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Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

I takt med at den globale opvarmning tager til, og polarisen hastigt smelter, øges de arktiske områders strategiske betydning. Polarområderne bliver gradvist mere tilgængelige for udnyttelse af det formodede væld af naturressourcer i undergrunden, og håbet er desuden, at de på længere sigt kan fungere som transitrute for den globale skibstrafik mellem Europa og Asien. Det har i de senere år medført fornyet politisk og økonomisk interesse i Arktis. Interessen for dette formodede arktiske bonanza har været så stor, at det i nogle iagttageres øjne lignede grundlaget for et nyt 'great game' mellem stormagterne. Denne bekymring ses ikke mindst i mediernes gentagne historier om russisk oprustning i Arktis. Og det russiske genbevæbningsprogram fra 2011, som frem til 2020 vil tilføre i alt 22 billioner rubler til indkøb af militært materiel til hele det russiske forsvar, tilfører da også markant øgede ressourcer til de russiske styrker i Arktis. Samtidig har en del af den russiske debat om Arktis været indlejret i en IP-realistisk/geopolitisk tænkning ovenikøbet med et patriotisk tilsnit, som har handlet om at Rusland skulle "erobre", "tilkæmpe sig" eller "besejre" Arktis og sætte magt, herunder militær magt, bag de nationale interesser i området. På den anden side har den førte politik fra Ruslands side hidtil været solidt indlejret i en IP-liberalistisk, folkeretsligt inspireret og moderniseringsfokuseret diskurs, som er præget af ord som "forhandling", "samarbejde" og "joint ventures", og som har som grundantagelse, at de virksomheder og lande, der opererer i Arktis, alle får mest ud af det, hvis man samarbejder i fred og fordragelighed. Spørgsmålet er, om Rusland har tænkt sig at fortsætte det IP-liberalistiske spor eller om det forværrende forhold mellem Vesten og Rusland, som følge af krigen i Ukraine, kan tænkes at få afsmittende virkning i Arktis?

Hvordan tænker den russiske sikkerhedspolitiske og militære elite påvirkningsoperationer? Og hvordan har man brugt påvirkningsoperationer i praksis i de to krige i Ukraine, i 2014 og 2022? Dette undersøger vi ved at søge at indfange den russiske forståelse af påvirkningsoperationer ved hjælp af begreberne "aktive foranstaltninger" og "maskirovka". Og som man måske kunne forvente, er aktive foranstaltninger og maskirovka blevet anvendt aktivt af Rusland i krigene mod Ukraine. Størst succes havde man i 2014, hvor Ukraine og Vesten stort set blev taget på sengen og Krim erobret nærmest uden kamp. Under invasionen i 2022 har de russiske påvirkningsoperationer dog også haft succes. Først og fremmest i forhold til at vildlede Ukraine om, hvor hovedangrebet blev sat ind. En vildledning, der kunne have haft fatale konsekvenser for Ukraine.

How does the Russian security and military elite think about influence operations? How have influence operations been used in practice in the two wars in Ukraine, in 2014 and 2022? We explore this by seeking to capture the Russian understanding of influence operations using the concepts "active measures" and "maskirovka". As might be expected, Russia has used active measures and maskirovka in the wars against Ukraine. The greatest success was in 2014 when Ukraine and the West were virtually caught off guard and Crimea was captured almost without a fight. However, Russian influence operations have also been successful in 2022 invasion, primarily in misleading Ukraine about where the main attack was being launched. A misdirection that could have had fatal consequences for Ukraine.