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Because of the upswing in electronic commerce via the Internet, governments in the European Union and the United States have been discussing the shaping of an effective system of turnover taxation in cyberspace since the late 1990s, but have failed to agree on a definite tax system. In the Kiel Discussion Paper 384, Jürgen Stehn discusses alternative approaches.¤ An analysis of the various possible approaches to turnover taxation in cyberspace shows that the main challenge of the new economy is to effectively cope with business-to- consumer (B2C) transborder trade in digital on-line goods and services. However, the traditional systems of turnover taxation that are based on the country-of-destination principle such as the transitional system of the European Union, the sales tax system, the community principle, and the VIVAT and CVAT approaches give rise to several surveillance, efficiency, incentive, and identification problems in taxing B2C e-commerce. This is also the case with the more innovative proposals that have been made with regard to the taxation of B2C transborder trade in digital on-line goods, such as the German payment flow proposal, the U.S. e-card proposal, the modified country-of-origin proposal of the EU Commission, or the bit tax proposal. As a consequence, the author concludes, there are only two appropriate approaches to deal with the special characteristics of transborder trade in cyberspace: the country-of-origin principle combined with a taxation of digital goods and services at the physical location of producers, and the community principle in combination with a withholding tax (WITHVAT). Under the country-of-origin principle, exports are taxed at the rate of the country of origin and imports are free of tax. The taxation of goods turnovers at the physical location of the firms involved could at least partly prevent the transfer of Internet firms to low-tax countries. The main advantage of the country-of-origin principle is that it does not require any transborder tax adjustment and that it is also a suitable and effective approach for the turnover taxation of traditional off-line and on-line goods. However, the country-of-origin principle requires an administratively burdensome central clearinghouse system in order to guarantee the regional fiscal assignment according to the country-of-destination principle as demanded by the governments of the EU member states. Under the WITHVAT system, exports of digital on-line goods are taxed at the rate of the country of destination and consumers are responsible for passing the tax funds on to their national tax authorities. In order to set incentives for consumers to correctly report their digital on-line purchases to national tax authorities, all suppliers of digital online goods would be forced to add a withholding tax that equals the highest VAT rate of all countries participating in the transborder VAT system to any sales to consumers. Consumers would get a refund according to the difference between the withholding tax and the tax rate of the country of destination if they presented the bills to their national tax authorities. The main advantage of the WITHVAT approach is that it does not need a central clearinghouse mechanism, because decentralized clearing is endogenous in the system. However, the WITHVAT approach may give rise to an unspecificable obstacle to e-commerce and is not a suitable approach for the taxation of traditional off-line and on-line goods, the author concludes.

Das vorliegende Diskussionspapier befaßt sich mit der bevorstehenden Osterweiterung der EU. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Frage, in wie weit die bestehenden EU-Verordnungen verändert werden müssten. Sowohl eine Reform der EU-Ausgabenprogramme wie auch eine Umstrukturierung der EU-Institutionen werden in Erwägung gezogen.

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Der Autor stellt vor dem Hintergrund der ökonomischen Theorie des Föderalismus die Frage, ob dezentrale Kompetenzen beim Infektionsschutz auf Länderebene weniger effizient sind als zentrale Kompetenzen auf der Bundesebene. Er stellt fest, dass die Präferenzen zwischen den Bundesländern mit Blick auf die Art und das Ausmaß der Pandemiebekämpfung in der Corona-Krise relativ stark variierten. Daher dürfte die Verantwortung der Bundesländer für den Infektionsschutz zu Wohlfahrtsgewinnen geführt haben, zumal die dezentralen Zuständigkeiten beim Infektionsschutz einen produktiven Wettbewerb der Bundesländer um geeignete Lösungen ermöglicht haben. Nachteilige externe Effekte einer regionalen Pandemiebekämpfung können hingegen durch eine Beschränkung der überregionalen Mobilität in engen Grenzen gehalten werden. Eine Verlagerung der Zuständigkeiten für den Infektionsschutz auf die Bundesebene ist daher aus Sicht des Autors unter Effizienzgesichtspunkten eher schädlich als nützlich. Auch eine bundeseinheitliche 'Notbremse' erscheint mit Blick auf ökonomische Effizienzkriterien bestenfalls als nutzlos. ; Against the backdrop of the economic theory of federalism, the author examines whether decentralized powers in infection control at the state level are less efficient than centralized powers at the federal level. He reveals that preferences varied relatively widely among the states with respect to the type and extent of pandemic response during the Corona crisis. Therefore, federal responsibility for infection control likely resulted in welfare gains, especially since decentralized responsibilities for infection control allowed for productive competition among the states for appropriate solutions. In contrast, adverse externalities of pandemic response at the state level can be kept within narrow bounds by limiting transregional mobility. Therefore, in the author's view, a shift of responsibilities for infection control to the federal level is more harmful than beneficial from an efficiency perspective. A uniform federal "emergency brake", as introduced by the federal government in April 2021, appears to be useless at best in view of economic efficiency criteria.

