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A growing number of Americans stay informed about current events through social media. But using social media as a source of news is associated with increased likelihood of being misinformed about important topics, such as COVID-19. The two most popular platforms—Facebook and YouTube—remain relatively understudied in comparison to Twitter, which tends to be used by elites, but less than a quarter of the American public. In this brief research report, we investigate how cognitive reflection can mitigate the potential effects of using Facebook, YouTube and Twitter for news on subsequent conspiracy theory endorsement. To do that, we rely on an original dataset of 1,009 survey responses collected during the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States, on March 31, 2020. We find that using Facebook and YouTube for news increases conspiracy belief (both general and COVID-19 specific), controlling for cognitive reflection, traditional news media use, use of web-based news media, partisanship, education, age, and income. We also find that the impact of Facebook use on conspiracy belief is moderated by cognitive reflection. Facebook use increases conspiracy belief among those with low cognitive reflection but has no effect among those with moderate levels of cognitive reflection. It might even decrease conspiracy belief among those with the highest levels of cognitive reflection.

Research examining attitudes and behaviors of Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic has largely focused on partisanship as a lens through which many Americans see the coronavirus. Given the importance of partisan affiliation and the degree of partisan polarization in the American society, that is certainly an important driver of public opinion, and a necessary one to understand. But an overlooked set of predispositions might also shape COVID beliefs and attitudes: populism. It is a worldview that pits average citizens against "the elites" and, importantly in the context of a pandemic, it includes anti-intellectual attitudes such as distrust of experts (including scientists). We find that populism is correlated with conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19, above and beyond partisanship. Furthermore, we find that conservative media consumption tends to be a stronger predictor of conspiracy belief among those high in populism than among those low in populism. We also show that these beliefs have consequences: those who believe the conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are less likely to adapt behaviors recommended by public health officials.

Supporters of the Republican Party have become much more skeptical of the science of climate change since the 1990s. This article argues that out-group cues from Democratic elites caused a backlash that resulted in greater climate skepticism. The authors construct aggregate measures of climate skepticism from nearly 200 public opinion polls at the quarterly level from 2001 to 2014 and at the annual level from 1986 to 2014. They also build time-series measures of possible contributors to climate skepticism using an automated media content analysis. The analyses provide evidence that cues from party elites – especially from Democrats – are associated with aggregate dynamics in climate change skepticism, including among supporters of the Republican Party. The study also involves a party cue survey experiment administered to a sample of 3,000 Americans through Amazon Mechanical Turk to provide more evidence of causality. Together, these results highlight the importance of out-group cue taking and suggest that climate change skepticism should be examined through the lens of elite-led opinion formation.

We have yet to know the ultimate global impact of the novel coronavirus pandemic. However, we do know that delays, denials and misinformation about COVID-19 have exacerbated its spread and slowed pandemic response, particularly in the U.S. (e.g., Abutaleb et al., 2020).

ObjectiveWork on economic news argues that U.S. coverage focuses primarily on changes rather than levels of future economic conditions; it also both affects and reflects public economic sentiment. Given that economic perceptions are related to policy preferences and government support, this is of consequence for politics. This article explores the generalizability of these findings.MethodsUsing nearly 100,000 stories over 30 years in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, we compare media tone, public opinion, and economic conditions.ResultAnalyses demonstrate that media tone and public opinion follow future economic change in all three countries. Media and opinion are also related, but the effect mostly runs from the public to the media, not the other way around.ConclusionThese results confirm the generalizability of prior findings, and the importance of considering more than a simple unidirectional link between media coverage and public economic sentiment.

Historically, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have relied on mainstream news media to expose human-rights violations and encourage governments to pressure the perpetrators. Thanks to the Internet, NGOs are crafting new strategies for conducting information politics. Despite the obvious democratization of access to the means of communication, however, the new media may in fact represent a more challenging environment in which to be heard for some groups seeking global attention. We draw on agenda-setting research to develop a theory of global attention bottlenecks and use it to explain the success of 257 transnational human-rights groups at generating attention in both international mainstream news media and social media outlets. We conclude that most NGOs lack the organizational resources to compete effectively for either traditional news coverage or for public attention and that the Internet is unlikely to resolve the problem of global communication.

Economic perceptions affect policy preferences and government support. It thus matters that these perceptions are driven by factors other than the economy, including media coverage. We nevertheless know little about how media reflect economic trends, and whether they influence (or are influenced by) public economic perceptions. This article explores the economy, media, and public opinion, focusing in particular on whether media coverage and the public react to changes in or levels of economic activity, and the past, present, or future economy. Analyses rely on content-analytic data drawn from 30,000 news stories over 30 years in the United States. Results indicate that coverage reflects change in the future economy, and that this both influences and is influenced by public evaluations. These patterns make more understandable the somewhat surprising finding of positive coverage and public assessments in the midst of the Great Recession. They also may help explain previous findings in political behavior. Adapted from the source document.

The novel coronavirus reached the United States and Canada almost at the same time. The first reported American case was January 20, 2020, and in Canada it was January 15, 2020 (Canada, 2020; Holshue et al., 2020). Yet, the response to this crisis has been different in the two countries. In the US, President Donald Trump, prominent Republicans, and conservative media initially dismissed the dangers of COVID-19 (Stecula, 2020). The pandemic became politicized from the early days, and even though Trump and Republicans have walked back many of their initial claims, there continue to be media reports of partisan differences in public opinion shaped by that early response. At the same time, the response in Canada has been mostly characterized by across-the-board partisan consensus among political elites (Merkley et al., 2020).