Democratic theory and the crisis of democracy -- Locating the demos -- Democracy against the demos : specters of totalitarianism and the construction of instrumental democracy -- The search for dynamic stability : democracy as a self-regulating system -- Cold War neoliberalism and the capitalist restructuring of democracy -- The erosion of democratic attunement and the crisis of democracy.
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Democratic Theory and the Crisis of Democracy -- Chapter 2. Locating the Demos -- Chapter 3. Democracy against the Demos: Specters of Totalitarianism and the Construction of Instrumental Democracy -- Chapter 4. The Search for Dynamic Stability: Democracy as a Self-Regulating System -- Chapter 5. Cold War Neoliberalism and the Capitalist Restructuring of Democracy -- Chapter 6. The Erosion of Democratic Attunement and the Crisis of Democracy -- Chapter 7. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- Back Cover.
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This article suggests that a "crisis of democracy" can be understood not simply as a deterioration of specific representative institutions but as a repositioning of democratic politics vis-à-vis other principles of social coordination, most notably the capitalist market, and the attendant decline of democratic subjectivity—people's attunement to claims appealing to the common good. I trace this process to the post–World War II era. I show that the crisis of democracy was shaped by the substantive imperative of fusing democracy with free-market capitalism. Many postwar democratic theorists believed that the welfare state could manage the tension latent in this fusion. But an analysis of Friedrich Hayek's theory of neoliberal democracy, which recognizes that tension more acutely, reveals that the incorporation of free-market capitalism creates tendencies that undermine democracy from within.
In her recent essay, Jessica Whyte has challenged the tendency to repurpose Friedrich Hayek's thought for a progressive and participatory politics. Objecting to such thinkers as Michel Foucault and William Connolly who find inspiration in Hayek's critique of the monolithic political sovereign and his defense of spontaneous order, Whyte contends that his neoliberalism is actually predicated on the cultivation of politically submissive subjectivity and the curtailment of democratic politics. While agreeing with her substantive conclusions, I suggest that her conceptual frame centered on the themes of invisibility and providentialism is limited in explaining Hayek's ideas and, more generally, the operation of neoliberalism. Pace Whyte, I argue that Hayek's neoliberalism does not simply stave off political challenges by obfuscation, but wages an active and highly visible campaign to recruit and interpellate individuals as market subjects.
In his recent essay, Mark Wenman highlighted parallels between Connolly's theory of pluralism and earlier iterations of pluralism in the postwar period and the early twentieth century. Focusing on his account of postwar pluralism and especially his interpretation of Dahl, I argue that Dahl's vision of democracy as polyarchy is fundamentally at odds with Connolly's. A close reading of Dahl's text and a consideration of the historical context suggest that Dahl's theory effectively creates a depoliticized world where citizens are unresponsive to claims about alternative possibilities of democratic life.
Both "populism" and "populist" have long been considered ill-defined terms, and therefore are regularly misapplied in both scholarly and popular discourses.1 This definitional difficulty is exacerbated by the Babelian confusion of voices on populism, where the term's meaning differs within and between global regions (e.g. Latin America versus Western Europe); time periods (e.g. 1930s versus the present), and classifications (e.g. left/ right, authoritarian/libertarian, pluralist/antipluralist, as well as strains that muddy these distinctions such as homonationalism, xenophobic feminism and multicultural neonationalism). While useful efforts have been made to navigate the vast and heterogeneous conceptual terrain of populism,2 they rarely engage with each other. The result is a dizzying proliferation of different definitions unaccompanied by an understanding as to how they might speak to each other. And this conceptual fragmentation reinforces, and is reinforced by, diverging assessments of populism which tend to cast it as either "good" or "bad" for democracy (e.g. Dzur and Hendriks 2018; Müller 2015).
