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Abstract
As in other industrialized countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870s. Cartels, and the public policy toward them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided into several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anticartel policy. The liberal economists' opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists- economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed "excessive" market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hands-off approach, in accordance with their employers' preferences.

Just like in other industrial countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870 decade. Cartels, and the public policy towards them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided in several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anti-cartel policy. The liberal economists'opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists-economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed 'excessive' market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hand-off approach, in accordance with their employers'preferences.

Just like in other industrial countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870 decade. Cartels, and the public policy towards them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided in several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anti-cartel policy. The liberal economists'opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists-economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed 'excessive' market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hand-off approach, in accordance with their employers'preferences.

Just like in other industrial countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870 decade. Cartels, and the public policy towards them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided in several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anti-cartel policy. The liberal economists'opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists-economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed 'excessive' market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hand-off approach, in accordance with their employers'preferences.

Just like in other industrial countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870 decade. Cartels, and the public policy towards them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided in several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anti-cartel policy. The liberal economists'opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists-economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed 'excessive' market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hand-off approach, in accordance with their employers'preferences.

Just like in other industrial countries, cartelization was widespread in France after the 1870 decade. Cartels, and the public policy towards them, were frequently addressed in the public debate. This article deals with the stance taken by French economists on this subject until the Great Depression. Although they were divided in several groups that were in sharp disagreement on most scientific and policy issues, French economists were almost united in their lack of support for anti-cartel policy. The liberal economists'opposition stemmed from their general hostility to government intervention. Unlike in the English-speaking world, where many economists otherwise critical of government gradually became supportive of antitrust after mounting evidence had revealed the scope of certain kinds of exclusionary behavior, the French liberal economists remained constant in their opposition. The more reform-minded university professors, as well as the sociologists-economists of the Durkheimian school, were unenthusiastic about policies meant to safeguard competition because they viewed 'excessive' market competition as destabilizing and wasteful. Finally, the most prominent experts in industrial economics, who were employed by large companies or professional organizations, also advocated a hand-off approach, in accordance with their employers'preferences.

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communicationbetween competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocationmechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communicationbetween competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocationmechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communicationbetween competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocationmechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communicationbetween competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocationmechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communicationbetween competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocationmechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

A firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. This strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers. In addition, allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms' incentives to exclude rivals, because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the transfer of another firm's profits.