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'Israeli Strategy After Desert Storm: Lessons of the Second Gulf War,' by Aharon Levran, is reviewed.

This thesis analyses the quality and nature of the thinking which has shaped the application of air power by the RAAF from its beginnings in 1921 to the present. Evidence and conclusions have been drawn largely from official records held in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, supplemented by secondary sources and interviews. The absence of a consolidated, formal record of the RAAF's fundamental beliefs for most of the period reviewed has made it necessary to examine not only ideas and strategies, but also such indicators of doctrine as force structure, roles, organisation, command and control and education. While the thesis covers a relatively long period, and a large number and wide variety of events, its unifying theme is that of attitudes and ideas. The thesis concludes that for most of its existence the RAAF has been an intellectually dependent organisation. While the Air Force has generally excelled at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, its strategic and political thinking has often been deficient. There is clear evidence that the RAAF's leaders have often failed to develop adequate strategic concepts for their Service. In particular, many have not appreciated the political significance of doctrine. There seems to have been a belief that the ability to fly an aeroplane brings with it an intuitive understanding of air power in its fullest sense. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. The reluctance of the Air Force's leadership to articulate a formal, Australian doctrine has both inhibited the full exploitation of air power in support of national security, and created something of a continuing identity crisis within the ranks of the RAAF. In the last 15 years, however, the Air Force has done more to place its activities on a sound conceptual basis than it did in the preceding 55 years. The development of the RAAF's first officially endorsed concept of operations in the 1970s and the publication of an air power manual in 1990 were landmarks in Air Force thinking. Those ...

Making Sense of War provides a comprehensive and clear analysis of the complex business of waging war. It gives readers a thorough understanding of the key concepts in strategic thought, concepts that have endured since the Athenian general Thucydides and the Chinese philosopher/warrior Sun Tzu first wrote about strategy some 2500 years ago. It also examines the influence on strategic choice and military strategy of political, legal and technological change. This book discusses strategy at every level of competition, employing a thematic approach and using historical examples from 500 BCE to the present. It discusses the contraints and opportunities facing military commanders in the 21st century, and demonstrates that the formulation of military strategy will continue to be perhaps the single most important responsibility for senior security officials. Making Sense of War offers original insights into the imperatives of military success in the era of asymmetric warfare