Suchergebnisse

In January 2012, the Secretary of State, in accordance with Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), designated the Islamic State in Iraq Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Based on this, the United States could take administrative measures against foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) associated with IS, including women. As of January 2023, the United States had formally repatriated 39 citizens. At least 11 more citizens returned of their own accord outside of formal processes, including two women. To date, 11 adults affiliated with the Islamic State, formally repatriated from Syria and Iraq to the United States, have faced charges for terrorism-related crimes. The aim of this research is to characterize the approach to female terrorist returnees in the United States. The following research problem is central to this article: How does the United States deal with the prosecution and conviction of women returnees involved in the activities of the Islamic State? The author focused research on case studies. Research methods include: analysis, synthe-sis, classification, generalization, and statistical data analysis. Women who are left on their own and remain in camps and prisons in Iraq and Syria can impose the ideology of the Islamic State on others, including their children. It is important not to treat the problem of repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of camp residents shortsightedly and to take a long-term solution.

In the years 2015-2021, Russia's rank in Global Terrorism Index became lower every year. In 2015 and 2016, it was classified as third among the European countries, behind Ukraine and France. In the following period (2017-2021), the United Kingdom also found itself ahead of Russia, which fell to the fourth position. The present article has the form of a quantitative analysis. The research goal is to identify trends related to terrorism that take place in the Russian Federation in the years 2015-2022 (in some parts, the analysis covers the time span between 2015 and 2021, due to lack of data). According to the hypothesis: The phenomenon of terrorism in Russia is closely related to the activities of jihadist organizations, and groups with a different profile pose a marginal threat. Quantitative analysis of the attacks conducted in the analyzed period will enable the verification of the hypothesis and determine the prospects for the development of this aspect.

Nasheeds outpace the era of Internet and Youtube. Jihadist poetry in the Islamist hymns can be seen as an extension of the 19th-century anticolonial style of poetry called qaseeda. Presented article shows that nasheeds were not always a significant element in the jihadi culture. The increase of their role was observed quite recently, after the outbreak of the "Arab Spring". This article is a case study. It attempts to fill a gap in research on the IS's propaganda materials. The major objective of this article is to investigate the phenomenon of jihadist naseeds, including their role in the 'jihadi culture'. The author seeks to answer to the question whether the presented facts may indicate the increase in their role occurred with the transfer of IS' activities to cyberspace and whether it will be intensified in the future. The article takes into account historical conditions, briefly describing the genesis of the naseeds and their proliferation after the events of the "Arab Spring". Then, using systemic analysis, the author presents their role in the activities of the Islamic State. In addition, theoretical and empirical research methods, such as: scientific literature analysis, case analysis, content analysis, classification, generalization were taken to solve the research problem.

In 2019, terrorism-related deaths decreased for the fifth consecutive year (by 15.5 %). However, the decline in the number of victims does not mean that there are no new, disturbing trends in the international system. Though, it is not easy to grasp the phenomenon of terrorism in the regions where asymmetric security threats coexist. Often, local armed conflicts and violence interlock terrorist actions. The following article has the form of a comparative study. The research goal is to identify trends taking place in the international and regional space related to the phenomenon of terrorism in years 2015-2022. The objects of research are the states most impacted by terrorism and selected states of the regional security complexes perceived as systems. Research has shown that the phenomenon of terrorism in the years 2015-2022 was associated with instability and conflict.

The post-Soviet states are also known as the former Soviet Republics (FSR). With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Moscow lost almost a quarter of its territory and nearly 150,000,000 people. As a result of this process, 15 sovereign states emerged or reemerged. The post-Soviet states are very diverse in terms of culture, economy, and politics. Moreover, the phenomenon of terrorism varies in the indicated area. The research goal of this study is to identify trends related to terrorism taking place in the post-Soviet space in the years 2014-2020 (in some cases, the analysis covers the years 2015-2019, due to data availability). The research area covers the former Soviet republics, which are further divided by the author into four subregions (Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and Baltic states) that are linked by cultural and geopolitical factors. Therefore, the research object covers 15 states and 4 subregions.

