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AbstractPublic inquiries remain the pre‐eminent mechanism for lesson‐learning after high‐profile failures. However, a regular complaint is that their recommendations get 'shelved'. In political science, the most common explanation for this lack of implementation tells us that elites mobilize bias in order to undermine inquiry lesson‐learning. This article tests this thesis via an international comparison of inquiries in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. A series of alternative explanations for shelving emerge, which tell us that inquiry recommendations do not get implemented when: they do not respect the realities of policy transfer; they are triaged into policy refinement mechanisms; and they arrive at the 'street level' without consideration of local delivery capacities. These explanations tell us that the mobilization of bias thesis needs to be reworked in relation to public inquiries so that it better recognizes the complex reality of public policy in the modern state.

"Institutional Amnesia and Crisis Management Analysis" published on by Oxford University Press.

This article explains why different government agencies experience variations in organizational memory loss. It first explains institutional amnesia theoretically by expanding the formal‐institutional view of organizational memory to include agential and structural‐contextual properties, revealing a broader range of novel explanations for amnesia. Institutional amnesia is then explained empirically through an international analysis of memory loss in four Westminster systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). This analysis, which principally relies on 100 interviews with ministers, policy officials, and public‐sector leaders across the four countries, leads to the introduction of four explanations for amnesia, relating to: organizational churn, absorptive capacity, strategic‐instrumental decision making, and historical storytelling.

Interactive and state-centric relational governance scholars disagree about the concept of metagovernance. Contestation relates to who can metagovern, the processes that can steer policy networks and the extent of autonomy held by non-state actors. This article uses data generated from interviews with policy officials and document analysis to examine the validity of these competing claims in relation to a European crisis management network. The findings validate both conceptualisations in terms of the minutia of network governance but they also question their value as a proxy for understanding how the European Union has affected the policymaking authority of the nation-state.

The concept of resilience has gained currency as a motif under which governments have sought to improve their responses to crises. At the heart of this agenda is an understanding that crisis management must be adaptable. Yet crises continue to expose the intransigent nature of central bureaucracies. This article addresses this issue by exploring how bureaucratic values can affect the ability of agents to adapt to the challenges of crises. Data are generated from a series of interviews with crisis managers who operate in a policy chain that connects the European Union to the United Kingdom. The data indicate that two well‐entrenched bureaucratic value‐sets, relating to efficiency and procedural rationality, have profound consequences for the resilience agenda.

Legislatures have the potential to influence the politics and policies of crisis management. As such, they deserve analytical treatment from those interested in the effectiveness of state-led efforts to resolve crises. However, determining and evaluating the extent of a legislature's involvement in a crisis management process is a complicated research endeavour. The purpose of this article is to reduce this complexity by presenting a research framework that can be used for the analytical and evaluative exploration of legislatures in relation to crisis management. As the framework unfolds, insights are generated about how the interaction between politics and policy affects crisis management performance, and the ways in which interpretations of 'success' and 'failure' are constructed subjectively by crisis actors. Emerging from the framework is an argument that assessments of institutional performance must be cognizant of the 'normative pluralism' that characterises contemporary crises.

This article explores the relationship between the United Kingdom's doctrine of ministerial responsibility and bureaucratic efforts to control four contemporary crises. Evidence emerges from a series of interviews with experienced crisis managers, which draws attention to the way in which this convention: (1) tacitly conditioned the thinking and behaviour of bureaucratic crisis actors through their sensitivity to political risk; and (2) was reinterpreted and utilized instrumentally by political and bureaucratic agents in response to the dilemmas posed by each crisis. The analysis of these themes connects governance and crisis literatures together by shedding light on the interaction between governance 'traditions', 21st century crisis episodes and the requirements of crisis management.