Suchergebnisse

Maastricht will induce changes to the EC budget the various dimensions of which are explored in this volume. Based on the theory of fiscal federalism the author discusses important aspects of multilayer government finance for existing federations - Australia, Germany, Switzerland and the USA. He sketches the effects of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) onto the Community budget, and concludes with a systematic treatment of revenue instruments for its future financing.

The development of the European Community is likely to be financed through expansion of tax sharing on VAT and by introducing general-revenue sharing indirectly. Tax sharing on VAT does not necessarily imply the harmonisation of tax rates, however. Other options for revenue equalisation schemes are the transfer of tax bases to the centre that exhibits implicit distributional effects. It is argued that capital taxation is the Achilles heel of any future tax system given the fact that—in globalised capital markets—effective marginal tax rates will more and more influence the international flow of capital, a phenomenon that forces governments into tax competition through market processes. A cash-flow corporation tax seems to be likely to become more and more prominent as an alternative to comprehensive capital income taxation. Applied at the Community level such a tax could serve as an implicit equalisation scheme that fosters developing regions by exempting new investment while taxing the proceeds from the more mature economic areas in the EC. It would also be neutral as to investment and financing decisions and it would attract savings funds from abroad to be invested in the Community. As far as explicit equalisation is concerned, it is argued that differentials among regions are best dealt with by a system of matching grants that concentrate on aspects of allocation rather than by general-revenue redistribution. Harmonisation of personal income taxation in Europe could also be achieved by introducing a piggyback tax onto the income tax system which taxes personal consumption at a flat rate. Shifting the centre of gravitation within these two-tiers of income–consumption taxation would allow national governments to maintain their sovereignty as regards allocative and distributive policy. The consumption tax part could also form the nucleus of a future supranational direct tax.

"Die Reform der Gemeindefinanzen ist von bleibender Aktualität. Bei der Reform muß als oberstes Ziel die verfassungsmäßig garantierte Selbstverwaltung der Gemeinden stehen, die sich auch auf die Einnahmeseite des Budgets erstreckt. Die vordringlichste Aufgabe bleibt die Reform der Gewerbesteuer. Dabei muß die Gewerbekapitalsteuer als die mit den größeren Problemen behaftete Teilsteuer abgeschafft und die verbleibende Gewerbeertragssteuer zu einer 'veredelten' Gewerbesteuer ausgebaut werden. Ziel der 'Veredelung' ist die Verbreiterung der Steuerbasis, sowohl hinsichtlich der Zahl der besteuerbaren Aktivitäten als auch hinsichtlich der Bemessungsgrundlage im Unternehmen selbst. Verbleibende Wettbewerbsverzerrungen im internationalen Kontext können durch eine Verzahnung der reformierten Gewerbesteuer mit der Mehrwertsteuer abgebaut werden. Auch kann die Steuer so konzipiert werden, daß sowohl eine Präferenzierung der Kapitalbildung erreicht wird als auch ein inplizites strukturpolitisches Programm. Zur Stärkung der allokationspolitischen Funktionen der Gemeinden können weitere Steuern Verwendung finden, so insbesondere die Kraftfahrzeugsteuer. Auch erscheinen die sogenannten 'Bagatellsteuern' im Lichte der Theorie des Finanzförderalismus auf gemeindlicher Ebene eher von Vorteil. Ihre Beseitigung war aus diesem Grund wohl ein etwas voreiliger Schritt." (Autorenreferat)

Abstract: Certain aspects of the new Australian tax sharing arrangements are analysed against the background of West German experiences. Emphasis is laid on Federal‐State relations in outlining the basic characteristics of the German machinery and the Australian arrangements. Compared to the Australian situation, the tax sharing base in West Germany is much broader and has indeed contributed to the safeguarding of State autonomy to a large extent. On the other hand, the German States have no individual power to legislate on taxes or tax surcharges. Although tax sharing is a powerful instrument in mitigating financial imbalances in a federation, it tends to conflict with the idea of a centrally controlled stabilization and distribution policy. In Germany, tax sharing is complemented by a complex coordination machinery stabilizing joint decision making of the Federal government and the States. In areas such as demand management, financial planning and allocation policies there seems to be need for such complementary arrangements, since tax sharing alone cannot achieve sufficient coordination among the different administrative levels of a federation.