Dieser Beitrag stellt die Frage, inwieweit das Weißbuch der EU-Kommission zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union erfolgversprechende Szenarien für eine künftige Ausgestaltung der europäischen Integration skizziert. Es wird gezeigt, dass die EU-Kommission bei dieser Aufgabe an einem Kern-Problem scheitert, nämlich der Definition und Begründung von Kernkompetenzen der EU anhand eines geeigneten Referenzsystems. Um dieses Kern-Problem zu lösen, werden auf Grundlage des ökonomischen Subsidiaritätsprinzips acht Kernkompetenzen und ein Sonderfall abgeleitet. Die Analyse verdeutlicht, dass die Handels-, Kapital- und Niederlassungsfreiheit, die Fusions- und Beihilfenaufsicht sowie die Asyl-, Sicherheits- und Umweltpolitik den thematischen Kern einer künftigen Ausgestaltung des europäischen Integrationsprozesses bilden sollten. ; This paper asks, in how far the White Paper on the Future of Europe of the European Commission sketches promising scenarios for a future European integration process. It shows that the EU-Commission fails at the task to define and justify European core competencies on basis of an appropriate reference system. To solve this problem, eight nucleus competencies and a special case are derived on basis of the economic principle of subsidiarity. The analysis shows that the freedom of trade, capital and establishment, merger and aid monitoring as well as asylum, security and environmental policies should build the thematic core of the future European integration process.

The paper analyzes one important aspect of the constitutional debate: the allocation of econornie competences between the EU and the mernber states. It takes the theory of fiscal federalism as a starting point for an optimal allocation of economic competences. The main message of the theory is that a transfer of econornie competences from a lower to a higher political level always leads to a negligence of individual preferences and, therefore, can only be economically justified if national policies cause strong spillovers (externalities) to other jurisdictions. Based on this approach, the paper proposes an allocation of econornic conipetences that can serve as an overall. guideline for a European constitution.

Auf dem Gipfel in Laeken im Dezember 2001 hat der Europäische Rat die Einrichtung eines Europäischen Konvents beschlossen, der sich mit Zukunftsfragen der Europäischen Union (EU) beschäftigen und Leitlinien für die nächste intergouvermentale Konferenz erarbeiten soll. Im Mittelpunkt der Konventsarbeit stehen die folgenden Fragen: Was erwarten die Bürger Europas von der Europäischen Union? Wie sollen die politischen und ökonomischen Kompetenzen zwischen der EU und den Mitgliedstaaten aufgeteilt werden? Welchen Institutionen sollen der EU zufallende Kompetenzen zugeordnet werden? Diese Verfassungsdebatte ist von besonderer Bedeutung, da immer mehr Menschen in Europa mit Misstrauen auf die wachsenden Kompetenzen der EU-Institutionen blicken und daher gute politische und ökonomische Gründe für eine weitere Zentralisierung von Kompetenzen fordern. Das Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, eine ökonomische Grundlage für die kommenden Diskussionen im Europäischen Konvent zu erarbeiten. Zunächst wird – basierend auf der Theorie des fiskalischen Föderalismus – ein Referenzsystem für eine ökonomisch optimale Verteilung von Kompetenzen innerhalb einer supranationalen Gemeinschaft wie der EU entworfen. Ausgehend von dieser theoretischen Analyse werden dann Leitlinien für eine Zuordnung ökonomischer Kompetenzen in den wichtigsten Politikbereichen der EU skizziert.

Because of the upswing in electronic commerce via the Internet, governments in the European Union and the United States have been discussing the shaping of an effective system of turnover taxation in cyberspace since the late 1990s, but have failed to agree on a definite tax system. An analysis of the various possible approaches to turnover taxation in cyberspace shows that the main challenge of the new economy is to effectively cope with business-to-consumer (B2C) transborder trade in digital on-line goods and services. However, the traditional systems of turnover taxation that are based on the country-of-destination principle such as the transitional system of the European Union, the sales tax system, the community principle, and the VIVAT and CVAT approaches give rise to several surveillance, efficiency, incentive, and identification problems in taxing B2C e-commerce. This is also the case with the more innovative proposals that have been made with regard to the taxation of B2C transborder trade in digital on-line goods, such as the German payment flow proposal, the U.S. e-card proposal, the modified country-of-origin proposal of the EU Commission, or the bit tax proposal. As a consequence, there are only two appropriate approaches to deal with the special characteristics of transborder trade in cyberspace: the country-of-origin principle combined with a taxation of digital goods and services at the physical location of producers, and the community principle in combination with a withholding tax (WITHVAT). Under the country-of-origin principle, exports are taxed at the rate of the country of origin and imports are free of tax. The taxation of goods turnovers at the physical location of the firms involved could at least partly prevent the transfer of Internet firms to low-tax countries. The main advantage of the country-of-origin principle is that it does not require any transborder tax adjustment and that it is also a suitable and effective approach for the turnover taxation of traditional off-line and on-line goods. However, the country-of-origin principle requires an administratively burdensome central clearinghouse system in order to guarantee the regional fiscal assignment according to the countryof- destination principle as demanded by the governments of the EU member states. Under the WITHVAT system, exports of digital on-line goods are taxed at the rate of the country of destination and consumers are responsible for passing the tax funds on to their national tax authorities. In order to set incentives for consumers to correctly report their digital on-line purchases to national tax authorities, all suppliers of digital online goods would be forced to add a withholding tax that equals the highest VAT rate of all countries participating in the transborder VAT system to any sales to consumers. Consumers would get a refund according to the difference between the withholding tax and the tax rate of the country of destination if they presented the bills to their national tax authorities. The main advantage of the WITHVAT approach is that it does not need a central clearinghouse mechanism, because decentralized clearing is endogenous in the system. However, the WITHVAT approach may give rise to an unspecifiable obstacle to e-commerce and is not a suitable approach for the taxation of traditional off-line and on-line goods.