Global Health Security Agenda and the International Health Regulations: Moving Forward
In: Biosecurity and bioterrorism: biodefense strategy, practice and science, Band 12, Heft 5, S. 231-238
ISSN: 1557-850X
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In: Biosecurity and bioterrorism: biodefense strategy, practice and science, Band 12, Heft 5, S. 231-238
ISSN: 1557-850X
In: Health security, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 11-15
ISSN: 2326-5108
The deteriorating political and economic situation in Venezuela has ramifications far beyond the Latin American country's borders as almost five million Venezuelans fled and migrated into countries in the region due to the crisis at home. The scarcity of health services, the lack of information sharing, and the absence of reliable data in Venezuela create challenges for confronting developing health emergencies and disease outbreaks. The need for accurate data is especially dire given the current COVID-19 pandemic and evolving movement of refugees. While countries and international organizations came together to form a coordinated response to Venezuela's political and humanitarian crisis, this geopolitical progress is threatened by the rapid spread of COVID-19, and the instinct for countries to focus inwards on domestic response priorities, rather than engage in regional cooperation. It is critical that the international community set aside geopolitical differences and cooperate to seek an accurate picture of the conditions on the ground to improve the welfare of Venezuelan migrants and to provide a more robust response to the current pandemic.
BASE
Cooperative bioengagement efforts, as practiced by U.S. government-funded entities, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, the State Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program, and parallel programs in other countries, exist at the nexus between public health and security. These programs have an explicit emphasis on developing projects that address the priorities of the partner country as well as the donor. While the objectives of cooperative bioengagement programs focus on reducing the potential for accidental or intentional misuse and/or release of dangerous biological agents, many partner countries are interested in bioengagement as a means to improve basic public health capacities. This article examines the extent to which cooperative bioengagement projects address public health capacity building under the revised International Health Regulations and alignment with the Global Health Security Agenda action packages.
BASE
Cooperative bioengagement efforts, as practiced by U.S. government-funded entities, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Cooperative Biological Engagement Program, the State Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program, and parallel programs in other countries, exist at the nexus between public health and security. These programs have an explicit emphasis on developing projects that address the priorities of the partner country as well as the donor. While the objectives of cooperative bioengagement programs focus on reducing the potential for accidental or intentional misuse and/or release of dangerous biological agents, many partner countries are interested in bioengagement as a means to improve basic public health capacities. This article examines the extent to which cooperative bioengagement projects address public health capacity building under the revised International Health Regulations and alignment with the Global Health Security Agenda action packages.
BASE
Early detection of emerging disease events is a priority focus area for cooperative bioengagement programs. Communication and coordination among national disease surveillance and response networks are essential for timely detection and control of a public health event. Although systematic information sharing between the human and animal health sectors can help stakeholders detect and respond to zoonotic diseases rapidly, resource constraints, and other barriers often prevent efficient cross-sector reporting. The purpose of this research project was to map the laboratory and surveillance networks currently in place for detecting and reporting priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan in order to identify the nodes of communication, coordination, and decision-making where health and veterinary sectors intersect, and to identify priorities and gaps that limit information sharing for action. We selected three zoonotic diseases as case studies: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, rabies, and brucellosis. Through meetings with government agencies and health officials, and desk research, we mapped each system from the index case through response – including both surveillance and laboratory networks, highlighting both areas of strength and those that would benefit from capacity-building resources. Our major findings indicate informal communication exists across sectors; in the event of emergence of one of the priority zoonoses studied, there is effective coordination across the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. However, routine formal coordination is lacking. Overall, there is a strong desire and commitment for multi-sectoral coordination in detection and response to zoonoses across public health and veterinary sectors. Our analysis indicates that the networks developed in response to HPAI can and should be leveraged to develop a comprehensive laboratory and surveillance One Health network.
BASE
Early detection of emerging disease events is a priority focus area for cooperative bioengagement programs. Communication and coordination among national disease surveillance and response networks are essential for timely detection and control of a public health event. Although systematic information sharing between the human and animal health sectors can help stakeholders detect and respond to zoonotic diseases rapidly, resource constraints and other barriers often prevent efficient cross-sector reporting. The purpose of this research project was to map the laboratory and surveillance networks currently in place for detecting and reporting priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan in order to identify the nodes of communication, coordination, and decision-making where health and veterinary sectors intersect, and to identify priorities and gaps that limit information-sharing for action. We selected three zoonotic diseases as case studies: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, rabies, and brucellosis. Through meetings with government agencies and health officials, and desk research, we mapped each system from the index case through response – including both surveillance and laboratory networks, highlighting both areas of strength and those that would benefit from capacity-building resources. Our major findings indicate informal communication exists across sectors; in the event of emergence of one of the priority zoonoses studied there is effective coordination across the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. However, routine formal coordination is lacking. Overall, there is a strong desire and commitment for multi-sectoral coordination in detection and response to zoonoses across public health and veterinary sectors. Our analysis indicates that the networks developed in response to HPAI can and should be leveraged to develop a comprehensive laboratory and surveillance One Health network.
