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Working paper
Interest groups, public choice and the economics of religion
In: Public choice, Volume 142, Issue 3, p. 429-437
ISSN: 0048-5829
Comment on Tollison's contributions to economic history and the history of economic thought
In: Public choice, Volume 142, Issue 3-4, p. 481-483
ISSN: 1573-7101
RESISTING TEMPTATION: US Debates Resumption of Nuclear Testing
In: Harvard international review, Volume 16, Issue 4, p. 62-65
ISSN: 0739-1854
The Paradox of Value: A Suggested Interpretation
In: History of political economy, Volume 4, Issue 1, p. 127-139
ISSN: 1527-1919
A Note on Simon Patten's Contribution to the Concept of Consumer's Surplus
In: Journal of political economy, Volume 77, Issue 2, p. 242-244
ISSN: 1537-534X
Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing Trap : Implications for Reform Strategy
Corruption is widely believed to be a self-reinforcing phenomenon, in the sense that the incentive to engage in corrupt acts increases as corruption becomes more widespread. Some argue that corruption's self-reinforcing property necessarily implies that incremental anticorruption reforms cannot be effective, and that the only way to escape a high-corruption equilibrium "trap" is through a so-called "big bang" or "big push." However, corruption's self-reinforcing property does not logically entail the necessity of a big bang approach to reform. Indeed, corruption's self-reinforcing property may strengthen the case for pursuing sustained, cumulative incremental reforms. While there may be other reasons to prefer a big bang approach to an incremental approach, this conclusion cannot be grounded solely or primarily on corruption's self-reinforcing character.
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The Incompatibility of Substantive Canons and Textualism
In: 137 Harv. L. Rev. 515 (2023)
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The Anti-democratic Major Questions Doctrine
In: The Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming
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The Untapped Potential of the Congressional Review Act
In: Harvard Journal on Legislation, Forthcoming
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Working paper
The Distributional Effects of Minority-Protective Judicial Review
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
Judicial Review and Democratic Failure
In: Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-47
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Working paper
Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes
This article contributes to the development of a positive theory of the interaction between institutional checks and balances and public accountability. In particular, the authors are interested in how various institutional separation-of-powers rules affect voter behavior, and in how these rational voter responses may affect our positive and normative assessment of different separation-of-powers regimes. The authors compare three stylized institutional arrangements: The first is a "Unilateral Authority". The second regime is a "Mandatory Checks and Balances" regime. The third and final regime they consider is an "Opt-In Checks and Balances" system. These are obviously only three of a much larger number of possible institutional arrangements, but their simple structure is useful in generating comparative insights that might then be transposed to more complex and realistic institutional settings.
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Search for common ground: Breaking the Sino-U.S. non-proliferation stalemate
In: Arms control today, Volume 26, Issue 7, p. 15-20
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online