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This article proposes a descriptive typology of civilian resettlement patterns in civil wars. The patterns vary in two dimensions: whether or not displaced civilians cluster together or resettle independently, and if they remain within their home country or not. The combination of the factors leads to four resettlement patterns: expulsion, segregation, integration, and dispersion. Expulsion and segregation occur when the displaced cluster, either within the home state (segregation) or beyond it (expulsion). Integration and dispersion occur when the displaced do not cluster but seek to blend in with other communities, either abroad (dispersion) or within core cities and towns in the state (integration). After introducing the typology and illustrating it with examples, the article engages in theory-building to explain variation in resettlement patterns. It argues that resettlement forms are based on the type of displacement that civilians experience, and the perpetrator of the violence. The displacement type influences individuals' best strategy for achieving relative safety. Within and across wars, groups that experience political cleansing are likely to cluster together for safety. The best destination options for the displaced to resettle depend on the perpetrator, which lead to clustering either within a state if the actor is non-state, or outside the state if the actor is the state or an ally. The argument is illustrated with examples. Finally, the article considers the implications of resettlement patterns for violence, conflict, and state-building.

Refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are not always safe where they resettle in ethnic civil wars, in which civilians' identities overlap with the ethnic profile of armed combatants. This article argues that IDPs are also vulnerable in non-ethnic civil wars, through two related mechanisms that indicate civilians' loyalties: (1) where the displaced are from and when they left; and (2) resettlement patterns. The first can suggest loyalties when the displacement is associated with territorial conquest and expulsion of suspected sympathizers. In turn, the displaced would be considered disloyal by the armed group responsible for the expulsion, and could be subject to further violence where they resettle. The second mechanism relates to the first: if displaced civilians are considered disloyal, then resettling with other, similarly stigmatized civilians can improve their security by reducing the household's risk of discovery. However, clustering together with other IDPs can have a perverse effect: even though living in an enclave may reduce a particular household's likelihood of suffering violence, the group itself is endangered because it is more easily detected. Armed groups can collectively target IDPs who resettle in clusters, either for strategic or retributive reasons. Implications of the argument are tested with detailed subnational panel data on IDP arrivals and massacres in Colombia, and the analyses provide support for the argument. The findings indicate that collective targeting of IDPs occurs even in civil wars without an ethnic cleavage, following voluntary resettlement patterns, and reinforces IDP security as a policy priority.

This article highlights a nefarious effect of elections during civil wars by demonstrating that they can facilitate the displacement of civilians. This occurs through two main mechanisms: they reveal information about civilians' loyalties directly to armed groups; and they threaten the status quo of local elites' power, motivating them to ally with outside armed groups in order to regain it. Armed groups strategically displace civilians identified as "disloyal" in order to gain control over a territory. I test implications of the argument with original, micro-level quantitative and qualitative data from northwest Colombia. Using voter censuses and disaggregated electoral returns from 1991-1998, I show that residents in urban neighborhoods that supported the insurgent-backed political party, the Patriotic Union (UP), were more likely to leave the city of Apartadó than neighbors in other districts. However, residents of the nearby rural communities that supported the UP were the least likely to leave. I trace the patterns of violence across the communities using local archival materials and interviews to assess how well the argument accounts for the variation observed, and to explore the unexpected outcome in the rural area. While I find that counterinsurgents attempted strategic displacement in both the city and the mountains, they only succeeded in the urban areas because residents of the rural hamlets were uniquely able to overcome the collective action problem that strategic displacement generates. The findings demonstrate that that political identities are relevant for patterns of violence, and that political cleansing resembles ethnic cleansing. ; Este artículo muestra un nefasto efecto de las elecciones durante las guerras civiles, ya que las contiendas por el poder local pueden generan grandes desplazamientos de civiles. Las elecciones generan desplazamiento forzoso de civiles a través de dos mecanismos. Primero, las elecciones revelan información acerca de las lealtades civiles a los grupos armados, que los permiten expulsar a los civiles señalada como "desleal" para ganar el control de territorios. Segundo, las elecciones amenazan el status que de poder de élites locales. Esto motiva a las élites de poder local a buscar alianzas con grupos armados para mantenerse en el poder, expulsando a la gente no simpatizante. El artículo presenta un análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo de las implicaciones de este argumento utilizando una base de datos novedosa de censos de votantes, y resultados electorales en Apartadó Colombia para los periodos de elecciones locales de 1991-1998. Los resultados demuestran que habitantes de barrios urbanos de Apartadó que apoyaron a la Unión Patriótica (UP) durante la elección del congreso de 1991, tenían mayor probabilidad desplazarse que sus vecinos de otras identidades políticas. De la misma manera, habitantes de las veredas rurales del corregimiento de San José de Apartadó que apoyaron a la UP tenían una menor probabilidad de ser desplazados. Utilizando datos de los archivos municipales y entrevistas con civiles, oficiales locales, y excombatientes, este artículo encuentra evidencia que puede explicar la variación dentro del municipio. Los paramilitares intentaban desplazar tanto a grupos de civiles que apoyan a la UP en la ciudad como en el campo, sin embargo, solo eran exitosos en los barrios urbanos dado que habitantes de veredas rurales pudieron superar el problema de acción colectiva de manera más exitosa. Los resultados demuestran que las identidades políticas y las elecciones están correlacionados con los patrones de violencia y el desplazamiento. De la misma manera, este artículo demuestra que los patrones y mecanismos utilizados en procesos de limpieza política se asemejan a los mecanismos utilizados en otras guerras civiles donde se realiza limpieza étnica.

This article highlights a nefarious effect of elections during civil wars by demonstrating that they can facilitate the displacement of civilians. In contrast to the perception of displacement as haphazard, the author argues that armed groups displace strategically when they attempt to gain control over a territory, and where they have information about civilians' loyalties. Although inferring preferences is difficult in the context of civil wars, elections conducted before or during a violent conflict are one way that armed groups can identify local cleavages and ''disloyal'' residents. The author tests implications of the argument with original, microlevel quantitative and qualitative data from northwest Colombia. Using voter files and disaggregated electoral returns, the author shows that residents in urban neighborhoods that supported the insurgent-backed political party, the Patriotic Union (UP), were more likely to leave the city of Apartadó than were neighbors in other districts. However, residents of the nearby rural communities that supported the UP were the least likely to leave. The author traces the patterns of violence across the communities using local archival materials and interviews to assess how well the argument accounts for the variation observed, and to explore the unexpected outcome in the rural area. While the author finds that counterinsurgents attempted strategic displacement in both the city and the mountains, they only succeeded in the urban areas because residents of the rural hamlets were uniquely able to overcome the collective action problem that strategic displacement generates. The findings demonstrate that political identities are relevant for patterns of violence, and that cleansing occurs even in nonethnic civil wars.