Suchergebnisse

The COST Action ASF-STOP brought together an extensive network of scientists of remarkable excellence on African swine fever (ASF) vaccinology, virology, immunology, diagnostics and pathology. The network also includes global leaders in wild boar ecology and management, renowned epidemiologists specialised in ASF and disease control and scientists with vast expertise in the pig sector in Europe, biosecurity, cleaning and disinfection in pig holdings. This book collects updated knowledge in these fields, with a focus on the European situation. ASFSTOP coordinated and integrated research on ASF. Despite the new knowledge generated on ASF by scientists in Europe and worldwide, many unknowns still remain. For example, many expressed ASF virus (ASFV) genes remain uncharacterised and the information is needed for efficient antiviral drug and vaccine development. Crucial interactions between ASFV and cells like macrophages or dendritic cells are not yet completely understood. Research is needed on the mechanisms of protective immunity and identifying further viral proteins for inclusion in subunit vaccines. An in-depth analysis of the impact of ASF on the structure of the pig farming system in the EU has not yet been conducted, and transmission risks from the wild boar-habitat epidemiological cycle to the domestic pig cycle are still not fully understood. The pig sector is one of the most economically significant farming sectors in the EU and pork is the most consumed meat. The EU is the world's second biggest producer of pork. In both the wild boar-habitat and the domestic pig epidemiological cycle fully implemented biosecurity can hinder or eliminate virus transmission. National legislation and EU regulations set out clear regulations for controlling ASF. However, across Europe, wild boar populations are growing in size and range and the control of ASF continues to be a major challenge. The great socio-economic impact of ASF calls for further collaborative efforts to tackle this disease.

American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5 to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period, (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and (iv) the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different clinical and laboratory sampling procedures are proposed depending on the scenarios considered. The monitoring period of 45 days was assessed as not effective and at least 90 days (3 months) is recommended in affected areas where high awareness is expected; when the index case occurs in an area where the awareness is low the monitoring period should be at least 180 days (6 months). Since transmission kernels do not exist and data to estimate transmission kernels are not available, the effectiveness of surveillance and protection zones for CBPP was based on expert knowledge. A surveillance zone of 3 km was considered effective, while a protection zone including establishments adjacent to affected ones is recommended. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CBPP.

This update on the African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in the EU demonstrated that out of all tested wild boar found dead, the proportion of positive samples peaked in winter and summer. For domestic pigs only, a summer peak was evident. Despite the existence of several plausible factors that could result in the observed seasonality, there is no evidence to prove causality. Wild boar density was the most influential risk factor for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar. In the vast majority of introductions in domestic pig holdings, direct contact with infected domestic pigs or wild boar was excluded as the route of introduction. The implementation of emergency measures in the wild boar management zones following a focal ASF introduction was evaluated. As a sole control strategy, intensive hunting around the buffer area might not always be sufficient to eradicate ASF. However, the probability of eradication success is increased after adding quick and safe carcass removal. A wider buffer area leads to a higher success probability; however it implies a larger intensive hunting area and the need for more animals to be hunted. If carcass removal and intensive hunting are effectively implemented, fencing is more useful for delineating zones, rather than adding substantially to control efficacy. However, segments of fencing will be particularly useful in those areas where carcass removal or intensive hunting is difficult to implement. It was not possible to demonstrate an effect of natural barriers on ASF spread. Human‐mediated translocation may override any effect of natural barriers. Recommendations for ASF control in four different epidemiological scenarios are presented.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia (CCPP). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period, (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones and iv) the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different clinical and laboratory sampling procedures are proposed depending on the scenarios considered. The monitoring period of 45 days was assessed as effective in affected areas where high awareness is expected, and when the index case occurs in an area where the awareness is low the monitoring period should be at least 180 days (6 months). Since transmission kernels do not exist and data to estimate transmission kernels are not available, a surveillance zone of 3 km was considered effective based on expert knowledge, while a protection zone should also be developed to include establishments adjacent to affected ones. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CCPP.