Suchergebnisse

AbstractInitial literature on the 'European refugee crisis' discerned intergovernmental tendencies in its management. This paper examines whether neofunctionalism may be able to explain a major case of 'European refugee crisis' policy‐making, the negotiations on the European Border and Coast Guard regulation. We argue, somewhat counterintuitively, that the theory considerably furthers our respective understanding. The crisis acted as a catalyst exposing the weaknesses of a system that pitted a supranational Schengen against a largely intergovernmental external border regime, notwithstanding a developing Frontex. These dysfunctionalities have been widely fostered by both national and supranational decision‐makers shrinking from the significant economic, political and sunk costs of Schengen disintegration, thus ruling out the possibility for spillback. Additionally, further integration was substantially nurtured by supranational agency, 'socialized' national civil servants, transnational NGOs and European business associations.