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Child protection systems differ across the four countries of the United Kingdom, and understanding the differences provide important opportunities for learning and improving day-to-day practice. This authoritative book compares UK child protection systems with other systems world-wide as well as scrutinising and comparing the systems in different parts of the UK. Reflecting on the impact of devolution, the authors consider and critically analyse the way child protection systems are being developed, thought about and put into practice in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. An intra-c

AbstractThe paper examines corporate governance mechanisms which aim to ensure financial accountability in the context of long‐term Public–Private Partnership (PPP) contracts in Britain, and assesses the degree to which they provide taxpayers with control and accountability. The corporate governance arrangements are drawn from the private sector, and therefore downplay the traditional concepts of probity and stewardship, in part due to the British Treasury's adoption of private sector financial reporting. The paper draws on Shaoul et al.'s (2012a) governance‐based reporting framework to critique the corporate governance mechanisms of structure, financial reporting, contracts, and scrutiny in relation to British PPP projects. It shows that the way these mechanisms are set up means there is a lack of control by the public sector, thus rendering public accountability ineffective.

Africa's rapid population growth and urbanisation has made its socioeconomic development a global priority. But as China ramps up its assistance in bridging Africa's basic infrastructure gap to the detriment of institutions building, warnings of a debt trap have followed. Building upon an extensive body of evidence, the editors argue that developing institutions and infrastructure are two equally desirable but organisationally incompatible objectives. In conceptualising this duality by design, a new theoretical framework proposes better understanding of the differing approaches to development espoused by traditional agencies, such as the World Bank, and emergent Chinese agencies. This new framing moves the debate away from the fruitless search for a 'superior' form of organising, and instead suggests looking for complementarities in competing forms of organising for development. For students and researchers in international business, strategic and public management, and complex systems, as well as practitioners in international development and business in emergent markets.

ABSTRACTRoad schemes are of major importance in the global PPP market. We focus on Design‐Build‐Finance‐Operate (DBFO) arrangements covered by shadow toll or availability payment mechanisms, where the UK and Spain are key players. Now that a good number of DBFO schemes in the UK and Spain have been operational for well over half the contract period, there is scope for a detailed ex post evaluation of DBFO performance in both countries and an analysis of how the DBFO model has evolved. Preliminary results show that these contracts continue to be very expensive for public administrations, especially in the UK, where the financing costs and fee per kilometre are high. On the other hand, they are an easy source of revenue for the parent companies of the concessionaires, where the increased use of subordinated debt rather than equity seeks to reduce risk. However, despite circumventing the controversial hard‐tolling, some projects in both Spain and the UK present poor outcomes. Several other problems around these projects are identified, including lack of public accountability and transparency or poor governance, raising long‐term questions around affordability and opportunities for further study.

In 1993, the British government turned to the private sector to finance much needed investment in public infrastructure and manage services under its Public Private Partnerships (PPP) policy (Edwards et al., 2004), with transport forming by far the largest component by value of the PPP programme. (.)

Health care public–private partnerships (PPPs), where clinical services as well as infrastructure are delivered by the private sector, are coming under the spotlight as governments seek to achieve value for money in health budgets. Existing examples have been widely reported as successful. However, this article urges caution as a closer look at the evidence shows that handing over control of service delivery to the private sector is difficult to monitor and evaluate, carries cost implications which remain largely unquantified and can create additional risk.

Governments increasingly use private finance to fund roads infrastructure. In particular the European Commission has promoted the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) to deliver the projects forming the trans-European Network. This use of private finance raises important questions about how public monies and assets are accounted for. The paper examines, first, accounting in both public and private sectors for roads PPPs in Spain and the UK, countries which not only have considerable experience in the use of private finance for the provision of roads but also act as exemplars of a number of differences which may be significant from an international perspective in termsof financial reporting and economic outcomes. Second, it examines the tensions between national, European Union and international accounting pronouncements. Our findings suggest that the businessenvironment has influenced the development of accounting policy. In Spain a powerful toll sector presence within the legal framework has led to substantial variations, having real economic impact.In the UK, the accounting regulator has prevailed over political concerns. For European public sector accounting, conflict remains between political choice and technical accounting. These findings may have global relevance, as the adoption of international accounting pronouncements will not remove these conflicts.

English
This article shows how the use of private sector advisors, predominantly from the Big Four accounting firms, to develop and manage the government's Public–Private Partnerships policy, has led to the privatisation of policy formulation and implementation. Financial advisors develop the policy and appraisal procedures, appraise individual projects, and advise both public and private sector clients. In some cases, the firms also have an equity stake and/or are key subcontractors. They prepare evaluative reports on the same policies in which they have a vested interest. Such conflicts of interest raise questions about who controls policy and the implications for democracy.