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ObjectiveThis article evaluates the relationship between the degree of access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the extent of anti‐government protests and riots, accounting for the effects of past protest on subsequent ICT access, and examines direct and indirect effects of ICT diffusion on political change.MethodUsing a cross‐national time‐series data set from 1995 through 2014, the article employs simultaneous equations using the GSEM function in Stata to assess these relationships.ResultsThe results indicate that ICT access at time t is conditioned on the number of anti‐regime mass actions four and five years earlier. They also show greater ICT access corresponds with more contemporaneous anti‐government mass actions.ConclusionsThe effect of ICT diffusion on political change occurs indirectly through its effect on mass actions, but may lead to either political retrogression or liberalization. ICT diffusions' direct effect sustains the political status quo. The conclusion that ICTs serve as liberation technology remains ambiguous.

This work examines the dynamic relationship among elites, media, and the public during authoritarian rule. Using Brazil's military regime (1964-85), it investigates whether changing press censorship influenced public support for military rule during the period of political liberalization. This paper uses the exposure-resistance model of opinion formation, in which a person's probability of supporting a position depends first on her probability of exposure to and reception of an elite cue advocating that position, and secondarily on the probability that she resists that position once exposed. Her likelihood of exposure to and reception of elite cues increases with her attention to news media and the extent of her political awareness; her odds of accepting the positions advocated by elites depends on her political ideology and her critical capacity to evaluate the content and source of the cue. Using three public opinion surveys carried out between 1972 and 1982, and an analysis of newspaper content during the dictatorship, this research demonstrates that censored media convinced Brazilians to support military rule initially, only later during political liberalization, to expose them to increasingly critical coverage of the regime, convincing many to abandon their support for the regime. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Inc.]

This work examines the dynamic relationship among elites, media, and the public during authoritarian rule. Using Brazil's military regime (1964–85), it investigates whether changing press censorship influenced public support for military rule during the period of political liberalization. This paper uses the exposure-resistance model of opinion formation, in which a person's probability of supporting a position depends first on her probability of exposure to and reception of an elite cue advocating that position, and secondarily on the probability that she resists that position once exposed. Her likelihood of exposure to and reception of elite cues increases with her attention to news media and the extent of her political awareness; her odds of accepting the positions advocated by elites depends on her political ideology and her critical capacity to evaluate the content and source of the cue. Using three public opinion surveys carried out between 1972 and 1982, and an analysis of newspaper content during the dictatorship, this research demonstrates that censored media convinced Brazilians to support military rule initially, only later during political liberalization, to expose them to increasingly critical coverage of the regime, convincing many to abandon their support for the regime.

This paper proposes that dissident leaders aiming to build mass opposition movements follow the mainstream press to help them gauge government tolerance for anti-government mass actions in repressive authoritarian regimes. Under conditions of censorship, media-state interactions serve as a barometer of the government's disposition toward and capacity to impede public displays of dissent. Observing trends in coverage and the government's reaction to this coverage helps activist leaders assess when it should be safest to plan anti-government mass actions, such as demonstrations, marches, or strikes. Using original data derived from coding content from the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo over the period of 1974-1982, I test whether opposition mass actions followed trends in taboo content and government treatment of the press during the period of political liberalization of Brazil's military regime. (JPLA/GIGA)

Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites' incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging the ambition of some elites who have more to gain with patience than with plotting, institutionalized succession rules hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters, which ultimately reduce a leader's risk of confronting coups. Based on a variety of statistical models, including instrumental variables regression that addresses potential endogeneity between succession rules and coup attempts, the empirical evidence supports the authors' hypothesis that institutions governing leadership succession reduce the likelihood that dictators confront coups. This study clarifies one of the ways in which institutions in dictatorships help autocratic leaders survive.

The media hold democratically elected leaders accountable by exposing corruption and policy failures. Although many politicians accept media criticism as intrinsic to liberal democracy, some politicians rein in freedom of the press or intimidate media outlets to silence their critics. We identify circumstances that motivate and enable presidents to curb media freedom in presidential democracies. We argue that (a) presidents who hold ideological positions contrary to those of the mainstream media adopt the media as viable opponents in the absence of an effective electoral opposition, and (b) the media are vulnerable to presidential infringements on their freedom where legislatures and judiciaries hold weak powers relative to presidents, and are therefore unable to constrain presidents' actions against media freedom. We support our argument with quantitative analyses of press freedom ratings in presidential and semi-presidential democracies from 1993 to 2013.

As of 2009, about one-third of the world's countries were governed by some form of dictatorship and an even larger percentage of the world's population lived under authoritarian rule. Despite the prevalence of dictatorships, scholars understand little about the internal politics of these regimes. The opaqueness surrounding authoritarian governance – especially compared to the transparency required in democracies – has impeded our ability to learn how dictatorships function. Despite the inherent limitations in studying dictatorships, an increasing number of studies elaborate on authoritarian regimes. Scholars of authoritarianism concur: dictatorships are not one and the same. Differences among regimes lead to systematic variations in how their leaders behave and in the policies they choose. We examine how leadership differs across dictatorships. Our research contributes to the burgeoning research on authoritarian regimes and broadens our understanding of leadership across political systems.