Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In this article, I review debates about relations between police chiefs and their governing authorities in Ontario over the last 70 years, beginning with the enactment of the Ontario Police Act in 1946, through its replacement by the Ontario Police Services Act in 1990, to the enactment of a new Police Services Act in 2018. I discuss how the respective roles and responsibilities of municipal and regional police chiefs and their police governing authorities, and the relationships between them, have evolved and changed over this period. I also discuss comparable developments in the relations between commissioners of the Ontario Provincial Police and provincial ministers responsible for policing in the province during the same period. The arguments and justifications that have been advanced for these developments by politicians, commissions of inquiry, police scholars, and representative bodies of police chiefs and police governing authorities, as well as in key court decisions, are reviewed, and their implications for the concept of 'police independence' are discussed. I conclude that although that concept has been the subject of much critique during these years, it so far remains intact as the key principle underlying police governance and accountability in Ontario.

RésuméDans la grande majorité des cas, la discrétion suscite peu de contestations et évoque peu de controverses lorsqu'elle est exercée convenablement dans les enquêtes ou les poursuites. Dans un petit nombre de cas notoires, par contre, les décisions discrétionnaires deviennent très controversées et le sujet de débats médiatiques animés, intenses et politiques. Cet article se penche sur ce type de cas relativement rare. Deux questions importantes sont typiquement au cœur des débats et des controverses. Quels sont les besoins de «l'intérêt public» dans ces cas? Qui, par la suite, devrait avoir le dernier mot dans la définition des besoins de l'intérêt public? La première question révèle typiquement une divergence d'opinions sur comment les différentes considérations de l'intérêt public devraient être appliquées. La deuxième question va au cœur même du concept de «l'indépendance», concept sensé représenter, au moment de prendre des décisions, les attributs essentiels fondamentaux et constitutionnels de la police et des procureurs. Dans cet article, l'auteur se penche non pas sur les décisions discrétionnaires en tant que telles, mais plutôt sur «l'économie politique» de la discrétion judiciaire, en portant une attention particulière sur les cas controversés et publics qui suscitent un questionnement important à propos des considérations de «l'intérêt public». Plus particulièrement, cet article examine qui est capable et qui devrait être capable d'exercer l'ultime autorité discrétionnaire dans de tels cas. L'auteur cherche non seulement à comprendre pourquoi cette distribution du pouvoir existe ainsi mais aussi ce qu'une telle distribution implique pour le concept prédominant de «l'indépendance» dans le contexte des poursuites. L'auteur se penche sur quatre cas controversés récents, dans le Royaume Uni et en Afrique du Sud, afin d'illustrer les différentes façons que ces questions ont été traitées ainsi que les controverses qui, subséquemment, ont eut lieu.

The modern public prosecutor is a figure both powerful and enigmatic. Legal scholars and criminologists often identify "three essential components" of criminal justice systems: police, courts and corrections. Yet increasingly, the public prosecutor occupies a distinct role independent from any of these branches. Acting outside of the court, and therefore largely out of the public eye, the prosecutor's control over whether and what charges proceed to court can limit judicial discretion on sentencing, open pathways to alternative measures and even deny entry into the criminal justice system entirely. In this sense the prosecutor serves as a true "gatekeeper" to the criminal process.This book addresses key aspects of the evolving role of domestic and international prosecutors in common law and civil law systems in the twenty-first century, and the challenges posed by this evolution. This collection of chapters from respected scholars takes an international, comparative approach and explores how these different legal systems have borrowed theorisations and articulations of the prosecutorial role from each other in adapting the office to changing conditions and expectations. The volume is structured around four main themes relating to the role of the modern prosecutor: the nature of the prosecutor's office, the role of the prosecutor in investigations, prosecutorial discretion and how it is exercised, and politicisation and accountability of prosecutors.This book is essential for scholars and students in criminal justice, pre-law/legal studies, criminology, justice studies and political science, and is useful as a resource for those interested in legal change around the world.

This article analyses the majority and minority positions in the Constitutional Court's Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others decision. It will identify the main differences in approach to the issue of the political 'independence' of an investigative agency such as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks), and its predecessor, the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions). The article assesses what 'room for manoeuvre' in terms of possible legislation the majority judgment leaves to the South African parliament. The Court's approach and these apparent requirements are compared with current provisions for political 'independence' of anti-corruption agencies in Australia and Indonesia, raising, in particular, an assessment of the arguments for and against (a) the need for an anti-corruption investigative agency to be separate from the 'regular' police and prosecution service; and (b) the proposition that an anti-corruption investigative agency requires a higher level of political independence than the 'regular' police service(s). It also looks at issues of cost and effectiveness in establishing and maintaining dedicated independent anti-corruption agencies.