In 1993, the British government turned to the private sector to finance much needed investment in public infrastructure and manage services under its Public Private Partnerships (PPP) policy (Edwards et al., 2004), with transport forming by far the largest component by value of the PPP programme. (.)
In 1993, the British government turned to the private sector to finance much needed investment in public infrastructure and manage services under its Public Private Partnerships (PPP) policy (Edwards et al., 2004), with transport forming by far the largest component by value of the PPP programme. (.)
In: Stafford , A , Acerete , B & Stapleton , P 2010 , ' Making concessions: Political, commercial and regulatory tensions in accounting for European roads PPPs ' Accounting and Business Research , vol 40 , no. 5 , pp. 473-493 . DOI:10.1080/00014788.2010.9995324
Governments increasingly use private finance to fund roads infrastructure. In particular the European Commission has promoted the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) to deliver the projects forming the trans-European Network. This use of private finance raises important questions about how public monies and assets are accounted for. The paper examines, first, accounting in both public and private sectors for roads PPPs in Spain and the UK, countries which not only have considerable experience in the use of private finance for the provision of roads but also act as exemplars of a number of differences which may be significant from an international perspective in termsof financial reporting and economic outcomes. Second, it examines the tensions between national, European Union and international accounting pronouncements. Our findings suggest that the businessenvironment has influenced the development of accounting policy. In Spain a powerful toll sector presence within the legal framework has led to substantial variations, having real economic impact.In the UK, the accounting regulator has prevailed over political concerns. For European public sector accounting, conflict remains between political choice and technical accounting. These findings may have global relevance, as the adoption of international accounting pronouncements will not remove these conflicts.
This article draws on a qualitative case study comparing two U.K. primary health care schemes which were entered into as part of the Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) policy. LIFT takes the form of a social infrastructure Public Private Partnership (PPP) where public procurers and private suppliers work together in active long-term partnering agreements to deliver local primary health care facilities. The organizational structure is that of a joint venture company which is jointly owned by public and private partners, with the expectation that by having both the public and private sector represented on the company board partnership working between the two sectors is enhanced. The two schemes studied delivered contrasting results. One scheme showed how the private sector dominated the board, making partnership working difficult to achieve in the context of directors following their fiduciary role to maximize profits for shareholders. However, the findings from the second scheme showed that partnership working and LIFT success may be dependent on trust, general business ethos, and key personalities working together. Policy makers should therefore pay attention to not only the organizational structures, but also how the private sector controls and governance are exercised to benefit all stakeholders.
This study focuses on examining the initiation and development of the IFRS convergence decision in India. It provides glimpses of the chaotic routes through which the idea of convergence traversed during the decision-making process. The study highlights some key examples of events from the decision-making arena to demonstrate the variety of influences that shape convergence decision at multiple levels. It draws on the concept of recursivity to analyse the actors, their interests in the convergence decision and the means through which they exert influences. The study finds that while global actors are significant in their role as initiators/drivers of the convergence decision in countries moving towards IFRS convergence, their role is complemented or in some cases contradicted by national actors who play an equally important role in determining the final terms of convergence. Negotiations in the form of recursive interactions between global actors and national forces of different countries moving towards convergence contribute to the kaleidoscope that constitutes the modern and global accounting regulatory space.
In: Acerete , B , Mar Gasca , , Stafford , A & Stapleton , P 2015 , ' A comparative policy analysis of healthcare PPPs: examining evidence from two Spanish regions from an international perspective ' Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis , vol 17 , no. 5 , pp. 502-518 . DOI:10.1080/13876988.2015.1010789
As demand for public healthcare grows and government budgets are squeezed, many countries find policies involving private sector delivery of clinical services increasingly attractive. This article takes a critical analysis approach to examine the organisational and financial arrangements of healthcare PPPs from two regions in Spain. The comparative policy analysis shows that competent learning from cross-national experience is complex because in practice it is difficult to identify specific institutional factors, evaluate operational costs, and determine whether risks have transferred. Care is needed to avoid unwarranted inferences that this policy will deliver the claimed benefits of lower costs whilst maintaining sustainable quality.
Within the context of the growing worldwide tendency to fund road construction, operation and maintenance through a variety of private financing arrangements, this article explores the implications of recent road developments in Spain and England. Among other things, it shows that the use of private financing mechanisms is problematic in relation to the cost of risk transfer, and that the lack of information due to commercial sensitivity acts as a deterrent to objective assessment. The pessimistic conclusion is that, in these arrangements, downside risks are borne by the state, and the authors argue that using private financing for roads is another case of 'privatising the benefits and nationalising the costs'.