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Introduction -- The distribution of self-financing : candidate quality, timing, and the local context -- How self-financing shapes the field of competition -- How much bang in a self-financed buck? -- Self-financing and the electoral connection -- Democracy, campaign reform, and politics

Every two years the financing of federal elections changes, sometimes subtly and other times more dramatically, sometimes necessarily in response to new rules and other times innovatively in response to old ones. This essay discusses changes in place or afoot for the 2008 congressional elections. In the coming cycle, the new congressional majority will enjoy a significant fundraising edge, social-welfare organizations will be more engaged in political interventions, unions and corporations will re-enter the pre-election advertising scene, and lobbyist contributions will come into the sunlight. Vacancies on the Federal Election Commission will likely stifle the creativity of candidates and campaign financiers, as innovations cannot be sanctioned until a quorum is available to approve advisory opinions. The non-profit education program of the IRS may also temper the anticipated rush to shift political activity to social-welfare organizations.

Every two years the financing of federal elections changes, sometimes subtly and other times more dramatically, sometimes necessarily in response to new rules and other times innovatively in response to old ones. This essay discusses changes in place or afoot for the 2008 congressional elections. In the coming cycle, the new congressional majority will enjoy a significant fundraising edge, social-welfare organizations will be more engaged in political interventions, unions and corporations will re-enter the pre-election advertising scene, and lobbyist contributions will come into the sunlight. Vacancies on the Federal Election Commission will likely stifle the creativity of candidates and campaign financiers, as innovations cannot be sanctioned until a quorum is available to approve advisory opinions. The non-profit education program of the IRS may also temper the anticipated rush to shift political activity to social-welfare organizations. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractDo term limits affect the probability that an incumbent state legislator will run for the United States Congress? The theory of strategic politicians suggests that by reducing legislators' opportunity costs of running for higher office, term limits should push some legislators into congressional campaigns they would have foregone had a long-term legislative career been an option. To test this hypothesis, I analyze data from congressional elections held from 1992 through 2004 in the 15 states where term limits were operative in 2004. I find that sitting state legislators who have hit the limit of their state legislative service are more likely to run for Congress than those who are eligible to serve additional terms, whether those terms are limited or not. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the congressional-candidacy rates of legislators whose re-election eligibility is limited, but not exhausted, and legislators whose terms are not limited. By increasing the supply of experienced challengers, term limits may increase competition in elections for non-term-limited offices and, consequently, the quality of representation provided by those elected.

Do term limits affect the probability that an incumbent state legislator will run for the United States Congress? The theory of strategic politicians suggests that by reducing legislators' opportunity costs of running for higher office, term limits should push some legislators into congressional campaigns they would have foregone had a long-term legislative career been an option. To test this hypothesis, I analyze data from congressional elections held from 1992 through 2004 in the 15 states where term limits were operative in 2004. I find that sitting state legislators who have hit the limit of their state legislative service are more likely to run for Congress than those who are eligible to serve additional terms, whether those terms are limited or not. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the congressional-candidacy rates of legislators whose re-election eligibility is limited, but not exhausted, & legislators whose terms are not limited. By increasing the supply of experienced challengers, term limits may increase competition in elections for non-term-limited offices &, consequently, the quality of representation provided by those elected. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-188) and index. ; Introduction -- The distribution of self-financing : candidate quality, timing, and the local context -- How self-financing shapes the field of competition -- How much bang in a self-financed buck? -- Self-financing and the electoral connection -- Democracy, campaign reform, and politics. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author considers the impacts of the "Millionaires Amendment" of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) in this chapter of Life after Reform: When Bipartisan Campaign Reform Meets Politics. Self financing as an issue of political equality is discussed in relation to the First Amendment & Buckley vs Valeo as an attempt to raise the opponents opportunity without restricting the wealthy self-financer. But, the direct impact of BCRA on self-lending is a reduction of competition due to increased risk nonrepayment of self-loans, increased individual contribution limits due to the opposition's receipts, & an incumbent protector. The extended effect of the Millionaire's Amendment on the contour of the candidate field is the possibility of less deterrence of new candidates facing self financers, although few elections will be impacted by the constraints of the amendment. The author concludes that the impacts on strategic decisions of potential candidates cannot be clearly predicted. 1 Table. J. Harwell