Suchergebnisse

Die Auflösung des erfolgreichen Obersten Arbitrage-Gerichts Russlands1 und dessen Fusion mit dem Obersten Gericht des Landes – eine unpopuläre Maßnahme, die Wellen geschlagen hat – ist von wohlinformierten Beobachtern klar als willkürliche politische Entscheidung interpretiert worden. Sie ist in einer Reihe mit anderen Initiativen zum Gerichtswesen zu sehen, die in der jüngsten eher politischen Zwecken dienten, als dass sie die Bedürfnisse der Gerichte oder die Bestrebungen der Gerichtsreformer berücksichtigten.

Die Auflösung des erfolgreichen Obersten Arbitrage-Gerichts Russlands1 und dessen Fusion mit dem Obersten Gericht des Landes – eine unpopuläre Maßnahme, die Wellen geschlagen hat – ist von wohlinformierten Beobachtern klar als willkürliche politische Entscheidung interpretiert worden. Sie ist in einer Reihe mit anderen Initiativen zum Gerichtswesen zu sehen, die in der jüngsten eher politischen Zwecken dienten, als dass sie die Bedürfnisse der Gerichte oder die Bestrebungen der Gerichtsreformer berücksichtigten.

To participate in the global economy authoritarian states are pressed to offer international business a legal order that protects the interests of investors, customers, and sellers, but the creation of a modern legal order threatens to undermine the leaders' control of public life. An increasingly common way to resolve this dilemma, I argue, is developing formal legal institutions that appear to meet world standards, while using informal practices to maintain control over the administration of justice when needed. In this paper I show how the governments of post-Soviet Russia (with its hybrid or competitive authoritarian regime) and the fully authoritarian People's Republic of China as well, have used this approach in their relations with judges and defense lawyers in their respective countries. The analysis underscores the utility of investigating informal practices along with the reform of formal legal institutions, especially in the context of transition.

This article argues that as an interactive, tactical approach to sharing good practices, model courts represent an especially fruitful vehicle for accomplishing judicial reform. This contention is illustrated with an assessment of Canadian and American judicial reform projects in Russia in creating model district courts and diffusing their experience to other courts throughout the country. Mechanisms of diffusion included both a new curriculum for the training of court staff and new instructions for case management, as well as the indirect spread of concepts and practices through social learning. The article goes on to explore the reasons for the success of these projects and the conditions under which the tactical approach is most appropriate.

As in Western democratic governments, so in the Russian Federation legislation is often confined to generalities and delegates to officials the task of creating operational rules. In making those rules they have the discretion to follow their own interests and policy preferences, however defined. But in making rules in Russia, officials face few serious constraints, either in the form of career-related incentives or cultural predispositions; and the interests of Russian officials are more likely to involve informal institutions like clientelistic networks. As a result, they are more likely to impede or distort the implementation of policies through such techniques as selective non-compliance, virtual or creative compliance, and partial or fully manipulated compliance, examples of which are provided in case studies. Adapted from the source document.

The establishment of constitutional review in transitional and nondemocratic regimes has drawn attention to courts in nondemocratic states. Typically, authoritarian leaders treat law and courts in an instrumental fashion and try to keep judges dependent and responsive to their desires. The three books under review reveal the sophisticated ways that this is achieved, including the development ofjudicial bureaucracies and the cultivation of apolitical judges, and how the empowerment ofjudges tends to produce power that is contingent and easily withdrawn. The leaders of established authoritarian regimes do empower judges, if only to gain legitimacy for the regime and keep its officials accountable, but sometimes at a cost to judicial independence. The mixture of independence, power, and accountability ofjudges in authoritarian states differs from what is found in democratic ones, and informal practices often determine the meaning of judicial power. These patterns have serious consequences for legal transition.

A review essay on books by (1) Lisa Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons form Chile (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge U Press, 2007); (2) Tamir Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge U Press, 2007); & (3) Anthony W. Pereira, Political (In)justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (Pittsburgh, PA: U Pittsburg Press, 2005).