Suchergebnisse

In this study, Tom Sorell seeks to rehabilitate views that are often instantly dismissed in analytic philosophy. His book serves as a reinterpretation of Cartesianism and responds directly to the dislike of Descartes in contemporary philosophy. To identify what is defensible in Cartesianism, Sorell starts with a picture of unreconstructed Cartesianism, which is characterized as realistic, antisceptical but respectful of scepticism, rationalist, centered on the first person, dualist, and dubious of the comprehensiveness of natural science and its supposed independence of metaphysics. Bridging the gap between history of philosophy and analytic philosophy, Sorell also shows for the first time how some contemporary analytic philosophy is deeply Cartesian, despite its outward hostility to Cartesianism

I. The science of politics and the unity of science -- II. The parts of science and the methods of science -- III. Knowledge and power in fallen man - IV. Two problems with demonstrative science -- V. First principles, first causes and the sciences of motion -- VI. Motion, phantasms and the objects of sense -- VII. Sense, thought and motivation -- VIII. The pursuit of felicity and the good of survival -- IX. Absolute submission, undivided sovereignty -- X. Sedition, submission and science.

Abstract
This paper considers the question of how police-related AI projects and data projects in general are normatively assessed in the UK. After locating data ethics in relation to policing ethics, I shall consider the workings of perhaps the leading regional data ethics committee in the UK. I go on to consider the approach of another committee that might in the future provide national data ethics advice for the police. Finally, I summarize the normative ethics frameworks in use in the two committees and their heavy reliance on the concepts of necessity and proportionality. I suggest that these concepts may have to be supplemented by systematic thinking about varieties of harm and the way in which severe harm may generate obligations to prevent it, where prevention may be assisted by AI models.

Carl Schmitt reads Hobbes as a philosopher who thinks that politics is a response to emergency, and Schmitt adapts what he takes to be Hobbesian ideas to give a politics of emergency of his own, one that was supposed to have particular relevance to the upheavals of the Weimar Republic. I shall consider how Schmitt's theory might apply to at least one recent emergency. I shall claim that when applied it has considerable shortcomings, but that these are not always inherited from Hobbes. ; Carl Schmitt bere Hobbesa kot fdozofa, ki misli, daje politika odgovor na izredne razmere, in prikroji, kar ima za Hobbesove ideje, da bi izdelal lastno politiko izrednih razmer, ki naj bi bila posebej pomembna glede na pretrese weimarske republike. Avtor postavlja vprašanje, ali je Schmittovo teorijo mogoče uporabiti za vsaj ene današnje izredne razmere, in v odgovoru na to vprašanje trdi, da v tem primeru ta teorija pokaže nezanemarljive pomanjkljivosti, ki pa niso vedno podedovane po Hobbesu.

Carl Schmitt reads Hobbes as a philosopher who thinks that politics is a response to emergency, & Schmitt adapts what he takes to be Hobbesian ideas to give a politics of emergency of his own, one that was supposed to have particular relevance to the upheavals of the Weimar Republic. I shall consider how Schmitt's theory might apply to at least one recent emergency. I shall claim that when applied it has considerable shortcomings, but that these are not always inherited from Hobbes. Adapted from the source document.