Suchergebnisse

Long-term policy issues are a particularly vexing class of environmental policy issues which merit increasing attention due to the long-time horizons involved, the incongruity with political cycles, and the challenges for collective action. Following the definition of long-term environmental policy challenges, I pose three questions as challenges for future research, namely 1. Are present democracies well suited to cope with long-term policy challenges? 2. Are top-down or bottom-up solutions to long-term environmental policy challenges advisable? 3. Will mitigation and adaptation of environmental challenges suffice? In concluding, the contribution raises the issue of credible commitment for long-term policy issues and potential design options.

Long-term policy issues are a particularly vexing class of environmental policy issues which merit increasing attention due to the long-time horizons involved, the incongruity with political cycles, and the challenges for collective action. Following the definition of long-term environmental policy challenges, I pose three questions as challenges for future research, namely 1. Are present democracies well suited to cope with long-term policy challenges? 2. Are top-down or bottom-up solutions to long-term environmental policy challenges advisable? 3. Will mitigation and adaptation of environmental challenges suffice? In concluding, the contribution raises the issue of credible commitment for long-term policy issues and potential design options.

Considering the long-term is not new, yet we seem to be overwhelmed by the long-term nature of many of our environmental policy problems. Following a definition of long-term policy problems, this editorial introduces the contributions to this special issue of Global Environmental Politics and outlines three major challenges for future research, including the time inconsistency problem, the effect of democratic and decentralized governance on problem-solving, as well as institutional designs to prevent or recover from unwanted long-term policy outcomes.

Considering the long-term is not new, yet we seem to be overwhelmed by the long-term nature of many of our environmental policy problems. Following a definition of long-term policy problems, this editorial introduces the contributions to this special issue of Global Environmental Politics and outlines three major challenges for future research, including the time inconsistency problem, the effect of democratic and decentralized governance on problem-solving, as well as institutional designs to prevent or recover from unwanted long-term policy outcomes. Adapted from the source document.

"Die Forschung zur Wirkung internationaler Institutionen hat ein erstes Stadium der Maturität erreicht. Gleichzeitig erscheinen neue Herausforderungen am Horizont. Der Autor stellt drei Forschungsfragen, die die Zukunft der Forschung zum Effekt internationaler Institutionen bestimmen können, dar und illustriert anhand der Oslo-Potsdam-Lösung zur Messung der Effektivität internationaler Institutionen wie mögliche Lösungen aussehen können. Erstens, wie kann die Interaktion zwischen verschiedenen internationalen Abkommen diagnostiziert und quantifiziert werden? Zweitens, wie kann der Effekt internationaler Institutionen über lange Zeiträume gemessen werden? Und drittens, wie können nachhaltige Nichtregime in eine solche Forschungslandschaft integriert werden?" (Autorenreferat)

Following corroboration of the existence of the anthropologically enhanced greenhouse effect, international environmental agreements were concluded by the international community. The article summarizes the development of international climate policy with particular emphasis on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) & the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The main provisions of these agreements are highlighted, followed by an assessment of the state of international climate policy & a brief examination from the perspective of the theories of international relations. The author concludes with suggestions for further political science research & highlights major challenges that international climate policy faces today. 2 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Summarizes development of an international climate policy in context of the perceived danger of global warming from carbon dioxide emissions; highlights the main provisions of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; recommendations for further research. Summary in English.

Does the form of a multilateral agreement (MEA) by itself improve environmental performance? In particular, do legally nonbinding MEAs pose a rival to the effect of more traditional legally binding international agreements? Our theory builds on the legal and international regimes literatures and postulates that legally binding agreements (LBAs) have more benign effects on water quality than legally nonbinding agreements (LNBAs). We probe two operationalizations of the form of MEAs. First, we purely focus on the form: of legally binding versus legally nonbindings. Second, we combine the form of an agreement each with an index of precision and an index of delegation. The empirical focus is on upstream–downstream water quality in Europe during 1990 to 2007. Our regression analyses, regardless of specification, find that LBAs beat LNBAs and that LBAs with high degrees of precision and delegation beat the effect of any other configuration of agreements with respect to enhancing water quality.

Arild Underdal's work on the Law of the Least Ambitious Program (LLAP) is a significant contribution to our understanding of the logic of international collaboration. The LLAP, however, applies only under particular conditions. After comparing the law to the joint decision trap and the veto player concept, we discuss four observations that tend to limit the law's domain. First, while the LLAP is intended to apply to decision-making under unanimity, in a number of international bodies decisions are made by some kind of majority voting. Second, the LLAP assumes that the alternative to collective agreement is individual decision-making, yet in practice the relevant alternative (the "reversion rule") is often the continuation of some pre-existing collaborative arrangement. Third, whereas the LLAP assumes that the unanimity rule invariably favors the least ambitious program, there are interesting cases where this assumption does not hold. Finally, the LLAP does not take into account that the outcome of international decision-making not only depends on the decision rule and the reversion rule, but also on the voting sequence.