This chapter presents how important place the energy resources occupy in the policy of the Russian Federation. Many countries, including Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia strongly feel the Russian "petro-force", based on taking advantage of oil and gas as a tool of foreign policy. That power is founded on the superiority of the Russian economy and its dominant position in the region. In recent years, Russia is using its energy potential. Openly rewards allies and punishes enemies, carefully using a variety of tactics, from threats or prices increase to absolute embargoes, that cause loss to the Moscow's opponents, both in terms of economic and increased political instability. Kremlin's energy policy is a threat to all countries that import Russian oil and gas, especially in the case of small, poor, dependent states, which Russia considers to be near abroad (ближнее зарубежье) the former Soviet republics. However, the Russian authorities use their influence not only to reward friends and punish enemies, trying to regain its influence over the region. Also express the ambitions of regaining power, because the impact of the Kremlin goes far beyond the direct neighbors. ; Publikacja recenzowana ; Niniejszy artykuł ukazuje, jak istotne miejsce zajmują surowce energetyczne w polityce Federacji Rosyjskiej. Wiele państw, w tym Ukraina, Białoruś czy Gruzja, silnie odczuwają rosyjską "petro-siłę", opartą na wykorzystywaniu zasobów ropy naftowej i gazu jako narzędzia polityki zagranicznej. Potęga ta bazuje na przewadze rosyjskiej gospodarki i jej dominującej pozycji w regionie. W ostatnich latach Rosja wykorzystuje swój potencjał energetyczny. Otwarcie wynagradza sprzymierzeńców i karze wrogów, starannie wykorzystując różnorodne taktyki, od gróźb czy podniesienia cen do bezwarunkowych embarg, które wywołują straty u przeciwników Moskwy, zarówno pod względem ekonomicznym jak i zwiększonej niestabilności politycznej. Polityka energetyczna Kremla jest zagrożeniem dla wszystkich państw, które importują rosyjską ropę naftową i gaz, szczególnie w przypadku państw małych, biednych, zależnych, które Rosja uznaje za bliską zagranicę (ближнее зарубежье), tj. byłe republiki radzieckie. Jednakże rosyjskie władze wykorzystują swoje wpływy nie tylko, by nagradzać przyjaciół i karać wrogów, starając się odzyskać swoje wpływy nad regionem. Wyrażają również ambicje odzyskania potęgi, ponieważ wpływ działań Kremla wykracza daleko poza bezpośrednich sąsiadów.

During the Cold War constructing nuclear weapons was extremely expensive, which limited the possibility of having it, only to the world's economic powers. The first owners of the destructive, nuclear technology was: United States and Soviet Union. In the meantime of the US-Soviet nuclear technology race, the role of other countries continued to grow. In this second category race, initially, at the forefront was United Kingdom. This situation changed, when China and France joined the race. In subsequent years, the nuclear club expanded by Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa and the nuclear weapons stockpile continued to grow, exceeding a level of more than 65,000 in 1986. It is said that nuclear potential saved global community from the U.S. and the Soviet Union using it against each other, instead triggering a substitute wars, in third world countries. However, declarative support for various nonproliferation initiatives, as it took place in the years 1945-1991, often do not have the impact on the reduction of the real threats of proliferation and usage of weapons of mass destruction. No doubt the nuclear potential developed by Islamic Republic of Iran, or Kim Jong-un's aspirations that are posing a threat to international security ; Podczas zimnej wojny skonstruowanie broni nuklearnej było bardzo kosztowne, co ograniczało możliwość jej posiadania tylko do potęg gospodarczych. Pierwszymi dysponentami destrukcyjnej technologii jądrowej były Stany Zjednoczone i ZSRR. Pomimo tego, w międzyczasie amerykańsko-radzieckiego wyścigu technologii jądrowej, rola innych krajów wciąż rosła. W tym wyścigu drugiej kategorii, początkowo, na czele stała Wielka Brytania. Sytuacja ta zmieniła się, gdy do wyścigu włączył się Pekin oraz Francja. W kolejnych latach do klub atomowego dołączyły: Izrael, Indie, Pakistan i RPA, a zasoby nuklearne wciąż rosły, by w 1986 roku przekroczyć poziom 65 tys. głowic. Mówi się, że to potencjał jądrowy uchronił jednak przed wzajemnym atakiem USA i Związek Radziecki, wywołując jednak wojny zastępcze, w państwach trzecich