Suchergebnisse

Mehr als 60 Jahre nach der Gründung des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts hat die Verwaltungsrechtsprechung eine lange Tradition vorzuweisen. Das bietet Anlass, in retrospektiver Perspektive eine Sammlung jener Entscheidungen anzubieten, die sowohl von historischer als sachgebietsbezogener Bedeutung sind – in Fortsetzung an den bereits erschienenen Band Verfassungsrechtsprechung. Ziel ist es, wichtige Entscheidungen vor ihrem Hintergrund und mit Blick auf ihre verwaltungsrechtliche und didaktische Relevanz aufzubereiten und über weiterführende Literatur eine Vertiefung zu ermöglichen. Die Autoren erläutern den juristischen Kontext der Entscheidungen, fokussieren deren Kernaussagen und identifizieren die daraus resultierenden Linien und Brüche in der Rechtsprechung.

The European debt crisis has given new impetus to the debate on economic policy coordination. In economic literature, the need for coordination has long been denied based on the view that fiscal, wage and monetary policy actors should work independently. However, the high and persistent degree of macroeconomic disparity within the EU and the absence of an optimum currency area has led to new calls for examining policy coordination. This book adopts an institutional perspective, exploring the incentives for policymakers that result from coordination mechanisms in the fields of fiscal, monetary and wage policy. Based on the concept of externalities, the work examines cross-border spillovers (e.g. induced by fiscal policy) and cross-policy spillovers (e.g. between fiscal and monetary policies), illuminating how they have empirically changed over time and how they have been addressed by policymakers. Steinbach introduces a useful classification scheme that distinguishes between vertical and horizontal coordination as well as between cross-border and cross-policy coordination. The author discusses farther-reaching forms of fiscal coordination (e.g. debt limits, insolvency proceedings, Eurobonds) with special attention to how principals of state organization affect their viability. Federal states and Bundesstaaten differ in the incentives they offer for debt accumulation - and thus in their suitability for fiscal coordination. Steinbach finds that the originally strict separation between policy areas has undergone significant change during the debt crisis. Indeed, recent efforts to coordinate policy are no longer limited to one policy area, but now extend to several areas. Steinbach argues that further fiscal policy coordination can be effectively deployed to address policy externalities, but that the coordination mechanisms used must match the form of

The European debt crisis has given new impetus to the debate on economic policy coordination. In economic literature, the need for coordination has long been denied based on the view that fiscal, wage and monetary policy actors should work independently. However, the high and persistent degree of macroeconomic disparity within the EU and the absence of an optimum currency area has led to new calls for examining policy coordination. This book adopts an institutional perspective, exploring the incentives for policymakers that result from coordination mechanisms in the fields of fiscal, monetary and wage policy. Based on the concept of externalities, the work examines cross-border spillovers (e.g. induced by fiscal policy) and cross-policy spillovers (e.g. between fiscal and monetary policies), illuminating how they have empirically changed over time and how they have been addressed by policymakers. Steinbach introduces a useful classification scheme that distinguishes between vertical and horizontal coordination as well as between cross-border and cross-policy coordination. The author discusses farther-reaching forms of fiscal coordination (e.g. debt limits, insolvency proceedings, Eurobonds) with special attention to how principals of state organization affect their viability.

Main description: Können Unternehmen, die von durch die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) genehmigten Strafzöllen betroffen sind, den entstandenen Schaden gegen die EG und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten einklagen? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage unternimmt Armin Steinbach einen Vergleich europäischer nationaler Staatshaftungsvorschriften, analysiert das EG-Staatshaftungsregime auf Grundlage der Francovich-Rechtsprechung, befasst sich mit der Wesensverschiedenheit von Nichtigkeits- und Schadensersatzklage und untersucht inwiefern die Nichtbefolgung von Entscheidungen des WTO-Streitbeilegungsorgans einen geeigneten Haftungsgrund darstellt. Komplementär dient eine ökonomische Analyse dazu, die gegenwärtige Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs auf ihre wirtschaftliche Effizienz und Anreizwirkungen zu untersuchen. Der Autor kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine Haftung aus rechtlicher Sicht möglich und aus wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Sicht wünschenswert ist.

Abstract
In a world marked by intensifying geopolitical rivalries, supply chain vulnerabilities and disruptive technological change, ensuring 'strategic autonomy' is now an avowed goal of numerous European Union (EU) policy initiatives. This article seeks to facilitate an assessment of this 'policy turn' by developing a taxonomy of associated objectives and by illuminating points of conformance and conflict with EU and international law. The EU Treaties offer a robust legal basis for a stronger-values orientation in external relations, for policies designed to rebalance reciprocity in pursuit of geo-economic ambition and for the pursuit of technological leadership within the EU Treaties' level-playing-field legal foundation. Yet there is a thin line to collisions with international (trade and investment) law, notably where value prioritization, technological preferences or geopolitical concerns are tantamount to discrimination or invite protectionist policy choices. Employment of coercive tools in a unilateral fashion questions the legal default of multilateralism and openness. Persistent strategic diversity within the Union hinders 'institutional autonomy', particularly where unanimity voting makes intergovernmentalism the predominant mode of cooperation. The findings shed light on how the evolving geopolitical environment leads to a recalibration of EU external relations between protection and openness, independence and interdependence, unilateralism and multilateralism and power and rules.

Abstract
By employing stylometric data analysis, Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc underpin the narrative of a power-mongering World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat. As 'holder of the pen' in writing WTO rulings, the Secretariat would absorb control over WTO adjudicators and the dispute settlement procedure. This reply disagrees. First, with stylometric analysis informing style rather than substance, this technique does not encrypt the intellectual ownership of WTO rulings, nor does it offer account of the deliberation between bureaucrats and adjudicators. Second, with public power typically deriving legitimacy from both political or judicial accountability as well as rational and de-politicized bureaucracies, an assertive WTO Secretariat under the direction of panellists is normatively desirable. Third, a WTO Secretariat pursuing consistent application of the growing WTO acquis does not impair the members-driven adjudication process.

All pillars of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have unleashed an array of measures to transform the economy towards climate neutrality. With the Green Deal, the strategy review of the European Central Bank (ECB), and the growing body of sustainable finance legislation, climate considerations have entered the traditional mandates governing the conduct of financial, fiscal, and monetary policy. The cross-sectional nature of climate issues reinforces the interdependence and coordination of EMU policies. This article explores changes to EMU architecture and discusses the institutional and legal implications of the novel role of climate in the coordination of EMU policies. It addresses the relationship between Treaty mandate and policy leeway, specifically the way in which the ECB extends its focus on price stability to account for climate considerations and the fiscal legal framework relies on flexibility to incentivize climate investment. It also tracks the emergence of climate stability as an EMU concept, adding to existing concepts of price, fiscal and financial stability.
EMU, ECB, monetary policy, financial policy, fiscal policy, climate change, sustainable finance, greenflation, policy coordination