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Posting commentary via social media can have very real consequences, and these can drive how users navigate the world of social media. The aim of this article is to develop a deeper appreciation of how users comprehend their security and privacy within their social media interactions. I turn to Anderson's work on street life in attempting to draw upon the decisions made in navigating particular environments—especially those with associated risks. This I argue is similar to how users rationalize their social media behavior to protect themselves and/or view others. Both are learned behaviors that are at times habituated, reactionary, or temporary in the face of heightened threats. Using findings from 27 interviews with UK social media users, I present three codes that may be useful in framing just how users navigate and comprehend their experiences of social media privacy and security.

In this paper I look at a farm that diversified its business and within this process bought a secondhand sausage vacuum filler. I do this in order to question how this machine came to be understood and valued by the farmers who bought it. The themes discussed include the role of the machine in changing the working practices of the farm, as well as factors unknown when buying secondhand—purchasers can only ever truly know the reliability and levels of performance of the machine retrospectively. While much work has considered the secondhand cultures of goods such as clothes, brick-a-brac, or cars, the departure I make here is to consider goods bought and used in commercial contexts. I consider the calculations made when a secondhand commodity is invested with the risks and tensions of expanding a business. There are critical and additional pressures resting on the machine: for example, if the machine fails to work, it may be detrimental to the business. The paper focuses on the appreciations of two farmers and how the machine they bought was used and appreciated.

This paper focuses on surveillant relations between citizens and police. We consider how online platforms enable the public to support the task of policing, as well as empowering the public to work without and beyond the police. While community-supported policing interventions are not new, more recently mobile and accessible technologies have promoted and enabled a DIY (Do-It-Yourself) culture towards policing amongst the public. The paper examines watch groups or those who task themselves with monitoring suspicious or actual behaviours. We consider two empirical examples: first, a community alert group mediated through social media. Second, a group of businesses that circulate, via a website, CCTV images of (alleged) wrongdoing in their premises. Drawing on David Garland's (1996) work on responsibilisation, we situate the growth of these types of responsibilised groups within the contemporary economic and political climate of crime control in the UK. We argue that citizens are establishing new surveillant relations that are pushing policing in new and evolving directions.

This paper focuses on surveillant relations between citizens and police. We consider how online platforms enable the public to support the task of policing, as well as empowering the public to work without and beyond the police. While community-supported policing interventions are not new, more recently mobile and accessible technologies have promoted and enabled a DIY (Do-It-Yourself) culture towards policing among the public. The paper examines watch groups or those who task themselves with monitoring suspicious or actual behaviours. We consider two empirical examples; first, a community alert group mediated through social media. Second, a group of businesses that circulate, via a website, CCTV images of (alleged) wrong-doing in their premises. Drawing on David Garland's (1996) work on responsibilisation, we situate the growth of these types of responsibilised groups within the contemporary economic and political climate of crime control in the UK. We argue that citizens are establishing new surveillant relations that are pushing policing in new and evolving directions.

This chapter considers Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as a viable tool for academic research. To date, journalist, campaigners or concerned consumers have been to the forefront in using FOIs to gain information on issues as diverse as politician's expenses, the cost of policing a royal event or the levels of food hygiene in restaurants. Yet this line of enquiry appears to be infrequently used by academic researchers. The chapter concentrates on the UK and will offer 5 areas for consideration. Firstly, we consider the value of FOIs as a research tool. Secondly, we reflect upon some of the limitations to using FOIs in research. Thirdly, we locate the FOIA within a broader process of modernising digital information and highlight some of the challenges that can present for researchers via this trend. Fourthly, we review effective use of FOI in research. Finally, we offer some observations from our own nascent research project that is using FOIs as a key methodological approach. The chapter concludes by stressing the usefulness of the FOIA for researchers to produce democratising and politically impactful research. The chapter's aim is to highlight the practicalities of applying this method of enquiry and to further its contribution to academic research.

The UK Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015) (CTSA) calls for a partnership between the government, individuals, organisations and communities to prevent the radicalisation of individuals and to prevent their participation in terrorist and illegal activities. As part of this strategy, universities have a statutory duty placed upon them to remain vigilant to signs of extremism. Based upon 20 interviews with UK university lecturers, the paper examines reactions of the academic community to this governmental mandate. Key to our understanding is the deputisation of lecturers into a security regime and how they perform the duty of identifying and monitoring extremism. Equally, forms of resistance are evident in how lecturers understand their new roles and for universities themselves a conservative approach to risk may be gaining traction. We argue there is confusion around the CTSA based upon the ambiguous language in which it is presented and the conservative and defensive reactions that have subsequently produced concern amongst lecturers and UK universities.

