Suchergebnisse

The dissertation explores the causes of the Euro crisis of 2009, using the institutional explanation in social sciences and the game theory. It includes discussions on the role of fiscal and monetary policies for stabilization of the economy, a brief history of monetary unions, as well as a summary of the European monetary integration process. Key findings of the dissertation are considering strategic situations in which the Member States have been involved before and after the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union and the euro, which can be analysed using the game theory. The institutional design of the European Communities, after the breakup of the Breton Woods system, has put the Members States in the strategic situation of prisoner's dilemma, which in turn made coordination of monetary policies and exchange rates unfeasible. The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) made possible for the Member States to overcome the dilemma by transferring the monetary policy from national to the European level of governance. Unfortunately, the institutional design of the EMU created a specific set of the interdependence of the Member States and the institutional incentives which created a new collective action problem. The new problem can be observed as a strategic situation of the chicken game in which the Member States again does not have the incentive to act in the accordance with the rules in the same, cooperative manner. Finally, the dissertation analyses the institutional consequences of the crisis and the incentives emerged after the post-crisis reforms. The conclusion is that the reforms should prevent similar euro crisis. On the other hand, questions could be raised regarding the power shift among the main bodies of the European Union. ; Rad se bavi istraživanjem uzroka krize evra nastale 2009. godine, oslanjajući se na institucionalno objašnjenje u društvenim naukama i teoriju igara. Disertacija sadrži rasprave o ulozi fiskalne i monetarne politike za stabilizaciju privrede, kratku istoriju monetarnih unija pre Evropske ekonomske i monetarne unije (EMU), kao i sažetu istoriju evropske monetarne integracije. Ključni nalazi disertacije su tiču se strateških situacija koje su dovele do nastanka jedinstvene evropske valute i kasnije do njene krize, koje je moguće analizirati uz pomoć teorije igara. Institucionalni aranžman Evropskih zajednica nakon raspada Bretonvudskog sistema stavio je države članice u stratešku situaciju zatvorenikove dileme, što je činilo koordinaciju monetarnih politike i deviznog kursa neodrživim. Kako bi se prevazišao taj problem, formirana je EMU kojom je uveden evro, a monetarna politika prenesena na sa nacionalnog evropski nivo vlasti. Međutim dizajn EMU stvorio specifičan spoj međuzavisnosti i podsticaja iz koga je nastao nov problem kolektivnog delanja za države članice monetarne unije. Taj problem se ogleda u strateškoj situaciji igre kukavice u kojoj učesnici nemaju podsticaj da se ponašaju na istovetan, kooperativan način. Na kraju disertacije analizirani su podsticaji nastali sprovedenih institucionalnih reformi. Zaključak je će reforme najverovatnije sprečiti da nastanak slične krize u budućnosti, ali i da se mogu otvoriti nova pitanja u vezi sa promenom ravnoteže moći unutar organa EU.

This paper tries to establish which circumstances have changed in Ukraine and led to the crisis in 2013 and armed conflict in 2014. The model for analysis is borrowed from Barry R. Posen's paper 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict' (1993). Posen uses the concept of security dilemma in order to explain why the ethnic conflict emerged between Serbs and Croats during the breakup of Yugoslavia and why there was no conflict between Russians and Ukrainians during the breakup of the USSR. The main task of this paper is to check if Posen's explanation still stands and to check if Posen's indicators could have signaled that the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 was imminent. ; U ovom radu pokušavam da ustanovim koje okolnosti u odnosima Rusa i Ukrajinaca u Ukrajini su se promenile i dovele do krize koja ja počela 2013, a eskalirala 2014. godine. Kao obrazac za analizu koristim tekst prof. Berija Pozena (Barry R. Posen) Bezbednosna dilema i entnički sukob (The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict) iz 1993. godine u kome uz pomoć koncepta bezbednosne dileme objašnjava zašto je došlo do entičkog sukoba između Srba i Hrvata posle raspada SFRJ, a istovremeno nije došlo do sukoba Rusa i Ukrajinaca posle raspada SSSR. Prema tome, glavni zadatak ovog rada je da pokaže da li Pozenovo objašnjenje još uvek stoji i da li je upravo promena faktora za koje je on smatrao da su bili ključni za održanje mira u Ukrajini sada dovela do kraha demokratije i sukoba u ovoj etnički složenoj Državi.

The article is the second part of the study the examines how political institutions affect economics policy notably, fiscal policy (the first part of the article was printed in the previous volume of Godišnjak FPN). In this part, we give results for the remaining four indicators that make up the power index - executive flexibility during execution, sufficient time for scrutiny and discussion, assembly committee capacity, and access to budgetary information. In the end of the article we put our findings in the comparative perspective. ; Tekst predstavlja drugi deo naše studije o empirijskoj analizi zakona koji regulišu odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela u vođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike (prvi deo štampan je u prethodnom broj Godišnjaka FPN). U drugom delu iznosimo rezultate vezane za četiri preostala empirijska indikatora koji čine indeks moći - fleksibilnost izvršne vlasti tokom izvršenja budžeta, vreme za podnošenje budžeta i vreme za raspravu, kapacitet skupštinskih odbora, pristup informacijama o budžetu. Na kraju teksta rezultate, dobijene našim istraživanjem, stavljamo u uporednu perspektivu.

The paper is an extension of our study on analysis of laws regulating relations between parliament and executive body in carrying out economic, particularly fiscal policy. This time, the influence of parliament to fiscal policy is measured empirically. In difference from results of the previous study, which showed that the Assembly exercised a relatively high influence to fiscal policy, here we show that the situation in practice is opposite the Government of Serbia has large power in carrying out fiscal policy, where as the influence of the Assembly of Serbia is negligible. The influence of legislative body is measured through analysis of two (out of six) indicators - power of submission of amendment sand budget reversion. ; Tekst predstavlja nastavak naše studije o analizi zakona koji uređuju odnose između parlamenta i izvršnog tela uvođenju ekonomske, pogotovo fiskalne politike. Ovoga puta uticaj parlamenta na fiskalnu politiku merimo empirijski. Za razliku od rezultata iz prethodne studije, gde se pokazalo da Skupština ima relativno veliki uticaj na fiskalnu politiku, ovde pokazujemo da je u praksi situacija obrnuta - Vlada Srbije ima veliku moć u vođenju fiskalne politike, dok Skupština Srbije ima zanemarljivi uticaj. Uticaj zakonodavnog tela merimo kroz analizu dva (od ukupno šest) indikatora-moć podnošenja amandmana i reverzija budžeta.