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ObjectiveThis article documents wide‐ranging revisions to the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which seeks to maximize the comparability of income inequality estimates for the broadest possible coverage of countries and years.MethodsTwo k‐fold cross‐validations, by observation and by country, are used to evaluate the SWIID's success in predicting the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), recognized in the field as setting the standard for comparability.ResultsThe cross‐validations indicate that the new SWIID's estimates and their uncertainty are even more accurate than previous versions, extending its advantage in comparability over alternate income inequality data sets.ConclusionGiven its superior coverage and comparability, the SWIID remains the optimum source of data for broadly cross‐national research on income inequality.

ObjectiveSince 2008, the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) has provided income inequality data that seek to maximize comparability while providing the broadest possible coverage of countries and years. This article describes the current SWIID's construction, highlighting differences from its original version, and reevaluates the SWIID's utility to cross‐national income inequality research in light of recently available alternatives.MethodsCoverage of inequality data sets is assessed across country‐years; comparability is evaluated in terms of success in predicting the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), recognized in the field as the gold standard in comparability, before those data are released.ResultsThe SWIID offers coverage double that of the next largest income inequality data set, and its record of comparability is three to eight times better than those of alternate data sets.ConclusionsAs its coverage and comparability far exceed those of the alternatives, the SWIID remains better suited for broadly cross‐national research on income inequality than other available sources.

ObjectiveDespite substantial theorizing, the relationship between economic inequality and participation in nonviolent protests has not been satisfactorily examined empirically.MethodsUsing multilevel models of data from four waves of the European Social Survey, this article examines whether differences in inequality across countries and over time help explain people's engagement in peaceful protest.ResultsIt finds that greater inequality reduces protest participation for all those with incomes below the top quintile.ConclusionsThis result provides strong support for the relative power theory of political participation; the predictions of grievance and resource theories regarding inequality's effects on protest are not supported.

Despite much attention to the problematic consequences of authoritarianism, little research focuses on the causes of such unquestioning respect for "proper" authority. Elaborating on the social learning approach to authoritarianism, this article argues that economic inequality within countries shapes individuals' feelings toward authority. As differences in condition increase, so does the relative power of the wealthy. As a result, regardless of their incomes, individuals' experiences are more likely to lead them to view hierarchical relations as natural and, in turn, to hold greater respect for authority. Multilevel models of authoritarianism in countries around the world over three decades support this relative power theory. Adapted from the source document.

Despite much attention to the problematic consequences of authoritarianism, little research focuses on the causes of such unquestioning respect for "proper" authority. Elaborating on the social learning approach to authoritarianism, this article argues that economic inequality within countries shapes individuals' feelings toward authority. As differences in condition increase, so does the relative power of the wealthy. As a result, regardless of their incomes, individuals' experiences are more likely to lead them to view hierarchical relations as natural and, in turn, to hold greater respect for authority. Multilevel models of authoritarianism in countries around the world over three decades support this relative power theory.

Objective. Cross‐national research on the causes and consequences of income inequality has been hindered by the limitations of existing inequality data sets: greater coverage across countries and over time is available from these sources only at the cost of significantly reduced comparability across observations. The goal of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) is to overcome these limitations.Methods. A custom missing‐data algorithm was used to standardize the U.N. University's World Income Inequality Database; data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study served as the standard.Results. The SWIID provides comparable Gini indices of gross and net income inequality for 153 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present, along with estimates of uncertainty in these statistics.Conclusions. By maximizing comparability for the largest possible sample of countries and years, the SWIID is better suited to broad cross‐national research on income inequality than previously available sources.

What effect, if any, does the extent of economic inequality in a country have upon the political engagement of its citizens? This study examines this question using data from multiple cross‐national surveys of the advanced industrial democracies. It tests the theory that greater inequality increases the relative power of the wealthy to shape politics in their own favor against rival arguments that focus on the effects of inequality on citizens' objective interests or the resources they have available for political engagement. The analysis demonstrates that higher levels of income inequality powerfully depress political interest, the frequency of political discussion, and participation in elections among all but the most affluent citizens, providing compelling evidence that greater economic inequality yields greater political inequality.

What accounts for differences in the extent of nationalist sentiments across countries and over time? One prominent argument is that greater economic inequality prompts states to generate more nationalism as a diversion that discourages their citizens from recognizing economic inequality and mobilizing against it. This article provides a first empirical test of this theory against rival explanations based on international conflict and the development of new nations using survey data on national pride in the advanced democracies over two decades, data on economic inequality from the Luxembourg Income Study, and data on international conflict from the Correlates of War project. Only the diversionary theory of nationalism is supported. This conclusion is an important contribution to our understanding of nationalism as well as of the effects of economic inequality on society.