The UK Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015) (CTSA) calls for a partnership between the government, individuals, organisations and communities to prevent the radicalisation of individuals and to prevent their participation in terrorist and illegal activities. As part of this strategy, universities have a statutory duty placed upon them to remain vigilant to signs of extremism. Based upon 20 interviews with UK university lecturers, the paper examines reactions of the academic community to this governmental mandate. Key to our understanding is the deputisation of lecturers into a security regime and how they perform the duty of identifying and monitoring extremism. Equally, forms of resistance are evident in how lecturers understand their new roles and for universities themselves a conservative approach to risk may be gaining traction.We argue there is confusion around the CTSA based upon the ambiguous language in which it is presented and the conservative and defensive reactions that have subsequently produced concern amongst lecturers and UK universities.

The Prevent Duty mandates that public authorities must work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. In this article we review how 158 UK Higher Education Institutions have responded to this new duty by examining their public-facing webpages and Prevent policy documentation. In doing this we draw upon de Certeau's notions of the everyday to highlight how such initiatives are presented publicly to viewing audiences, and how messages seep into and deepen security measures within UK Higher Education. In reviewing the performative element of Prevent, specifically how information is displayed, we find that the majority of UK Higher Education Institutions have approached their new roles through the prism of 'compliance' and/or 'safeguarding'. The article argues presentations of safeguarding, reassurance and reluctance offer a telling insight into how the Duty has been adopted in Higher Education Institutions' everyday practice.

Drawing upon 157 responses to Freedom of Information Requests sent to Higher Education Institutions across England, Scotland and Wales, this article explores how the Prevent Duty has been enacted within UK higher education. The article shows how the duty has seen considerable repositioning and restructuring across the sector, conflated counterterrorism with safeguarding and introduced further bureaucracy. The article also explores the low number of Channel referrals, the justifications provided for these and the several instances in which institutions refused to disclose this information. We argue that these disproportionate developments have brought harmful depoliticising effects while also enhancing the mechanisms of surveillance and governance. Furthermore, we argue that our findings demonstrate the value in Freedom of Information Requests as a means of approach and suggest a continued need for critical researchers to explore the specific functioning of the duty to complement the broader critiques that are levelled at the policy as a whole.

Prevent is the UK's counter-extremism strategy and is designed to stop people being drawn towards, or coming to support, terrorism. Framed as a 'softer' element of the counter-terrorism strategy, Prevent looks to engage with communities and public bodies to identify vulnerable people and interpose. In an effort to expand Prevent's coverage, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA, 2015) came into law in September 2015 and with it so too did the Prevent Duty (henceforth 'the duty'). The duty made it the legal requirement of a series of public sector 'specified authorities' to pay, 'due regard to the need to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism' (CTSA, 2015). The duty broadened the coverage of Prevent to include all the people that work within these specified authorities as well as those who 'go through' them – a group that would cover almost the entirety of the population in England, Scotland and Wales.

This paper examines the organizational tensions arising from mandatory data exchange initiatives between private and public organizations. The focus is the UK financial services sector, which is required to monitor and report on customer identities and transactions under the country's Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Finance (AML/CTF) regulations. The transferred data are generated from existing organizational activities, systems, processes and working patterns; we examine how government demands for such data affect commercial priorities, customer relationships and working patterns in the sector. We adopt an exploratory approach to investigate this phenomenon, consisting of 16 in-depth interviews, analysis of documents and two case studies. Three contributions are made. First, we use remediation theory to show that existing organizational arrangements are reconfigured at multiple analytical levels, creating tensions between the organizations' commercial and compliance roles. Second, we establish the information flow as an appropriate unit of analysis in the study of data exchange mechanisms and reveal the flows that characterise AML/CTF compliance for financial services organizations. Finally, we adopt a 'set theoretic' perspective on multi-level organizational research, to argue that the multi-level effects of this regulation can be examined in parallel.

Commercial organisations are increasingly asked to perform tasks traditionally associated with governmental bodies, such as law enforcement. The rationale for these public-private partnerships is that there are synergies between traditional business skills and those required to achieve certain societal goals. However, there is a lack of research into whether this is, indeed, the case. This paper addresses this gap by investigating one particular type of public-private partnership: anti-money laundering (AML). The study explores the potential synergies between customer relationship management (CRM) and those required for AML. A quantitative survey-based approach is used to identify the overlaps and connections between these two areas of competence. The findings reveal tensions between financial institutions' dual roles as both commercial organisations and players in the battle against money laundering. The consequences for these firms are explored, and the wider implications for other organisations supplying non-commercial services to government are considered. © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group