BASE
To guide One Health capacity building efforts in the Republic of Guinea in the wake of the 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, we sought to identify and assess the existing systems and structures for zoonotic disease detection and control. We partnered with the government ministries responsible for human, animal, and environmental health to identify a list of zoonotic diseases – rabies, anthrax, brucellosis, viral hemorrhagic fevers, trypanosomiasis and highly pathogenic avian influenza – as the country's top priorities. We used each priority disease as a case study to identify existing processes for prevention, surveillance, diagnosis, laboratory confirmation, reporting and response across the three ministries. Results were used to produce disease-specific systems "maps" emphasizing linkages across the systems, as well as opportunities for improvement. We identified brucellosis as a particularly neglected condition. Past efforts to build avian influenza capabilities, which had degraded substantially in less than a decade, highlighted the challenge of sustainability. We observed a keen interest across sectors to reinvigorate national rabies control, and given the regional and global support for One Health approaches to rabies elimination, rabies could serve as an ideal disease to test incipient One Health coordination mechanisms and procedures. Overall, we identified five major categories of gaps and challenges: (1) Coordination; (2) Training; (3) Infrastructure; (4) Public Awareness; and (5) Research. We developed and prioritized recommendations to address the gaps, estimated the level of resource investment needed, and estimated a timeline for implementation. These prioritized recommendations can be used by the Government of Guinea to plan strategically for future One Health efforts, ideally under the auspices of the national One Health Platform. This work demonstrates an effective methodology for mapping systems and structures for zoonotic diseases, and the benefit of conducting a baseline review of ...
BASE
In the wake of the 2014–2016, West Africa Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak, the Government of Guinea recognized an opportunity to strengthen its national laboratory system, incorporating capacity and investments developed during the response. The Ministry of Health (MOH) identified creation of a holistic, safe, secure, and timely national specimen referral system as a priority for improved detection and confirmation of priority diseases, in line with national Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response guidelines. The project consisted of two parts, each led by different implementing partners working collaboratively together and with the Ministry of Health: the development and approval of a national specimen referral policy, and pilot implementation of a specimen referral system, modeled on the policy, in three prefectures. This paper describes the successful execution of the project, highlighting the opportunities and challenges of building sustainable health systems capacity during and after public health emergencies, and provides lessons learned for strengthening national capabilities for surveillance and disease diagnosis.
BASE
In: International journal of emergency management: IJEM, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 179
ISSN: 1741-5071
In: International journal of emergency management: IJEM, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 179
ISSN: 1741-5071
Confronts the world's key global security issues and challenges in the twenty-first centuryProvides a comprehensive analysis of core global security challenges of the 21st Century with emphasis on the third decadeTraverses a range of analyses across the spectrum between core global security challenges (environment, WMDS, health, gender, great power politics, etc) with ongoing theoretical debates (critical theoretical approaches, traditional orthodox approaches)Encompasses a diverse range of emerging, middle and senior academics from around the world, covering a multitude of topics in the global security domainProvides a much-needed re-assessment amidst one of the most defining global junctures in 21st Century, if not the last 70 plus yearsThis book presents a range of analyses across the security spectrum, bringing a deep understanding of core global security challenges into contention with ongoing theoretical debates between critical and traditional approaches. Chapters analyse the evolving and shifting dynamics of geopolitics, prolonged armed conflicts, large-scale public health emergencies, and economic fractures. Additionally, authors discuss climate shocks, deepening social and economic inequity, trends in nationalism and populism, gendered violence, as well as challenges pertaining to cyber insecurity, emerging technologies, nuclear weapons, and global terrorism. The book illustrates these unparalleled circumstances, taken together with the epochal juncture expressed in the global pandemic, have evolved and coalesced to redefine the many complexities and oscillations of global security
In: Health security, Band 18, Heft S1, S. S-34-S-42
ISSN: 2326-5108