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The essay examines D. A. Andreev's monograph "Autocracy at a turning point: 1894 in the history of the dynasty and power" dedicated to the process of transformation of Tsarevich Nicholas Alexandrovich into Tsar Nicholas II. The monograph addresses the key problems of its topic: the formation of the bureaucratic competence of Nikolai Alexandrovich and the question of the political testament of Alexander III to his son; the perception of the interregnum of 1894 by representatives of the ruling elite and the oppositional public; the reflection on the relationships between Nicholas II and his entourage by Empress Alexandra Feodorovna on the pages of her husband's diary at the end of 1894; the circumstances of the first major personnel decisions of Nicholas II, which were the dismissal of the Minister of Railways A. K. Krivoshein and the appointment of Prince M. I. Khilkov as his successor. The paper draws a special attention to the central plot of the monograph — the speech of Nicholas II delivered on January 17, 1895, before representatives of the estate and local governments. The author of the essay comes to the conclusion that the January 17 speech symbolized the distancing of Nicholas II from the zemstvo, who sought to politicize local self-government, and from adherents of parliamentary constitutionalism, according to which, the monarch, as in England, "reigns, but does not rule". In other words, the notorious speech did not mean the tsar's refusal to cooperate with loyal zemstvo and to implement, at the same time, a reformist course aimed at gradually transformation the state system of the Russian Empire.

This article focuses on Finland's relations with Turkey in 1940–1944. Although Turkey recognized Finland's independence as early as 1918 and established diplomatic relations with Finland in 1926, Finland did not have a diplomatic mission in Ankara until 1940. The protracted nature of the relations was mainly determined by the lack of a basis (political or economic) for Finland's interest in Turkey. A sharply changed situation following the Soviet-Finnish war (1939–1940) and the war in Europe inevitably required additional information for evaluation of the processes taking place. Neutral Turkey could provide such an opportunity even by virtue of the fact that the Finnish diplomatic representative was able to contact with diplomats of both Axis and Western powers (with the British Embassy before relations with Finland were severed by England in 1943). The content of the reports of the Finnish envoy A. A. Yrjö-Koskinen enable to imagine the extremely difficult situation of Turkey, which was under constant political pressure from the opposing sides. From the point of view of the Turkish state and military leadership, the victory of either side in the World War posed a risk to Turkey. In reality, Yrjö-Koskinen's role as the head of Finland's diplomatic mission was reduced to collecting somewhat chaotic information about world events, not always accompanied by his own analyses or comments. At the same time, the envoy's reports to the Finnish Foreign Ministry showed the lack of any evident Turkish interest in the development of relations with Finland.

The article studies the question whether bishop Caesarius of Arles (503–542) could be the owner of a leather belt with an ivory buckle from the Museum of Antique Arles. The issue is the absence of narrative sources directly proving that idea. High price of the object did not match the bishop's ascetic reputation. Still that did not preclude that someone from the closest circle of his associates or supporters could make that gift to Caesarius. The article studies the ornament of the movable ring of the buckle and the iconographic type of the plot of the Resurrection of Christ carved on its surface. Some parts of the belt, its decoration and manufacturing techniques find parallels with various artifacts (buckles, sarcophagi, diptychs) stored in other museums or discovered during archaeological excavations in Gaul. A review of the elements of the liturgical vestments of the clergy of Late Antiquity led to the conclusion that the belt could not have a liturgical status. On the basis of narrative sources related to the life and work of Caesarius, the author makes assumptions about the possible extra-liturgical contexts of wearing such a belt. The data presented in the study make it possible not only to attribute the belt to the period of bishop Caesarius's life, but also to consider the latter as the most likely owner of the thing.

The review is devoted to scientific and historical-journalistic works of the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods which formulate the original versions of the events of the Interregnum of 1825 and the revolt of the Decembrists. The elimination of the ideological framework of Soviet studies of the Decembrists emancipated scholarly research and made it possible to put forward previously impossible concepts and hypotheses. On the other hand, the same circumstance contributed to the emergence of conspiracy theories and other quasi-scientific or not at all scientific versions that are not based on the necessary sources, but appeal to a wide range of readers. As a result, modern literature has developed a contradictory variety of conceptual models of different levels and quality claiming to explain the events of 1825. This review offers an experience of understanding the existing range of concepts, versions and hypotheses in post-soviet historiography. It focuses on the main discussion topics: about the circle of contenders to the throne (whether it was limited to Grand Dukes or included the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna); about the position and role of the Governor-General of the capital Miloradovich and the existence of a general opposition or a conspiracy of generals who supported the transfer of the throne to Grand Duke Constantine; about the role of the secret society of the Decembrists and the officer conspiracy initiated by him in the Guards Corps; about other influential political actors (the Russian–American Company, the "German party", etc.) presumably opposing the accession of Grand Duke Nicholas.

The article discusses the history of the communist memorial project, with Vladimir Lenin at its core. A theoretical framework is based on the concepts by Pierre Nora ('sites of memory') and Jan Assmann ('cultural memory' and 'communicative memory'). The data sources are public opinion polls, transcripts of state officials' speeches, media coverage, and expert interviews conducted by the authors themselves. The cult of Lenin, which was important for the formation of Soviet identity, was sometimes an outcome of conflicts and compromises, employed in the most unpredictable ways. Opponents and open adversaries of the communists indirectly participated in its construction. The authors offer their explanations for the fact that today the memory of both Lenin and the Revolution is not perceived as a viable resource by any prominent political actor in Russia. Contemporary Russian society is divided in assessing Lenin's historical role, but the majotiry of citizens oppose the dismantling of the Soviet memorial project. The memory of Lenin is associated not with historical events, but with the Soviet memorial project instead. The "anti-revolutionary consensus" also influences attitudes towards this memorial project: the majority of Russians reject the revolution as a country's prospect, they also reject symbolic politics regarded as revolutionary. This also blocks the radical dismantling of the Soviet memorial project. Lenin and the 100-year-old revolutionary events do not evoke vivid and strong emotions, unlike memories of repressions or the Great Patriotic War.