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When designing a world trading system for the twenty-first century, "Keep calm and carry on" beats "Move fast and break things." Global trade is in trouble. Climate change, digital trade, offshoring, the rise of emerging markets led by China: Can the World Trade Organization (WTO), built for trade in the twentieth century, meet the challenges of the twenty-first? The answer is yes, Robert Staiger tells us, arguing that adapting the WTO to the changed economic environment would serve the world better than a radical reset. Governed by the WTO, on the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), global trade rules traditionally focus on "shallow integration"—with an emphasis on reducing tariffs and trade impediments at the border—rather than "deep integration," or direct negotiations over behind-the-border measures. Staiger charts the economic environment that gave rise to the former approach, explains when and why it worked, and surveys the changing landscape for global trade. In his analysis, the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements provides a compelling framework for understanding the success of GATT in the twentieth century. And according to this understanding, Staiger concludes, the logic of GATT's design transcends many, if not all, of the current challenges faced by the WTO. With its penetrating view of the evolving global economic environment, A World Trading System for the Twenty-First Century shows us a global trading system in need of reform, and Staiger makes a persuasive case for using the architecture of the GATT/WTO as a basis for that reform.

In this paper I sketch out the rough contours of the challenge faced by the WTO in dealing with non-tariff measures (NTMs) as seen from the economic theories of trade agreements. The key questions for the WTO - the answers to which largely dictate the choice between shallow and deep approaches to integration - appear to be two: (1) Is it the terms-of-trade problem or the commitment problem that WTO member governments seek to solve with their WTO membership?; and (2) Is it market clearing or offshoring/bilateral bargaining that is now the most prominent mechanism for the determination of international prices? I suggest that evidence on the first question points to the terms-of-trade theory and hence toward shallow integration, but that answering the second question may be the key to identifying the best way forward on NTMs for the WTO.

Front Cover -- Handbook of Commercial Policy -- Copyright -- Introduction to the Series -- Contents -- Preface -- Contributors -- Part I: Commercial Policy: Empirical Facts, Determinants and Effects -- Chapter 1: The Empirical Landscape of Trade Policy -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Import Tariffs -- 2.1. MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) Ad Valorem Import Tariffs Under the WTO -- 2.1.1. MFN Applied Rates, Tariff Bindings/Caps, and Binding Commitments -- 2.1.2. MFN Applied Tariffs Across Sectors -- 2.1.3. MFN Applied Tariffs Within Sectors by End-Use

World trade is governed by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO sets rules of conduct for the international trade of goods and services and for intellectual property rights, provides a forum for multinational negotiations to resolve trade problems, and has a formal mechanism for dispute settlement. It is the primary institution working, through rule-based bargaining, at freeing trade.In this book, Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger provide an economic analysis and justification for the purpose and design of the GATT/WTO. They summarize their own research, discuss the major features of the GATT agreement, and survey the literature on trade agreements. Their focus on the terms-of-trade externality is particularly original and ties the book together. Topics include the theory of trade agreements, the origin and design of the GATT and the WTO, the principles of reciprocity, the most favored nation principle, terms-of-trade theory, enforcement, preferential trade agreements, labor and environmental standards, competition policy, and agricultural export subsidies.

SUMMARY
How should economists interpret current trade wars and the recent US trade actions that have initiated them? In this paper, we offer an interpretation of current US trade actions that are at once more charitable and less forgiving than that typically offered by economic commentators. More charitable, because we argue that it is possible to see a logic to these actions: the United States is initiating a change from 'rules-based' to 'power-based' tariff bargaining and is selecting countries with which it runs bilateral trade deficits as the most suitable targets of its bargaining tariffs. Less forgiving, because the main costs of these trade tactics cannot be avoided even if they happen to 'work' and deliver lower tariffs. Rather, we show that the main costs will arise from the use of the tactics themselves and from the damage done by those tactics to the rules-based multilateral trading system and the longer-term interests of the United States and the rest of the world. JEL codes: F02, F13