Suchergebnisse

A general growth model with explicit resource reallocation costs is set up. A new feature is the property of hysteresis (i.e. a continuum of stationary equilibria) in closed-economy growth models. Employing a linear model the hysteresis range and the consequences for the long-run growth rate are determined analytically. The most important conclusions are the following: (1) An economy's long-run position may depend critically on the initial intersectoral allocation pattern as well as on the efficiency of the resource reallocation sector; (2) if we interpret the resource reallocation sector as a specific part of the education sector, there is a straightforward possibility for the government to reduce the range of hysteresis and hence the dependence on initial conditions; (3) international trade is an important device to overcome the negative consequences of high resource reallocation costs for long-run growth.

The theory of endogenous technical change has deeply contributed to our understanding of the fundamental sources of economic growth and development. In this chapter we survey important contributions in the field by focussing on the basic structure of endogenous growth models with horizontal as well as vertical innovation and emphasizing important implications for growth policy. We address issues like the scale effect problem, directed technological change to understand the evolution of wage inequality, long-run divergence between the innovating North and the imitating South due to inappropriate technology in the South, the relationship between trade and growth, competition and R&D, and the role of imperfect capital markets for R&D-based growth.

Motivated by the process of economic development in Eastern Germany since the German reunification we set up a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open economy where both capital and labor are mobile and there are increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level. The model features multiple equilibria as well as (local and global) indeterminacy. Expectations matter for resulting equilibrium dynamics, implying that economic confidence may be crucial for the process of economic development. Despite its simplicity, the model can replicate major empirical facts and bears a number of non-trivial implications.

This paper aims at better understanding the inefficiency due to distributional conflicts, which are inherent in every market economy. To this end, we set up a simple general equilibrium model with the following characteristics: two groups of agents (capitalists and workers), an endogenous income tax, productive government expenditures, social transfers, and an outside option for capital. The political mechanism employed in this paper accounts for the evidence showing that the degree of organization of major interest groups has an impact on political outcomes and, in addition, allows for strategic interaction among major interest groups. We decompose the overall inefficiency into three components: (i) a fundamental time inconsistency problem; (ii) strategic interaction in the political process; (iii) heterogeneity among individuals and the resulting unavoidable conflict of interest. A numerical exercise (based on OECD data) shows that the distributional-conflict inefficiency may cause a substantial output loss of about 7%.

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.

We set up a simple dynamic macroeconomic model with (i) polluting consump- tion and a preference for a clean environment, (ii) increasing returns in abate- ment giving rise to an EKC and (iii) sustained growth resulting from a linear final-output technology. The model captures two sorts of market failures caused by external effects associated with consumption and environmental effort. This model is employed to investigate the determinants of the turning point and the (relative) effectiveness of different public policy measures aimed at a reduction of the environmental burden. Moreover, the model offers a potential explana- tion of an N-shaped pollution-income relation. Finally, it is shown that the model is compatible with most empirical regularities on economic growth and the environment. ; May 2005