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AbstractThis study provides a further test of whether the price change‐volume relationship is asymmetric as Epps' theoretical model and empirical evidence indicate. Testing during periods of known information arrival supports his hypothesis that the ratio of volume to absolute price change on price increases is higher than that ratio on equivalent price decreases. There is some contrary evidence when the testing occurs over trading days for which there is no known information arrival. This reversal of results could be due to the combined effect of positive transaction costs and no information arrival. There is evidence in support of this explanation.

We show that gender diversity in corporate boards could improve firm value because of the contributions that women make to the board. Prior studies examine valuation effects of gender-diverse boards and reach mixed conclusions. To help resolve this conundrum, we consider how gender diversity could affect firm value, that is, what mechanisms could explain how female directors benefit corporate board performance. We hypothesize and provide evidence that women directors contribute to boards by offering specific functional expertise, often missing from corporate boards. The additional expertise increases board heterogeneity which Kim and Starks (2015) show can increase firm value.

AbstractResearch Question/IssueWe examine how countries' cultural and legal environment, in addition to firm‐level governance mechanisms, affects firms' retention and termination decision of the CEO.Research Findings/InsightsPrevious research focuses primarily on the effects of governance structures and incentives on turnover. In this paper, we focus on two additional institutions—cultural and legal. We find that in cultures characterized by higher individualism, competition, and stronger views that hard work leads to success, boards are more likely to replace CEOs in response to poor shareholder performance. Conversely, we find that in more corrupt cultures and cultures more protective of employees, there is lower turnover–performance sensitivity.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWilliamson (2000) provided a framework consisting of four levels of institutional influences on economic activity: (1) cultural norms, (2) the legal system, (3) governance structures, and (4) resource allocation and employment. Previous research focuses primarily on the two highest levels; we focus on the two more basic levels, cultural and legal, while controlling for firm‐level governance.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsCultural values and legal conditions combine with the firm's governance structure to affect CEO turnover and its sensitivity to firm shareholder performance.

In this paper we compare changes in asset allocations between mutual funds held in defined contribution pension plans and funds held by other investors. We investigate how flows into equity and fixed income mutual funds depend on macroeconomic conditions. We find that defined contribution plans react more sensitively to these conditions, suggesting effects on mutual fund managers and other investors.