oil and natural gas dependencies) and 'new' security issues (migration, drugs, human rights violations, environmental degradation) bear on EU concerns with the political fate of the Mediterranean basin. These concerns led to the Barcelona Declaration or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Initiative, designed to promote peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. Three main processes are critical to the relationship between the industrialized North and the industrializing Mediterranean countries: economic reform, democratization, and the role of multilateral organizations. All three are lagging in the Mediterranean South and East, with important consequences for the conception of a Mediterranean region as a whole. The consequences of this lag have implications for the broader debacle in which the Europeans and the West more generally, find themselves in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation.

International Relations theory has recently turned its attention to the study of comparative regionalism in economics and security. As part of this new research agenda, this article explores what we might learn from the Southern Cone's experience with denuclearization that might be applicable to the Middle East. The two regions differ with respect to security dilemmas, military capabilities and doctrines, and the prior availability of a cooperative regional institutional infrastructure. Yet two aspects of the Southern Cone process seem potentially relevant to other regions. The first relates to improving our understanding of the appropriate domestic political conditions that underpin denuclearization. In particular, the nature of domestic coalitions and of their respective approaches to the global economy and political institutions deserve far more serious consideration than they have gained thus far. The second relates to the nature of the regional denuclearization regime initially fashioned in the Southern Cone, which set an international precedent. A regionally-based system of mutual inspections could help remove some of the most intractable barriers to a future Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

Why do national leaders choose to create a multilateral mechanism for international cooperation? This analysis of the multilateral Arab-Israeli peace negotiations (1993-95) takes stock of the original motivations in launching a multilateral process and of the subsequent development of institutional 'focal points' in five issue areas: Arms Control and Regional Security, Economic Development, Refugees, Water, and the Environment. The multilaterals were designed to provide a supportive framework for the bilateral negotiations, to lubricate the participants' common domestic political and economic agenda, to weaken domestic rivals opposed to the peace process, to enhance the support of the international community, and to provide inducements for inclusion and signal opportunity costs to rejectionists in the region. The multilaterals' preliminary, incipient achievements came about despite continued concerns with 'relative gains', raised mostly by opponents of the peace process. The collapse of bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations (1996-99) doomed this very brief episode of institution-building. Although it is too early to project the direction of the peace process under the new Israeli coalition government led by Ehud Barak, a dedicated effort to resolve outstanding bilateral Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli issues bodes well for a subsequent resumption of multilateral negotiations.

This article examines most significant causes of the development of a weapons industry in Argentina and Brazil. International market and political conditions, domestic economic and political determinants, and regional contextual factors explain the evolution and makeup of the military industrial complex in these countries. The article examines all three sources and provides a summary profile of the arms sector in each country. Developments in the 1980 and early 1990s - domestic, regional, and international - have resultsted in the near-collapse of arms production in Argentina and Brazil. In the last section, the implications of this dramatic contraction are explored.

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CAUSES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WEAPONS INDUSTRY IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. IT PROVIDES A SUMMARY PROFILE OF THE ARMS SECTOR IN EACH COUNTRY. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S HAVE RESULTED IN THE NEAR-COLLAPSE OF ARMS PRODUCTION IN THOSE COUNTRIES. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DRAMATIC CONTRACTION ARE EXPLORED.