Contents -- Preface -- List of cases -- List of tables -- Introduction -- Toward a diplomatic viewpoint -- When diplomatic communication is missing -- Bargaining, negotiation, and convergent interests -- Diplomacy as independent and dependent variable -- Diplomatic mediation as an independent variable -- To arms control or not -- Diplomacy as effect: public opinion as constraint and pressure -- Seeking diplomatic theory: an interim report -- Bibliography
Abstract This article pits two diplomatic strategies in competition for policy officials' support. Distributive strategies promote one party's goals at the expense of another. Integrative strategies promote goals that are in conflict with those of another state. The focus is strategy choice and strategy's bargaining potential of less developed countries (LDC) coalitions in the GATT/WTO regime. Amrita Narlikar, whose study of LDC coalitions is relied upon here, finds that many LDC states employ distributive strategy because of asymmetric structure, which emphasizes the gap between LDC and developed state capabilities, yet she critiques that strategy as ineffective in supporting LDC objectives. This disconnect is probed in this article, which concludes that LDC distributive strategy must be improved and that the integrative strategy's success in attaining LDC objectives can be important enough to override the structural argument for distributive strategy.
AbstractThis article, a corrective to long-time frustration experienced by the United States in mediating Israel-Palestine differences, argues for American recognition of a Palestinian state to reach a two-state solution. Recognition, though not even-handed, constitutes legitimate mediation, as confronting one or another primary antagonist can be a useful mediation strategy. Though Israel is likely to object tousrecognition of Palestine, analysis suggests the objection is not likely to lead to a break in Israel-American relations, which would jeopardize the valued Israel-American alliance. Recognition as a fallback option is recommended for the Trump administration's way forward in mediating the conflict.
Diplomacy, defined as formal communication and bargaining between states, is subject to limits that diplomatic theory must demarcate and understand. This article compares state incentives and disincentives (including rejection of negotiation as well as refusal to concede) affecting the decision whether to negotiate in six cases of interstate crisis between militarily unequal antagonists. While it has been argued that asymmetric powers are more likely to reach negotiating agreement than their symmetric counterparts, with weaker states doing surprisingly well, that finding is questioned here in the crisis context. For example, the militarily inferior antagonist, attracted to diplomacy as an alternative to war, might well anticipate inferior results from direct negotiations. The weaker antagonist's unwillingness in these cases to negotiate with a strong opponent suppressed diplomacy, but great power support for the weaker side, and the stronger power's lack of war readiness, added to the stronger antagonist's willingness to negotiate.
Leroy C. Hardy, emeritus professor of political science at California State University, Long Beach (CSULB), passed away on November 2, 2008, at the age of 81. He specialized in California government and politics and was best known as a long-term consultant to state legislators on the subject of the reapportionment of legislative districts.
Successful third-party diplomatic mediation illustrates diplomacy as a causative, independent element in world politics. This article asks how mediators forge agreement between force-prone, deadlocked parties in intractable diplomatic conflict, and why some such conflicts are more difficult to mediate than others. It compares three interstate and three intrastate mediation cases, each probed as a deviant episode, and tests the conventional view that intrastate conflict presents the more difficult mediation challenge. Confirming that intrastate conflict is more difficult to mediate than its interstate counterpart, the study narrows and refines the sources of the added difficulty.
