Suchergebnisse

Studies of international environmental regulation have traditionally focused on transboundary pollution as the major explanation of international regulation. As a consequence, domestic sources of international environmental regulation were neglected. In this paper, the domestic and international sources of international environmental regulation are outlined, and their effects tested for the international regulation of acid rain in Europe. In the analysis, the complex interdependence approach and the foreign environmental policy approach represent the major theories in the tradition of the international sources of international environmental regulation. Among the domestic factors, a range of elite attitudes are evaluated as well as economic and technological factors. The results from the empirical analysis generally show minor support for those theories that stress the importance of the international sources of regulation, while the costs of regulation and access to technology are more strongly associated with a country's support for . international environmental regulation.

Long-term policy issues are a particularly vexing class of environmental policy issues which merit increasing attention due to the long-time horizons involved, the incongruity with political cycles, and the challenges for collective action. Following the definition of long-term environmental policy challenges, I pose three questions as challenges for future research, namely 1. Are present democracies well suited to cope with long-term policy challenges? 2. Are top-down or bottom-up solutions to long-term environmental policy challenges advisable? 3. Will mitigation and adaptation of environmental challenges suffice? In concluding, the contribution raises the issue of credible commitment for long-term policy issues and potential design options.

Long-term policy issues are a particularly vexing class of environmental policy issues which merit increasing attention due to the long-time horizons involved, the incongruity with political cycles, and the challenges for collective action. Following the definition of long-term environmental policy challenges, I pose three questions as challenges for future research, namely 1. Are present democracies well suited to cope with long-term policy challenges? 2. Are top-down or bottom-up solutions to long-term environmental policy challenges advisable? 3. Will mitigation and adaptation of environmental challenges suffice? In concluding, the contribution raises the issue of credible commitment for long-term policy issues and potential design options.

Considering the long-term is not new, yet we seem to be overwhelmed by the long-term nature of many of our environmental policy problems. Following a definition of long-term policy problems, this editorial introduces the contributions to this special issue of Global Environmental Politics and outlines three major challenges for future research, including the time inconsistency problem, the effect of democratic and decentralized governance on problem-solving, as well as institutional designs to prevent or recover from unwanted long-term policy outcomes.

Considering the long-term is not new, yet we seem to be overwhelmed by the long-term nature of many of our environmental policy problems. Following a definition of long-term policy problems, this editorial introduces the contributions to this special issue of Global Environmental Politics and outlines three major challenges for future research, including the time inconsistency problem, the effect of democratic and decentralized governance on problem-solving, as well as institutional designs to prevent or recover from unwanted long-term policy outcomes. Adapted from the source document.

"Die Forschung zur Wirkung internationaler Institutionen hat ein erstes Stadium der Maturität erreicht. Gleichzeitig erscheinen neue Herausforderungen am Horizont. Der Autor stellt drei Forschungsfragen, die die Zukunft der Forschung zum Effekt internationaler Institutionen bestimmen können, dar und illustriert anhand der Oslo-Potsdam-Lösung zur Messung der Effektivität internationaler Institutionen wie mögliche Lösungen aussehen können. Erstens, wie kann die Interaktion zwischen verschiedenen internationalen Abkommen diagnostiziert und quantifiziert werden? Zweitens, wie kann der Effekt internationaler Institutionen über lange Zeiträume gemessen werden? Und drittens, wie können nachhaltige Nichtregime in eine solche Forschungslandschaft integriert werden?" (Autorenreferat)

Following corroboration of the existence of the anthropologically enhanced greenhouse effect, international environmental agreements were concluded by the international community. The article summarizes the development of international climate policy with particular emphasis on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) & the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The main provisions of these agreements are highlighted, followed by an assessment of the state of international climate policy & a brief examination from the perspective of the theories of international relations. The author concludes with suggestions for further political science research & highlights major challenges that international climate policy faces today. 2 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Summarizes development of an international climate policy in context of the perceived danger of global warming from carbon dioxide emissions; highlights the main provisions of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; recommendations for further research. Summary in English.

Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regulating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects—but fall substantially short of the collective optima.

Despite growing international environmental interdependence, the international system lacks a central authority to foster environmental protection. As a consequence, countries have adopted different policies to reduce international environmental problems. More specifically, costly regulations are not universally supported. In order to explain the success and failure of international environmental regulation, it is necessary to systematically focus on the factors that shape the environmental foreign policy of sovereign states. Since such an approach is missing from the literature, we develop an interest-based explanation of support for international environmental regulation and postulate what impact it should have on state preferences for international environmental regulation. Specifically we apply our framework to two prominent cases of negotiations on atmospheric pollution control, namely, efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and the regulation of transboundary acidification ("acid rain") in Europe.

Analyzes factors that shape state support for international regulation, focusing on negotiations for regulation of stratospheric ozone and acid rain. Positions taken during negotiations on the Montreal Protocol and the Helsinki Protocol.