Book Review: The Sources of Democratic Responsiveness in Mexico
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 1435-1439
ISSN: 1552-3829
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In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 1435-1439
ISSN: 1552-3829
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 1435-1439
ISSN: 1552-3829
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 1435-1439
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 98-112
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 98-112
ISSN: 1540-5907
A significant majority of the world's constitutional courts publicize their decisions through direct contact with the national media. This interest in public information is puzzling in so far as constitutional judges are not directly accountable to voters. I argue that the promotion of case results is consistent with a theory of judicial behavior in which public support for courts can undermine incentives for insincere decision making. In this article, I develop a simple game theory model that identifies how case promotion is linked to judicial choice. Results of a simultaneous equations model estimating the Mexican Supreme Court's merits decisions and its choices to publicize those decisions by issuing press releases to national media outlets support an account of constitutional review in which judges believe they can influence their authority through case promotion.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 38, Heft 9, S. 1159-1162
ISSN: 1552-3829
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 38, Heft 9, S. 1159-1161
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 38, Heft 9, S. 1159-1162
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Comparative politics, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 41
ISSN: 2151-6227
In: Comparative politics, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 41-60
ISSN: 0010-4159
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 477-491
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractInternational courts have far-from-perfect records of compliance. States routinely delay the implementation of policy changes necessary to come into line with international obligations. Some judicial orders are simply ignored in their entirety. Yet judicial orders aimed at potentially recalcitrant states often vaguely express what is required and thus create conditions for delay and defiance. This article leverages a detailed public monitoring system for decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to evaluate a model of judicial opinion writing that connects the informational challenges associated with effectuating significant policy change to the language that judges adopt in their orders and, ultimately, to the reactions of states. Our results suggest that uncertainty about how precisely to bring about a policy change influences compliance by reducing the clarity of judicial orders. Flexibility in language permits judges to tradeoff maximal pressure for compliance for the ability to leverage local knowledge about how to bring a state in line with its international obligations. From this perspective, noncompliant outcomes are not necessarily a clear signal of weak judicial institutions, but, instead, they are a natural piece of the process by which judges manage difficult policy-making tasks.
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 274-302
ISSN: 1460-3667
Followers of law, politics and business commonly relate stories of individuals who appear to predict an expected performance level below what they believe themselves to be capable of. The standard explanation for such rhetoric is that it hedges against the negative consequences of unanticipated failures and takes advantage of unexpected successes. Although the strategy appears highly attractive, some individuals do provide honest evaluations of their abilities, and some overpromise. We develop a model of strategic communication designed to explain this variation. Underpromising is especially attractive when observers have strong incentives to watch a preliminary performance; however, when high-quality individuals are in large supply and when the costs of performing badly are neither too high nor too low, underpromising can result in individuals being ignored. To ensure that they are not, individuals must give up the opportunity to outperform a promise and risk an underperformance.
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 274-303
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 274-302
Followers of law, politics and business commonly relate stories of individuals who appear to predict an expected performance level below what they believe themselves to be capable of. The standard explanation for such rhetoric is that it hedges against the negative consequences of unanticipated failures and takes advantage of unexpected successes. Although the strategy appears highly attractive, some individuals do provide honest evaluations of their abilities, and some overpromise. We develop a model of strategic communication designed to explain this variation. Underpromising is especially attractive when observers have strong incentives to watch a preliminary performance; however, when high-quality individuals are in large supply and when the costs of performing badly are neither too high nor too low, underpromising can result in individuals being ignored. To ensure that they are not, individuals must give up the opportunity to outperform a promise and risk an underperformance. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: International organization, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 553-587
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractAlthough scholars have made considerable progress on a number of important research questions by relaxing assumptions commonly used to divide political science into subfields, rigid boundaries remain in some contexts. In this essay, we suggest that the assumption that international politics is characterized by anarchy whereas domestic politics is characterized by hierarchy continues to divide research on the conditions under which governments are constrained by courts, international or domestic. We contend that we will learn more about the process by which courts constrain governments, and do so more quickly, if we relax the assumption and recognize the substantial similarities between domestic and international research on this topic. We review four recent books that highlight contemporary theories of the extent to which domestic and international law binds states, and discuss whether a rigid boundary between international and domestic scholarship can be sustained on either theoretical or empirical grounds.