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The age of puberty in many populations has declined steeply over recent centuries and may be declining still. Consequently, today's children tend to experience the hormonal stresses of rapid development at younger ages than did their ancestors, around whose later, if not more gradual, maturation traditional behavioral expectations formed. Little has been made of this "rush to puberty" outside the life sciences. This article reviews its historical documentation, scholarly appreciation, epidemiological correlations, putative physiological and environmental explanations, sociological implications, and largely latent politics.

Microenvironmental risks are largely unseen but not wholly uncontrollable. They are subject to exaggeration and misunderstanding but also to exacerbation, which can indeed be dangerous, and to amelioration, which requires a high degree of policy convergence. Technologically mediated alterations of the microenvironment have been both intentional and incidental; three types, while overlapping in mechanism and interactive in effect, may yet be distinguished by motivation: immunomodulation, chemotherapeusis and chemoprophylaxis, and species population management. Eight types of collective action are recommended to lessen microenvironmental risks. Their common feature is emphasis on ecological stability with quick identification and minimally disruptive containment of destabilizing elements on either side—microbial or human—of a highly dynamic and generally fruitful relationship. Their goal is "global microenvironmental community policing."

Our environment is complex, but it is understandable through rational investigation, and it is not to be feared. So wrote Titus Lucretius Carus of the nature of things some thirty human lifetimes ago—not so long, really. About species evolution Lucretius thought much, guessed well, and worried little. About microparasitic evolution he knew nothing. Would he have feared it? Should we fear it now?

Background. Disinformation, now best known generically as "fake news," is an old and protean weapon. Prominent in the 1980s was AIDS disinformation, including the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth, for whose propagation some figures ultimately admitted blame while others shamelessly claimed credit. In 2013 we reported a comprehensive analysis of this myth, finding leading roles for the Soviet Union's state security service, the KGB, and for biologist and independent conspiracy theorist Jakob Segal but not for East Germany's state security service, the Stasi. We found Stasi involvement had been much less extensive and much less successful than two former Stasi officers had begun claiming following German reunification. In 2014 two historians crediting the two former Stasi officers coauthored a monograph challenging our analysis and portraying the Stasi as having directed Segal, or at least as having used him as a "conscious or unconscious multiplier," and as having successfully assisted a Soviet bloc AIDS-disinformation conspiracy that they soon inherited and thenceforth led. In 2017 a German appellate court found our 2013 analysis persuasive in a defamation suit brought by a filmmaker whose work the 2014 monograph had depicted as co-funded by the Stasi.Question and methods. Were our critics right about the Stasi? We asked and answered ten subsidiary questions bearing upon our critics' arguments, reassessing our own prior work and probing additional sources including archives of East Germany's Partei- und Staatsführung [party-and-state leadership] and the recollections of living witnesses.Findings. Jakob Segal transformed and transmitted the myth without direction from the KGB or the Stasi or any element of East Germany's party-and-state leadership. The Stasi had trouble even tracking Segal's activities, which some officers feared would disadvantage East Germany scientifically, economically, and politically. Three officers in one Stasi section did show interest in myth propagation, but their efforts were late, limited, inept, and inconsequential.Conclusion. The HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth, most effectively promoted by Jakob Segal acting independently of any state's security service, was not, contrary to claims, a Stasi success.

Doi:10.2990/32_2_2, published by Association for Politics and the Life Sciences at Texas Tech University and the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, October 2013.

BackgroundWhen in May 1983 the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) was first securely attributed to a virus, eventually called the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), many controversies arose. Among these was one centering on HIV's origin. A startling hypothesis, called here the "HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth," asserted that HIV had been a product, accidental or intentional, of bioweaponry research. While its earliest identifiable contributors were in the West, this myth's most dynamic propagators were in the East. The Soviet security service, the KGB, took "active measures" to create and disseminate AIDS disinformation beginning no later than July 1983 and ending no earlier than October 1987. The East German security service, a complex bureaucracy popularly known as "the Stasi," was involved, too, but how early, how deeply, how uniformly, how ably, and how successfully has not been clear. Following German reunification, claims arose attributing to the Stasi the masterful execution of ingenious elements in a disinformation campaign they helped shape and soon came to dominate. We have tested these claims.QuestionWas the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth a Stasi success?MethodsPrimary sources were documents and photographs assembled by the Ministry of State Security (MfS) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany), the Ministry of Interior of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and the United States Department of State; the estate of myth principals Jakob and Lilli Segal; the "AIDS box" in the estate of East German literary figure Stefan Heym; participant-observer recollections, interviews, and correspondence; and expert interviews. We examined secondary sources in light of primary sources.FindingsThe HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth had debuted in print in India in 1983 and had been described in publications worldwide prior to 1986, the earliest year for which we found any Stasi document mentioning the myth in any context. Many of the myth's exponents were seemingly independent conspiracy theorists. Its single most creative exponent was Jakob Segal, an idiosyncratic Soviet biologist long resident in, and long retired in, the GDR. Segal applied to the myth a thin but tenacious layer of plausibility. We could not exclude a direct KGB influence on him but found no evidence demonstrating it. The Stasi did not direct his efforts and had difficulty tracking his activities. The Stasi were prone to interpretive error and self-aggrandizement. They credited themselves with successes they did not achieve, and, in one instance, failed to appreciate that a major presumptive success had actually been a fiasco. Senior Stasi officers came to see the myth's propagation as an embarrassment threatening broader interests, especially the GDR's interest in being accepted as a scientifically sophisticated state. In 1986, 1988, and 1989, officers of HV A/X, the Stasi's disinformation and "active measures" department, discussed the myth in meetings with the Bulgarian secret service. In the last of these meetings, HV A/X officers tried to interest their Bulgarian counterparts in taking up, or taking over, the myth's propagation. Further efforts, if any, were obscured by collapse of the East German and Bulgarian governments.ConclusionNo, the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick myth was not a Stasi success. Impressions to the contrary can be attributed to reliance on presumptions, boasts, and inventions. Presumptions conceding to the Stasi an extraordinary operational efficiency and an irresistible competence - qualities we could not confirm in this case - made the boasts and inventions more convincing than their evidentiary basis, had it been known, would have allowed. The result was disinformation about disinformation, a product we call "disinformation squared."