Suchergebnisse

The current crisis and discussions, in the euro area in particular, show that sovereign debt crises/defaults are no longer restricted to developing economies. After crises in many Latin American countries, the literature on quantitative dynamic macro-models of sovereign default has been advancing. Current debate should take notice of the findings from this literature an extensive overview of which has been provided in this paper. This paper also discusses the difficulties involved in, but also possibilities of, integrating this type of model in standard business cycle models (RBC and DSGE models). This is likely to be particularly helpful when using models to analyse upcoming issues in the euro area, such as a suitable (sovereign) insolvency law or the assumption of joint liability.

In a dynamic model of fiscal policy, social polarization provokes a deficit bias. Policy advisors have recently proposed that governments running a deficit should be forced to generate additional tax revenue. We show that this deficit taxation reduces the deficit bias as it internalizes the externality different lobby groups impose on others. The mechanism described here is not due to the political risk of being elected out of office because the private sector dislikes taxation. Lower government spending and the resulting reduced deficit bias augment capital accumulation.

In a dynamic model of fiscal policy, social polarization provokes a deficit bias. Policy advisors have recently proposed that governments running a deficit should be forced to generate additional tax revenue. We show that this deficit taxation reduces the deficit bias as it internalizes the externality different lobby groups impose on others. The mechanism described here is not due to the political risk of being elected out of office because the private sector dislikes taxation. Lower government spending and the resulting reduced deficit bias augment capital accumulation.

In theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal.

From an economic perspective, imposing a credible one-off net wealth levy in crisis times as a tool to ward off a national emergency appears to be advantageous as, in an ideal world, this would not distort market players' allocation decisions. However, in practice, charging such a levy may give rise to distortions and unwanted effects on the real economy. Credibility that the levy will be imposed as a once-only measure is key to ensuring that harmful distortions in the allocation of resources are kept to a minimum. This paper confirms this using an analysis based on a DSGE model. In practice, while a government cannot guarantee that such a measure will be taken once only, it can contribute to the credibility thereof in a number of ways. First, the country's future 'business model' must become apparent; second, there has to be a basic level of confidence in the government and a firm belief that the budgetary imbalances were not actively caused by the state - at least not by the government currently in power; third, a verifiable outlook of sustainable public finances must be in place; and fourth, the political costs of a repeat levy must be high. This paper also discusses the potential impact of alternative model setups as well as some practical implementation problems.

This paper uses an extended version of 'FiMod-A DSGE Model for Fiscal Policy Simulations' (Stähler and Thomas Econ Model 29:239-261, 2012) with endogenous job destruction decisions by private firms to analyze the effects of several currently discussed labor market reforms on the Spanish economy. The main focus is on the firms' hiring and firing decisions, on the implications for fiscal balances and on Spain's international competitiveness. We find that measures aiming at reducing (policy-induced) outside option of workers, such as a decrease in unemployment benefits, public wages or, to a lesser extent, public-sector employment, seem most beneficial to foster output, employment, international competitiveness and fiscal balances. Decreasing the unions' bargaining power also accomplishes this task. Our simulation suggests that reforming employment protection legislation does not seem to be a suitable tool from the perspective of improving international competitiveness. All measures imply (income) redistribution between optimizing and liquidity-constrained consumers. Our analysis also suggests that those reforms that are beneficial for Spain generate positive spillovers to the rest of EMU, too.

This paper uses an extended version of 'FiMod - A DSGE Model for Fiscal Policy Simulations' (Stähler and Thomas, 2011) with endogenous job destruction decisions by private firms to analyze the effects of several currently discussed labor market reforms on the Spanish economy. The main focus is on the firms' hiring and firing decisions, on the implications for fiscal balances and on Spain's international competitiveness. We find that measures aiming at reducing (policy-induced) outside option of workers, such as a decrease in unemployment benefits, public wages or, to a lesser extent, public-sector employment, seem most beneficial to foster output, employment, international competitiveness and fiscal balances. Decreasing the unions' bargaining power also accomplishes this task, however, at a lower level and at the cost of higher job turnover. Our simulation suggests that reforming employment protection legislation does not seem to be a suitable tool from the perspective of improving international competitiveness. All measures imply (income) redistribution between optimizing and liquidity-constrained consumers. Our analysis also suggests that those reforms that are beneficial for Spain generate positive spillovers to the rest of EMU, too.