Suchergebnisse

This article examines the arbitrary and oftentimes violent nature of loyalty and belonging in the case of Syria but with applicability to other authoritarian or high-surveillance contexts. It shows how the new "settlement of status" process is an extension of the governmentality of violence used by the Syrian regime to delineate loyal citizens from traitors. However, the article argues that this process is Janus-faced and actually serves to undermine the regime in the long run by destabilizing its surety around who is considered loyal and who is a potential threat. This uncertainty has the potential to sow the seeds for greater dissent and with it, act as one possible catalyst for the regime's eventual collapse. The Syrian case offers broader insights into the various social and political permutations of a citizen's relationship to the state and how that relationship can be impacted over time by the state's use of fear and violence as mechanisms for social control.

Abstract
This article examines the arbitrary and oftentimes violent nature of loyalty and belonging in the case of Syria but with applicability to other authoritarian or high-surveillance contexts. It shows how the new "settlement of status" process is an extension of the governmentality of violence used by the Syrian regime to delineate loyal citizens from traitors. However, the article argues that this process is Janus-faced and actually serves to undermine the regime in the long run by destabilizing its surety around who is considered loyal and who is a potential threat. This uncertainty has the potential to sow the seeds for greater dissent and with it, act as one possible catalyst for the regime's eventual collapse. The Syrian case offers broader insights into the various social and political permutations of a citizen's relationship to the state and how that relationship can be impacted over time by the state's use of fear and violence as mechanisms for social control.

Ceasefire agreements are legally governed by international humanitarian law because they have generally been considered in relation to how they affect levels of violence. However, new research in the fields of anthropology, security, and development studies suggests that ceasefires can have many more ramifications. These range from their ability to influence governance institutions, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security mechanisms. Consequently, this article suggests that a broader legal framework is needed through which to consider ceasefires and their consequences. While canvassing the option of ceasefires being types of contractual documents or as special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the article concludes that the best way to regulate ceasefire agreements is through an expanded version of lex pacificatoria. Rather than being governed by hard international law, such a move would allow for the implementation of more flexible programmatic standards to influence the myriad ways ceasefires are negotiated, the conduct of belligerents, and their diverse effects on the ground during wartime.

This paper views cease-fires as being multifaceted with the potential for having diverse consequences for rebel governance development. It uses the February 2016 cease-fire for Syria as a lens through which to examine the interplay of order and violence at the national level on the development of local governance institutions in Syria's southern Dara'a province. It argues that cease-fires do not simply end or freeze hostilities but rather are political instruments that recalibrate complex systems of layered governance.

During the Syrian civil war the gap left by the state in providing legal identity documentation has been filled by other actors. This has forced Syrians to navigate a course through webs of interlocking identity documents to garner small benefits and manage substantial risks. The situation disproportionately affects Syrian women, particularly their parental, inheritance, and property rights.
In addition to the Syrian state, the Islamic State, the Syrian Interim Government/Syrian National Coalition, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's Salvation Government, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, and Turkey in the northern Euphrates Shield zone have all issued legal identity documentation at various times during the Syrian civil war.
People need life-cycle events documented to ensure they and their children do not become stateless; to access humanitarian aid, local justice mechanisms, healthcare, and education; to ensure freedom of movement through internal checkpoints; and to conduct trade or real estate transactions.
Driven primarily by necessity, many Syrians are attempting to access official, forged, or fraudulent documents through an expensive and unreliable underworld of brokers (samasira).
Lack of documentation can mean Syrian women whose husbands have been killed, disappeared, displaced, or conscripted into the military are particularly at risk of losing or being unable to access property rights to which they are entitled.
The problem of access to and/or lack of official identity documentation is a ticking time bomb that could lead to an entire generation of Syrians being undocumented.
External states should advocate that the Syrian regime recognise prima facie the details of life-cycle events and property transactions contained in documents issued by non-state actors. This would ensure that future generations of Syrians have access to documentary evidence of these events. It would also minimise the long-term, cascading effects caused by lack of documentation.