Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe paper examines corporate governance mechanisms which aim to ensure financial accountability in the context of long‐term Public–Private Partnership (PPP) contracts in Britain, and assesses the degree to which they provide taxpayers with control and accountability. The corporate governance arrangements are drawn from the private sector, and therefore downplay the traditional concepts of probity and stewardship, in part due to the British Treasury's adoption of private sector financial reporting. The paper draws on Shaoul et al.'s (2012a) governance‐based reporting framework to critique the corporate governance mechanisms of structure, financial reporting, contracts, and scrutiny in relation to British PPP projects. It shows that the way these mechanisms are set up means there is a lack of control by the public sector, thus rendering public accountability ineffective.

ABSTRACTCorporate social responsibility encompasses a multiplicity of different concepts, such that its nature is confused, and it remains difficult to operationalize because opening dialogue with and responding to the various expectations of diverse stakeholders is beyond the capacity of many companies. This paper adapts Mayston's normative "information beneficiaries" framework and focuses on intermediaries who might potentially use published financial information to open a restricted form of dialogue with companies, which might benefit unsophisticated stakeholders. The paper examines the Mayston framework using interviews conducted in organizations that might act on behalf of three stakeholder groups associated with gas and electricity suppliers in the United Kingdom, these being: consumers, employees, and the environment. While a long chain of communication exists between utility company and stakeholder, and many organizations do not fulfill their full potential as information intermediaries, there is some evidence that Mayston's framework might well operate in practice.

Health care public–private partnerships (PPPs), where clinical services as well as infrastructure are delivered by the private sector, are coming under the spotlight as governments seek to achieve value for money in health budgets. Existing examples have been widely reported as successful. However, this article urges caution as a closer look at the evidence shows that handing over control of service delivery to the private sector is difficult to monitor and evaluate, carries cost implications which remain largely unquantified and can create additional risk.

English
This article shows how the use of private sector advisors, predominantly from the Big Four accounting firms, to develop and manage the government's Public–Private Partnerships policy, has led to the privatisation of policy formulation and implementation. Financial advisors develop the policy and appraisal procedures, appraise individual projects, and advise both public and private sector clients. In some cases, the firms also have an equity stake and/or are key subcontractors. They prepare evaluative reports on the same policies in which they have a vested interest. Such conflicts of interest raise questions about who controls policy and the implications for democracy.

English
This article uses a case study approach based on documents provided by the Department for Transport's executive Highways Agency, information in the public domain and interviews of key players associated with a 'successful' project to examine the nature of evidence-based policy. Few evaluations exist of whether public–private partnerships achieve their objectives and the study focuses on those objectives that specifically relate to the policy of using private finance: risk transfer; building to time and budget; and innovation. We conclude that 'success' is determined at a micro level on the basis of technical achievement but that broader social and financial objectives on which the policy is based have not been assessed.