Suchergebnisse

"This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries. TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics, it places emphasis in understanding the nature of the hazards inherent to these interactions. The emphasis on transactional hazards requires a microanalytical perspective, where performance assessment is undertaken within the realm of possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance of public / private interactions. The paper discusses two fundamental hazards and their organizational implications: governmental and third party opportunism. Both interact to make regulatory processes and outcomes more rigid, formalistic, and prone to conflict than envisioned by relational contracting"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Proceedings Paper (for Acquisition Research Program) ; The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation is a political risk adaptation by which public agents limit hazards from opportunistic third parties''political opponents, competitors, and interest groups''and externalize the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Public agents endogenize the likelihood of opportunistic challenge, lowering third parties'' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions: Scrutiny increases public contracting efficiency in costly litigation environments, concentrated (politically) contestable markets, and with upwardly biased beliefs about benefits of challenge. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Fil: Spiller, Pablo T. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. ; Fil: Tommasi, Mariano. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.