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Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms' competitiveness or profitability. For the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) the empirical literature documents that significant emissions reductions have resulted from it. Surprisingly, however, the literature shows that there have been hardly any concurrent negative effects on firms' competitiveness during the first two phases of the scheme (2005–2012). We show that the main explanations for the absence of negative impacts on competitiveness are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may have limited the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. Several factors suggest that over-allocation is likely to remain substantial in the upcoming periods of the scheme. Therefore, we expect to see no negative competitiveness effects from the EU ETS in Phases III and IV (2013–2030).

Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms' competitiveness or profit-ability. However, the empirical literature shows that hardly any statistically significant effects on firms can be detected for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We explain why there are arguably no significant competitiveness effects on firms, at least not during the first two phases of the scheme (2005-2012). We also reason why the third phase (2013-2020) is likely to reveal similar results. We show that the main explanations for this finding are a large over-allocation of emissions allowances leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through combined with free allocation, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may limit the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far.

Environmental policies may have important consequences for firms' competitiveness or profitability. However, the empirical literature shows that hardly any statistically significant effects on firms can be detected for the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). On the basis of existing literature, we focus on potential explanations for why the empirical literature finds hardly any significant competitiveness effects on firms, least not during the first two phases of the scheme (2005-2012). We also reason why the third phase (2013-2020) could reveal similar results. We show that the main explanations for this finding are a large over-allocation of emissions ertificates leading to a price drop and the ability of firms to pass costs onto consumers in some sectors. Cost pass-through, in turn, partly generated windfall profits. In addition, the relatively low importance of energy costs indicated by their average share in the budgets of most manufacturing industries may limit the impact of the EU ETS. Finally, small but significant stimulating effects on innovation have been found so far. These different aspects may explain why the empirical literature does not find significant effects from the EU ETS on firms' competitiveness.

This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the distributional effects of subsidies for the purchase of alternative vehicles based on an extended version of Hausman's exact consumer surplus. Consistently with economic theory, we estimate changes in household welfare, inequality and social welfare corresponding to different reforms. First, we find that an additional tax on conventional fuel is regressive. However, returning the additional tax revenue via lump-sum transfers can alleviate this effect. Second, when the additional revenue is also used to finance subsidies for electrical and compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles, households that own such vehicles experience welfare gains. However, this policy also increases income inequality and decreases social welfare.

This paper investigates the increase in wage inequality, the decline in collective bargaining, and the development of the gender wage gap in West Germany between 2001 and 2006. Based on detailed linked employer-employee data, we show that wage inequality is rising strongly – driven not only by real wage increases at the top of the wage distribution, but also by real wage losses below the median. Coverage by collective wage bargaining plummets by 16.5 (19.1) percentage points for male (female) employees. Despite these changes, the gender wage gap remains almost constant, with some small gains for women at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution. A sequential decomposition analysis using quantile regression shows that all workplace related effects (firm effects and bargaining effects) and coefficients for personal characteristics contribute strongly to the rise in wage inequality. Among these, the firm coefficients effect dominates, which is almost exclusively driven by wage differences within and between different industries. Labor demand or firm wage policy related effects contribute to an increase in the gender wage gap. Personal characteristics tend to reduce wage inequality for both, males and females, as well as the gender wage gap.

This paper investigates the increase in wage inequality, the decline in collective bargaining, and the development of the gender wage gap in West Germany between 2001 and 2006. Based on detailed linked employer-employee data, we show that wage inequality is rising strongly - driven not only by real wage increases at the top of the wage distribution, but also by real wage losses below the median. Coverage by collective wage bargaining plummets by 16.5 (19.1) percentage points for male (female) employees. Despite these changes, the gender wage gap remains almost constant, with some small gains for women at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution. A sequential decomposition analysis using quantile regression shows that all workplace related effects (firm effects and bargaining effects) and coefficients for personal characteristics contribute strongly to the rise in wage inequality. Among these, the firm coefficients effect dominates, which is almost exclusively driven by wage differences within and between different industries. Labor demand or firm wage policy related effects contribute to an increase in the gender wage gap. Personal characteristics tend to reduce wage inequality for both, males and females, as well as the gender wage gap.